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Abstract 
This thesis defines a system which solves problems stated in the predicate 
calculus, combining the techniques of expert systems and theorem proving. Expert 
systems gain much of their advantages by a) being able to explain their actions in 
terms a user can understand; b) allow easy debugging of the input knowledge by 
associating each step with input given by the user; and c) being able to use domain 
specific heuristics. These advantages are gained by reasoning without destroying the 
user input structure. Expert systems, however , use restricted languages which do 
not have the expressive power of the predicate calculus. On the other hand , while 
theorem proving systems have the expressiveness of formal logic, the combined 
effects of their internal representation and inference rules, they produce proofs that 
are usually hard to follow . 
CES is a family of complete problem solvers for the first order predicate 
calculus with a common semantic base. The members work with the input form of 
the wffs, offering the advantages of both expert systems and theorem provers. CES 
provides a unifying framework for such diverse methods as expert systems, linear 
resolution, connection graph proof procedures and Nilsson[79]'s production system 
for logical deduction. CES is expanded to use default logic and is applied to state 
change problem solving. Implementations can be derived by adding an appropriate 
control structure to the logical component of CES. CES is given a firm logical base 
with correctness and completeness proofs for an axiomatic description of its logical 
component. A proof of correctness of an algorithm derived from that description is 
also given , together with an actual implementation based on that description. 
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Chapter 1 
· Introduction 
This thesis describes a family of problem solving systems called "CES" that 
combine theorem proving and expert systems into one coherent framework . 
1.1 Historical Context 
Problem solving systems over the last decade and a half may be briefly 
characterised as follows: 
1.1.1 Theorem Proving 
Following Robinson[65]'s historic paper on resolution, systems for logical 
deduction, commonly called theorem provers became very popular. (For overviews 
of this area sec Chang and Lee[73] ; Kowalski[79]; Loveland[78] ; Nilsson[71,80] .) 
These had the advantage of a natural, precise, concise, modular language with clear 
semantics that has a long history and is well understood, namely predicate calculus. 
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There were many practical implementations, for example QA3 (Green[69I), but 
these suffered severely from a combinatorial explosion when the number of facts 
were increased. 
Many attempts were made to make these more efficient, for example Model 
Elimination (Loveland[70], Luckham[70]), semantic resolution (Slagle[67]) , and lock 
resolution (Boyer[71]). All of these prune the search by adding syntactic constraints , 
and although they were much better than straight binary resolution, they still suffer 
from combinatorial explosion. 
A later refinement of resolution was the connection graph proof procedures 
(Kowalski[75], Sickel[76], Andrews[76 ,81], Chang and Slagle[79]) . The unifying 
concept in these systems is the connection graph, a data structure for maintaining 
paired complementary literals. In each of these systems computing the most general 
unifier for each pair of complementary input li t erals is done once. During the 
deduction stage there is no searching for complementary literals, with unifying 
compositions used to combine the substitutions. Each of these systems uses the 
graph in a: different wa.y: Kowalski to perform resolution ; Sickel for graph walking; 
Andrews for searching for acceptable matings; and Chang and Slagle for finding 
rewriting rules. 
These problem solvers were, in general, obscure in that they could not explain 
their reasoning in terms that the users could easily understand. As such it was 
difficult to debug the users' input, and to justify the answers given were correct. 
Most of them had to have their knowledge in quantifier-free conjunctive normal 
form ( clause form) , which meant either multiplying out sub terms and making the 
forms used a long way from the users input, or forcing the user into expressing all 
knowledge in the more constrained clause form. 
They were inefficient when confronted with a large number of facts. The 
syntactic restrictions on the uniform proof procedures cut down the search , but the 
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semantic constraints that people seem to use to limit the search were not able to be 
incorporated into these problem solvers. 
The predicate logic has also been used as a programming language 
(Kowalski[7 41). This manifests itself in the language Prolog (Warren and 
. 
Pereira[77I) which is used much more like programming languages, such as Lisp, as 
it has explicit control and evaluates expressions rather than using an inference rule. 
The ordering of the rules and the literals within rules, together with the use of cut 
and fail allow the user to manipulate the control within the problem solver, making 
it closely related to the work on procedural knowledge. 
1.1.2 Procedural Knowledge 
During the same period there was another camp of researchers, very critical 
of the logical approach who were advocating pattern directed inference with 
knowledge being intrinsically tied to the way it is to be used. Thus for each piece of 
knowledge added to the system the user specifies how it is to be used. This 
procedura} representation of knowledge was used in such systems as Planner 
(Hewitt[72]), implemented as Micro-Planner (Sussman and Winograd[70]); Conniver 
(McDermott and Sussman[72]); QA4 (Rulifson et.al.[72]); Popler (Davies[72]) and 
later Amo rd ( de Kleer et.al. [77, 78]). These system allowed the addition of domain 
specific heuristics at the cost of a loss of modularity, in that each piece of 
knowledge is explicitly tied to other knowledge to be used for related tasks. In 
explicitly specifying control to limit the combinatorial explosions for large domains, 
the interdependencies become so large that the system becomes difficult to debug, 
prove correct and update without rewriting. There is no notion of an interpretation 
of the knowledge being added to the system, so that the knowledge cannot be 
checked locally to see if it fits in with the world being modelled. Each knowledge 
fragment has a meaning only within the global context. Thus when the system 
becomes large the meaning of any knowledge fragment becomes opaque. 
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1.1.3 Production Systems 
During the 1970's another programming methodology, production systems, 
became fashionable (see Davis and King[77], Waterman and Hayes-Roth[78]). 
Production systems consist of sets of condition-action pairs known as production 
rules; a data base on which they act; and a production interpreter which uses some 
conflict resolution strategy to determine which rule, of those whose condition holds , 
fires at any time. A rule can only fire if its condition holds in the data base. Firing 
consists of updating the data base in the manner specified by the action of the rule. 
Production systems were originally designed for cognitive simulation (Newell[73]) , 
but have been used for many other domains (Rychener[76]) . 
Although they have the advantage of modular rules, the semantics of a 
particular rule is usually dependent on context. The global control flow often needs 
to be directed , but is usually difficult to d · rect to a useful purpose. Much 
modularity is lost by trying to add control structures for specific purposes 
(Poole[80]). Such attempts have either been very contrived syntactic strategies for 
conflict resolution (McDermott and Forgy[78]) , or very theoretic for procedural 
control in production systems (Georgeff[82]). General production systems differ 
from logical implication by allowing rules to remove things from the data base. The 
most successful of the systems that could be described as production systems {Davis 
et.al.[77]) do however have rules that represent implication (without the 
contrapositive). 
1. 1.4 Expef'i Systems 
Expert systems are large knowledge based systems designed to match human 
expertise in some limited domain. For example mass spectrometry in Dendral 
(Buchanan et.al.[71,721) , medical diagnosis in Mycin (Shortliffe[76], Davis et.al.[771) , 
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minerals exploration in Prospector (Duda et.al.[781). There are also a number of 
expert system building systems, for example Emycin (van Melle[80]), Age (Nii and 
Aiello[79]), Rosie (Fain et.al.[81], Hayes-Roth et.al.[811). 
In general the deductive part of such expert systems may be characterised as 
follows: 
a) simple rule base input. This is usually of the form of a production rule with a 
premise and an action, with the premise a conjunction of clauses. These are used by 
backward chaining, forming an and/or search tree. An exhaustive search can often 
be carried out, and is in some cases (Davis et.al.[771). Sometimes subgoals are solved 
by asking the user. User responses are equivalent to extra facts in the database. 
b) All reasoning is done in terms of the input knowledge. This allows: 
i) explanation of the behavior of the system in terms of the knowledge given by the 
user, so it is in terms that the user can understand. 
ii) debugging is made much easier as each step can be attributed directly to 
knowledg~ that the user has put in. The local effect of adding or removing a piece 
of knowledge can be easily seen at each step. 
iii) the addition of domain specific meta-knowledge ( eg meta rules of Teiresias 
(Davis[80])) is enhanced by allowing meta rules to specify input rules, and be used 
directly on the internal form of the rules. 
c) A certainty factor is often associated with each rule and assertion, the search 
being pruned if the cumulated certainty factors do not meet some threshold. 
1. 1.5 Controlling the Search 
Each of the above problem solving methodologies provides a mechanism for 
searching for ~t solution to a problem. How to efficiently search the space, and so to 
find a solution in a reasonable time remains as a problem in all of these systems. 
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Blind searching is not adequate to solve the type of problems that are being 
expected of problem solving systems. 
Many of these systems provide syntactic methods for constraining the search, 
for example the refinements of resolution, and the conflict resolution strategies of 
production systems. There is the need to be able to add the domain specific 
semantic control knowledge that humans use to solve problems. This has been done 
in procedural systems by allowing each goal to explicitly mention the applicable 
rules (Hewitt[72]), by allowing the system to have explicit access to the list of 
choices at any point (McDermott and Sussman[72]), or by having subgoals as 
explicit objects to manipulate {de Kleer et.al.[77,781). These in many cases force the 
user to specify how any piece of knowledge is to be used, and so to anticipate every 
use for a knowledge fragment. Thus modularity and generality of all knowledge is 
reduced, making the system more difficult to use. 
In an attempt to have explicit contra~ statements, but to still retain 
modularity, the meta-rules of Teiresias (Davis[80]) were developed. The::;e are rules 
which allow the conflict set to be pruned and reordered. They are in the same form 
as the domain rules and act directly on the search tree of the input rules. The 
choice protocol of NASL (McDermott[77]) allows rules to rule-in , rule-out and 
rule-together options when there is a choice to be made. The procedurai control of 
production systems (Georgeff[82]) provides a formal basis for adding explicit control 
to production systems. The proof checker FOL (Weyhrauch[80]) also provides a 
metatheory to describe the object level system, but for different reasons than 
controlling the seach. 
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1.2 The Lessons from History 
To be a good problem solver, a problem solver must excel at both being 
efficient for the machine, and in communicating with the user. 
The most successful systems for the human interface situation are those that 
are very modular; where each piece of knowledge can be understood and seen to be 
correct in its own right; where the addition of new knowledge is easy; and where 
the computer can explain to users, in their terms, how it derived the answer for 
both debugging the combined knowledge and for gaining the confidence of the user. 
To be efficient for the machine much expertise needs to be brought to bear to 
minimise the redundant searching. It has been found that syntactic restrictions of 
the search space are not adequate for reducing the combinatorial explosion found in 
the problems to be solved. Humans seem to be able to use domain specific 
meta-knowledge to reduce the search much more than can be obtained by purely 
syntactic methods. A good problem solver must be able to incorporate and use such 
knowledge if it is to reach a high level of performance. 
1.3 Design Goals 
Firstly what is required is a language in which to state the knowledge about 
the world and the problem to be solved . This should be a precise language with well 
defined and understood semantics so that input to the system can be verified . In 
this language objects, properties of the objects, and interrelationships between the 
properties need to be able to be specified. The language must be a hie to ref er to 
parameterised individuals; the conjunction and negation of statements; the fact that 
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one statement is a consequence of another and the existence of an object with 
certain properties. Thus the language must at least contain the first order 
predicate calculus. Hayes[77] asserts that "Modern formal logic is the most 
successful precise language ever developed to express human thought and 
inference." The first order predicate calculus is, however, not entirely satisfactory 
as it does not, for example, allow the expression on uncertainties and defaults (for 
example "assume a bird can fly unless it is proven otherwise."), but it seems to be 
the only contender as a language with a well understood formal basis, and can act 
as a basis for more expressive languages. 
The problem solver itself must be able to adequately use the language to solve 
problems. The power of the problem solver must be well understood, so that if it is 
reasonable that a solution be found then a solution should be found. Thus for the 
first order predicate calculus the problem solver must be complete, so that if the 
problem solver announces there is no solution then a more powerful problem solver 
does not need to be brought in to solve tne problem. The problem solver should be 
able to sacrifice completeness for efficiency if it is deemed necessary at any time. 
The problem solver must have a good user interface. It should accept the full 
predicate calculus and not force the users to express their knowledge, for example, 
in the more constrained clause form, or in the form of the operators and reducers of 
Nilsson[79]. 
The problem solver must be able to explain its reasoning and justify its 
answers in terms that the user can understand. This is both to gain the confidence 
of the user in knowing that reasonable information has been used , and in debugging 
the knowledge base. The explanation of the actual reasoning is needed to isolate 
misinformation and missing information . To do this satisfactorily there must be an 
isomorphism from the internal form of the knowledge to the external (input) form 
of the knowledge . By virtue of this isomorphism such a problem solver may be 
defined in terms of a problem solver that uses the input form of the knowledge and 
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does not destroy that form during processing. Such a problem solver is called an 
input form problem solver. 
The set of tractable problems for the problem solver must include those 
problems that people easily solve. To do this it must be able to incorporate the 
domain specific heuristics and strategies that people use to solve problems. These 
are often general rules about when it is appropriate to use a piece of knowledge. To 
use such meta-knowledge, arbitrary statements about the input form of the 
knowledge must be able to mapped into equivalent statements about the internal 
form of the knowledge. This also implies the need for an input form problem solver. 
For modularity , to enable input to be proven correct, and to enable the 
problem solver to use the most appropriate control structures to solve a problem, 
the knowledge for any domain and the meta-knowledge about how to use that 
knowledge should be kept separate (Kowalski[79b], Georgeff[82]). This should apply 
to the problem solver itself where there should be a clear separation between the 
logic and the control of the p:rnblem solver. The problem solver should be modular, 
able to be. expanded to more expressive languages ( eg to iri<!_ude defaults, and state 
changes), and should be proven correct. 
In summary, what is required is a complete, natural, input form problem 
solver for the predicate calculus. 
1.4 Overview of the System 
CES is a family of input form problem solvers with a common logical base. 
Within each problem solver there is a clear separation of logic and control. The 
lo~ic component is given as a set of axioms defining a relation representing 
implication. The logical basis is first given for the propositional calculus which is 
then expanded to the predicate calculus, which is in turn extended to cover default 
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logic. The outline of how it can be extended to domains with state changes is also 
given . Thus there is a hierarchy of more powerful problem solvers each an extension 
of the one below. Different implementations of CES can be obtained by changing 
the control component. An implementation of CES is presented which has been 
used as a basis for an expert system on student enrolment. 
CES is based mainly on Nilsson[79]'s production system for automatic 
deduction, the Model Elimination proof procedure, connection graph proof 
procedures, and expert systems. 
It is similar to Nilsson's system in propagating a relation between wffs, in 
CES's case between input wffs rather than between a fact tree and a goal tree. The 
relation here is also called CANCEL in recognition of its historical roots. In the 
backward chaining form higher level subgoals are carried around much like boxed 
literals in Model Elimination. A connection graph of the knowledge base and the 
problem to be solved is built up so that there is no searching for matching atoms 
and no unifying is done during processing. Unifying compositions are carried out 
during the deduction phase. As with expert systems, all of the reasoning is done 
in terms of the input, to enable the system to explain its reasoning and justify its 
results. 
This thesis does not explore the the problem of how to incorporate meta-level 
control knowledge into computer problem solvers to enable them to find solutions 
as efficiently as a human can. This thesis goes some way towards solving it by 
defining input form problem solvers, with clear separation of logic and control , 
which should form a firm basis on which this problem can be tackled. 
1.4.1 An Example 
This example shows the sort of reasoning done by CES. Consider the 
following facts from a hypothetical expert system on students and courses: 
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1. A student is slack or attends the courses they should 
2. Slack students go and see their tutor 
3. Tutors only see students who attend lectures 
4. Students should attend courses for the year in which they are enrolled 
5. Bruce is enrolled in 3rd year 
6. CS3 is a third year course 
The goal is to prove that Bruce attends lectures. Consider the following 
reasonmg: 
1. If a student is slack then they go and see their tutor {fact 2) 
2. If a student is slack they must attend lectures - follows from step 1 and fac t 3. 
3. Bruce is enrolled in year 3, and CS3 is a third year subject so Bruce should 
attend CS3. 
4. If Bruce attends the courses he should then he attends CS3. 
5. So by steps 2 and 4, and fact 1, which ever one occurs he attends lectures. 
This solve_s the problem. 
Notice that in this explanation the if-then relations follow from previous steps 
and uses of the logical connectives. There are rules for generating new steps which 
operate on the logical connectives and previous steps to propagate the relation until 
the goal is proven . In this thesis these rules are specified in the first order predicate 
calculus, and are shown to be correct. 
1.5 Overview of the Thesis 
In Chapter 2 the logical basis for CES for the propositional calculus is given. 
In Chapter 3 this is extended to the full predicate calculus. Chapter 4 describes the 
design of a control component for a particular implementation of CES derived from 
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the axioms in chapter 3. CES is extended to include default reasoning in Chapter 5, 
and it is shown how it can be extended to a problem solver for state change 
problems in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides a conclusion and an overview of the 
thesis. 
Appendix A gives some mathematical results , mainly to do with substitutions. 
Although most are not new results they have not been collected together before, 
and are needed for other proofs. Appendix B proves the identical subgoal deletion 
theorem, and proves some lemmas for the proof of completeness of the problem 
solver in appendix C. Appendix D shows the output from a particular 
implementation of CES which is used as an expert system on student enrolment. 
Appendix E gives a list of the variants of the axioms that are presented in the 
thesis. 
Chapter 2 
The Logical Basis for Propositional CES 
2.1 Overview 
In this chapter the formal specification of the logical component of a family of 
problem solvers for the propositional calculus is given. This is a base from which 
more powerful problem solve1·s have been designed (Chapters 3,5,6) , and from 
which practical implementations have been obtained (Chapter 4) . The base is 
specified by axioms for a relation, "CANCEL", representing reasoning of the form 
"If a holds then /3 holds", where a and /3 are signed input that the user has given 
the problem solver. CES is a family of problem solvers based on these axioms. 
It is envisioned that practical problem solvers would be derived, not from 
interpreting the CES axioms directly (thus having two levels of interpretation) , but 
rather by compiling them into an efficient problem solver , either by hand or by 
some automatic programming technique. The specification of CES by axioms allows 
the logical component to be proven correct and complete, as well as forming a 
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common semantic base for many different problem solvers. 
This chapter contains definitions of input wffs, the syntax and semantics of 
CANCEL, the axiomatisation of the relation, together with a examples of bow the 
axioms can be used. A syntactic method of pruning the search is also given. 
2.2 The Propositional Calculus 
The normal definitions of the propositional calculus are used . Here is a brief 
review. 
In the propositional calculus there are two types of symbols: atoms, and 
logical connectives {and, or, ~, not). 
Definition: A well formed formula (wff) for the propositional calculus 
can be defined as follows: 
l . An atom is a wff. 
2. If w is a wff then (not w) is a wff (representing the negation of w). 
3. If u and w are wffs, then (u and w), (u or w) and (u ~ w) are wffs (representing 
conjunction, disjunction and implication respectively) . 
Often wffs are written without the parentheses, in which case the normal 
precedence of logical connectives bolds (i.e. not, and, or, implication), with same 
logical connectives being rigb t associative. 
Definition: There is a finite set of distinguished wffs called facts. These are 
wffs that are input by the user of the system. 
Definition: Input wffs are defined as follows : 
Facts are input wffs; 
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If w is an input wff then 
If w is of the form (not u) then u is an input wff; 
If w is of the form (u and v), (u or v) or (u :::::} v) then u and v are both input 
wffs. That is they are all the wffs in the parse of the fact. 
For example if ((A:::::} not B) and (C and D :::::} not B)) is a fact then the following 
are input wffs: A; the first occurence of B; the first (not B); (A :::::} not B); C; D; (C 
and D); the second B; the second (not B); (C and D :::::} not B) and ((A:::::} not B) and 
(C and D :::::} not B)) 
Definition: Two input wffs are the same if t hey are the same instance (same 
location in the parse t ree). 
By the definition of well formed formulae , there is an isomorphism between 
inpu t wffs and the instances of the atoms and logical connectives used in the fact . 
Thus thus the terms "wff of a connective" and "connective of a wff" may be used 
unambiguously by virtue of this isomorphism. 
CES is given a set of facts (implicitly conjoined), and a goal and must prove 
that the goal is a logical consequence of the facts. 
Assume, without loss of generality that there is only one goal, namely the 
atom "success". If g is a sufficient goal (i.e. it is sufficient to prove g to solve the 
prob lem) , then "(g:::::} success)" is conjoined to the facts . Thus the aim of the 
prob lem solver is to prove success is a logical consequence of the facts. This does 
not reduce the power of the system, but allows for the homogeneous description of 
facts and goals, and the separate spec ification of disjunctive goals. 
To prove that success is a logical consequence of the facts, a relation between 
inpu t wffs, based on the CANCEL relation of ilsson[79] is defin ed. A.,x ioms for the 
CA CEL relation, and semant ics of the relation to be modelled will be given in this 
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chapter for the propositional calculus, and will be expanded to the predicate 
calculus in the next chapter. 
2.3 Preliminary definitions 
In this section some definitions that will be needed for the formal description 
of the problem solver are given. 
Definition: a sign is an element of {p,n} . Informally "p" will be taken to be 
the positive sign , and "n" the negative sign . 
Define the function ,...__, on signs by: 
Definition: A signed wff is a pair <s,w> wheres is a sign and w is an 
input wff . . 
Definition: If S=<s,w> is a signed wff then the value S* of Sis the value 
of (IF s="p" THEN w ELSE (not w)). 
Lemma 2.1: If <s,w> is a signed wff, then 
(not <s,w>*) = <,...__,s,w>* 
Proof: 
Consider the case of s= "p". In this case 
(not <s,w>*) = (not w) = <n,w>* = <,...__,s,w>* 
The other case is if s= "n". In this case 
(not <s,w>*) = (not (not w)) = w = <p,w>* = <,...__,s,w>* 
Q.E.D. 
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2.4 The Propositional CANCEL Relation 
In this section the CANCEL relation between input wffs in the propositional 
calculus is defined. 
The relation is based on the CANCEL relation of Nilsson[79], and is called 
CANCEL in recognition of its derivation. CANCEL represents implication between 
pairs of signed input wffs in the propositional calculus. There are two main 
differences to Nilsson 's relation for the propositional logic. The first is that the signs 
of the wffs are incorporated into the relation , so that a concise formal 
characterisation of the relation can be given. A simple CANCEL relation 
representing implications, of the sort used by Nilsson[79], is not a powerful enough 
basis for a complete problem solver. To overcome this deficiency "assumption sets" 
are introduced. The revised CANCEL depends on a set of signed wffs (called the 
assumption set) which must hold for the relation to hold. The use of assumption 
sets corresponds to reasoning by cases, and to the use of framed literals in model 
elimination (Loveland[79]) and linear resolution (Chang and Lee[73]). 
The problem solver works by logical deduction on the relation: 
CANCEL(S1, S2, A) 
where S1,S2 are signed wffs; 
A, called the assumption set, is a set of signed wffs. 
CANCEL( S1, S2, A) will be defined to have the following semantics: 
F f-A*/\S1*::::}S2* 
where A* is the conjunction of the S* for SE A. The facts, F will be implicit in 
the rest of the thesis. 
In the following section the relation is axiomatised, and it is proved that the 
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axiomatisation does model the above relation. Completeness of this axiomatisation 
is defined and proved in Appendix C. 
2.5 Axioms for CANCEL in the Propositional Calculus 
1. CANCEL on atoms. 
If x and y are different instances of the same atom then 
a) Equality CANCEL Axiom 
CA CEL( <p,x> , <p,y>, A) 
"If two input atoms have the same form then they CANCEL, no matter what is 
assumed." 
For example, if f 1 = (b =} a) is a fact and f 2 = (a =} c) is a fact , and a 1 
is the "a" in f 1 and a2 is the "a" in f 2 then CANCEL(<p,a 1>, <p,a2> , A} can 
be deduced_. 
Proof of Correctness 
x and y are different instances of the same atom 
then x ::::} y 
so I- A*/\ <p,x>*::::} <p ,y>* for any A 
i.e. CA CEL( <p,x>, <p,y>, A) 
Q.E.D. 
lb) Equality Substitution Axiom 
If CANCEL(S, <s,x>, A) 
th~n CANCEL(S, <s,y >, A) 
11iis is the substitution rule for equality. 
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If atom "a" appears in two different wffs, then if {A*/\ S*) implies one of 
them, then it implies the other one. 
Proof of Correctness 
assume CANCEL(S, < s,x > , A) 
i.e. r A* /\ S* =} <s,x> * 
so, as x = y, <s,x > * = < s,y >* 
so by substitution of equals 
r A*/\ S* =} < s,x > * 
i.e. CANCEL( S, < s,y > , A) 
Q.E.D. 
2. CANCEL for Binary Logical Connective 
If xis of the form (x1 op x2) where op is a binary logical connective in {and , 
or, =}} , then the logical meaning of op can be abstracted as follows: 
with each logical connective, op, associate a triple < opo,OP1 ,OP2> , where each opi 
is a sign , s.uch that 
if x is (x1 op x2) 
then <op0,x> * = < op1,x1> * V <op2,x2 > * 
"or" has triple <p ,p,p> 
"and" has triple < n,n,n > 
"=}" has triple <p ,n,p> 
Proof of correctness of triple definitions: 
If x is (x1 or x2) 
then, by definition of valu e of signed wff: <p,x > * = <p ,x1 > * V <p,x2 > * 
. thus for op="or", opo= "p"; op1= "p"; op2= "p" 
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then (not x) = (not x1) V (not x2) -- De Morgan's Law 
so <n ,x>* = <n,x1>* V <n,x2>* --Defn of value of signed wf f 
thus for op="and", opo="n", op1="n" , op2= "n" 
If x is (x1 =} x2) 
then x = (not x1) V x2 
so <p ,x>* = <n,x1>* V <p,x2>* -- Defn of value of signed wf f 
Q.E.D. 
Using the triple associated with each logical operator, the meanings of the 
binary connectives can be abstracted out to simplify the axioms for CANCEL in the 
following way: 
If xis of the form (x1 op x2) where op is in {and , or, =}} and if op has triple 
<opo , op1, op2 > then 
2a) Upward Disjunction Axiom 
For i E {1 ,2} 
If CANCEL(S, <opi,xi> , A) 
then CANCEL( S, <op0,x>, A) 
This axiom is the normal definition of "or", that is if {A* I\ S*) implies a wff, 
then it implies the disjunction of that w ff with any other w ff. 
Note that it is called "upward" as it is using a relation on a wf f to deduce a 
relation on a superwff of a fact. 
Proof of Correctness 
assume CANCEL( S, <opj,xj>, A) 
then f- A* /\ S* => < opi ,xi > * -- Defn of CANCEL 
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for j E {1,2}, j ~ i, 
<opi,xi> * V <opj,xj>* .. <op0,x>* 
so f- A* /\ S* =} <op0,x > * 
i.e. CANCEL( S, <op0,x > , A) 
Q.E.D. 
2b) Upward Conjunction Axiom 
If CANCEL( S, < ,..___,op1,x1> , A1) 
and CANCEL( S, <,..___,op2 ,x2> , A2) 
then CANCEL( S, < ,..___,op o,x>, A1UA2) 
-- defn of triple 
-- transitivity of =} 
-- defn of CANCEL 
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Th is is the normal definition of "and" , that is if both wffs of a conjunction are 
implied then the conjunction of the wffs is implied. The resulting implication 
depends on the union of the assumptions of the original implications. 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL(S, <,..___,op1,x1> , A1) 
means f- A1* /\ S* =} < ,..___,op1,x1> * 
CANCEL( S, < ,..___,op2,x2 > , A2) 
-- Equation ( 1) 
means f- A2* /\ S* =} < ,..___,op 2,x2>* · -- Equation (2) 
so f- A1* /\ A2* /\ S* =} < ,..___,op1,x1>* /\ < ,..___,op 2,x2> * 
-- from (1) and (2) 
so f- (A1 U A2)* /\ S* =} not ( <op1,x1 > * V <op2,x2 > *) 
so f- (A1 U A2)* /\ S* =} < ,..___,opo ,x>* 
i.e. CANCEL(S, < ,..___,op0,x >, A1 U A2) 
_Q.E.D. 
--De Morgan's Law, Lemma 2.1 
--triple definition, Lemma 2.1 
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2c) Downward Conjunction Axiom 
For i E {1,2} 
if CANCEL( S, < '"'"'op0,x>, AY 
then CANCEL( S, < ,..__,opi,xi > , A) 
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This follows directly from the definition of "and". If {A* I\ S*) implies the 
conjunction of two wf fs then it implies each of the wffs. 
Proof of CorrectnesA 
CANCEL(S, <,..__,op0,x>, A) 
means f- A*/\ S* ::::} < ,..__,op0,x>* 
not < op0,x>* 
= not (<op1,x1> * V <op2,x2> *) --defn of triple 
= < ,..__,op1 ,x1> * /\ < ,..__,op2 ,x2 >* --De Morgan's Law, Lemma 2.1 
::::} < ,..._,opi,xi > * --def n of conj unction 
so f- A* /\ S* ::::} < ,..__,opi,xi > --transitivity of implication 
i.e. CANCEL(S, < ,..__,opi,xi> , A) 
Q.E.D. 
2d) Implication Axiom 
If {i,j} = {1,2} 
and CANCEL(S, <op0,x > , A) 
and CANCEL( S, < ,..__,opi,xi >, Ai) 
then CANCEL(S, <opj ,xj> , Aj) 
where Aj=A U Ai 
This is the normal definition of implication, so that if the disjunction holds, and 
one of the disjuncts does not hold then the other dis junct must hold. Thi s 
depends on the union of the two assumption sets. Note that by abstracting out th e 
defini tion of implica tion, only one rule is needed for implications, contrapositive 
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of implications , "or" s acting as implications and "and" s acting as implications 
using the rules f or transforming wf fs by distributing negations . 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( S, <op0,x> , A) 
means f- A* /\ S* ==} < op0,x > * 
CANCEL( S, < '""'-'OPi,xi > , Ai) 
--Equation (1) 
means f- A/ /\ S* ==} < ,...,_,opi,xi > * --Equation (2) 
so f- A*/\ A//\ S* ==} <op0,x>* /\ < ,...,_,op i,xi>* 
--from (1) and (2) 
< op0,x>* /\ < ,...,_,opi,xi>* 
= (<opi ,xi> * V <opj ,xj> *) /\ < ,...,_,opi,xi>* 
= <opj ,xj>* /\ <,...,_,oPi,xi>* 
==} < opj ,xj>* 
so f- A//\ S* ==} <opj ,xj>* 
i.e. CANCEL{S, <opj ,xj> , Aj) 
Q.E.D. 
3. CANCEL on negations 
If x is of the form (not z) then 
3a) Upward Negation Ax iom 
If CANCEL( S, <s,z>, A) 
then CANCEL( S, <,...,_,s ,x> , A) 
--transitivity of implication 
"If {A* I\ S*) implies z with sign s, then it implies its negation with opposite 
sign." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL{ S, <s,z>, A) 
mean f- A* /\ S* ==} < s,z > * 
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< s,z > * = < ""'s,(not z)>* 
= <""'s ,x >* 
so~ A*/\ S* =} <"-'s,x>* 
i.e. CANCEL( S, <""'s,x>, A) 
Q.E.D. 
3b) Downward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL(S, <s,x > , A) 
then CANCEL(S, <""'s ,z> , A) 
-- by lemma 2.1 
-- defn of "x" 
Page 2-12 
"If {A*/\ S*) implies (not z) with sign s then it implies z with opposite sign." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( S, <s,x > , A) 
means~ A*/\ S* =} <s,x>* 
< s,x >* = <s,(not z)>* 
= < ""'s,z > * 
so~ A*/\ S* =} < ""'s,z > * 
i.e. CANCEL( S, < "-'S,z > , A) 
Q.E.D. 
4. Manipulation of Assumption Set 
-- defn of x 
-- Lemma 2.1 
The above axioms on the relation representing implication are not power Jul 
enough to solve all solvable problems in the first order predicate calculus. For 
completeness there must be some way to do what humans do as "case analysis". 
Thi s is done in CES by having an assumption set as the set of current cases 
being considered. If Sr <s,y> is a signed wff, then there are two cases to 
consider: either <s,y> * holds or < ,....._,s,y> * holds. There are two axioms for case 
an_alysis: one to consider a particular case, and the other to draw conclusions 
from a contradiction when that case is considered. 
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4a) The Unassuming Axiom 
If CANCEL(S, <,..__,s ,y>, AU { <s,y> }) 
then CANCEL(S, <,..__,s,y>, A) 
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"In the case of assuming <s,y> *, if its negation can be proven then there is a 
contradiction so in that context {that is assuming the other assumptions}, 
<,..__,s ,y> * must hold." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( S, <,..__,s ,y > , AU { <s,y> }) 
means ~ (AU { <s,y>} )* /\ S* ~ < ,..__,s ,y> * 
-- Defn of CANCEL 
so ~ A* /\ < s,y > * /\ S* ~ < ,..__,s,y > * -- Defn of * on assumption sets 
so~ A*/\ S* ~ <,..__,s ,y > * V <,..__,ss>* -- contrapositive of~. lemma 2.1 
so~ A*/\ S* ~ < ,..__,s,y > * 
i.e. CANCEL( S, < ,..__,s,y >, A) 
Q.E.D, 
4b) The Assuming Axiom 
CANCEL(S1, S2, AU {S2}) 
"At any time the case of S2 holding can be considered by putting it in the 
assumption set." 
Proof of Correctness 
~A*/\ S1* /\ S2* ~ S2* 
so~ S1* /\(AU {S2})* ~ S2* 
. i.e. CANCEL( S1, S2, AU { S2}) 
Q.E.D. 
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5. CANCEL for Facts 
If f is a fact then 
Sa) Fact Axiom 
CANCEL( S, <p ,f> , A) 
"As f is a fa ct anything implies it ." 
Proof of Correctness 
f is a fact means ~ f 
so~ A*/\ S* => <p ,f> * 
i.e. CANCEL( S, <p,f> , A) 
Q.E.D. 
Sb) Contradiction Axiom 
If CANCEL( <s,y> , <n,f> , A) 
then CANCEL( S, < ,...__,s ,y> , A) 
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"If {A* I\ <s,y> *) implies a f act is f alse, then in the case A* holding <s,y> * 
does not hold." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( <s,y> , <n ,f> , A) 
means~ A* /\ <s,y>* => <n,f>* 
so {A*/\ <s,y> *) is false 
so~ A* /\ S* => < ,...__,s ,y>* for any S 
i.e. CANCEL( S, <,...__,s,y> , A) 
Q.E.D. 
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6. Contrapositive axiom 
CANCEL( <s1 ,x >, <s2,Y>, A) 
= CANCEL( <'"'"'s2,Y> , <'"'-'s1,x >, A) 
This is the normal contrapositive rule for implications . 
Proof of Correctness 
Note that "=" represents equivalence. 
CANCEL( <s1,x> , <s2 ,Y >, A) 
means f- A*/\ <s1,x >* =} <s2,Y >* 
so f- A*/\ <'"'-'s2,Y>* =} <'"'"'s1 ,x > * 
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-- contrapositive of implication, lemma 2.1 
i.e. CANCEL( <'"'"'s2 ,Y >, <,.___,s1,x>, A) 
Q.E.D. 
2.6 Use of the CANCEL Relation 
2.6.1 Top Level Goal 
Given a set of wffs, and the implicit goal "success", the problem solver 
attempts to prove that an implicit input wff, "succ", an instance of success , is a 
logical consequence of the facts. That is, 
f- succ 
Thus the problem solver must deduce 
CANCEL( S, <p,succ>, {}) 
where S is free 
Note that these free wffs are introduced by axioms 4b, Sa and Sb. 
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2.6.2 Forward Chaining on the Axioms 
The CES axioms, specified in the predicate calculus, form a problem to be 
solved. Any of the problem solving methods for the predicate calculus can be used. 
AB they are all specified as Horn clauses (or can be expanded into Horn clauses), 
two obvious problem solving methods present themselves. The axioms could be used 
in a forward chaining manner, that is when the antecedents of an axiom are 
satisfied the consequent is deduced. An alternative is to backward chain on the 
axioms, so when the consequent of an axiom matches a subgoal, the antecedents are 
set up as subgoals to be solved. 
Forwards chaining on the CES axioms can produce searches which are both 
forwards and backwards at the objed level, as the following example shows: 
Example 2.1 
Con~ider the following facts: 
(A==} not B) 
(A and (D or E)) 
(D ==} F) 
(F ==} C) 
(not E or C) 
The goal is to prove (not B and C), so 
(not B and C ==} success) is added to the set of facts . 
To describe the deduction there must be a way to uniquely identify each 
input wff. To this end each input atom and logical connective is labelled, the 
connection labels stand for the associated wff, as defined in the definition of input 
wffs. 
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A =} not B 
w1 w4 w3 w2 
A and ( Dor E) 
wS w9 w6 w8 w7 
D =} F 
w10 w12 w11 
F =} C 
w13 w15 w14 
not E or C 
w17 w16 w19 w18 
not B and C =} success 
w21 w20 w23 w22 w25 w24 
Thus for example w8 is the wff "(D or E)" , and w23 is the wff "(not B or C)". 
Note that w6 and wlO are different input wffs, but are instances of the sa.me wff, 
namely the atom "D". 
Assume that there is an implicit input wff, named w26 , that is the goal succ, 
an instance of the wff "success" . The goal of the problem solver is to prove w26 is 
implied by the facts. So the aim of the problem solver is to deduce 
CANCEL(S, <p,w26>, {}) 
where S is an arbitrary signed wff. That is to prove that any signed wff implies 
success, and so success must hold. 
Consider the following deduction: 
1. CANCEL(<p,w6>, <p,wlO>, {}) 
2. CANCEL( S, <p,w12>, {}) 
3. CANCEL(<p,w6>, <p,w11>, {}) 
"If D holds then F holds." 
4. CANCEL(<p,w6>, <p,w13>, {}) 
5. CANCEL( S, <p,w15>, {}) 
6. CANCEL(<p,w6>, <p,w14>, {}) 
"If D holds then C holds." 
7. CANCEL(<p,w6>, <p,w22>, {}) 
8. CANCEL( <p,w7>, <p,w16> , {}) 
-- Axiom la 
-- Axiom 5a 
-- A.xiom 2d, steps 1,2 
-- Axiom 1 b, step 3 
-- Axiom 5a 
-- Axiom 2d, steps 4,5 
-- Axiom 1 b, step 6 
-- Axiom la 
, 
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9. CANCEL( <p,w7> , <n,wl7>, {}) 
10.CANCEL(S, <p,wl9> , {}) 
ll.CANCEL(<p,w7>, <p,wl8> , {}) 
"If E holds then C holds." 
12.CANCEL( <p,w7>, <p,w22>, {}) 
13.CANCEL( <n,w22>, <n,w7>, {}) 
14.CANCEL( <n,w22>, <n,w6> , {}) 
IS.CANCEL( <n,w22 >, <n,w8> , {}) 
16.CANCEL( <n ,w22 > , <n,w9> , {}) 
17.CANCEL(S, <p ,w22 > , {}) 
"C holds." 
18.CANCEL(S, <p,w9 > , {}) 
19.CANCEL(S, <p,w5 > , {}) 
"A holds." 
20.CANCEL(S, <p,wl> , {}) 
21.CANCEL(S, <p,w4 > , {}) 
22.CANCEL(S, <p ,w3>, {}) 
23.CANCEL(S, <n,w2> , {}) 
"B does not hold." 
24.CANCEL(S, <n,w20> , {}) 
25.CANCEL( S, <p,w21> , {}) 
26.CANCEL(S, <p,w23 > , {}) 
27.CANCEL(S, <p,w25 > , {}) 
28.CANCEL(S, <p,w24 >, {}) 
"success holds ." 
29.CANCEL(S, <p,w26 >, {}) 
"The problem is solved." 
Q.E.D. 
2.6.3 Some Observations from Example 2.1 
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-- Axiom 3a, step 9 
-- Axiom Sa 
-- Axiom 2d, steps 9,10 
-- Axiom 1 b, step 11 
-- Axiom 6, step 12 
-- Axiom 6, step 7 
-- Axiom 2b, step 13,14 
-- Axiom 2a, step 15 
-- Axiom Sb, step 16 
-- Axiom Sa 
-- Axiom 2c, step 18 
-- Axiom lb, step 11 
-- Axiom Sa 
-- Axiom 2d, steps 20,21 
-- Axiom 3b, step 22 
-- Axiom 1 b, step 23 
-- Axiom 3a, step 24 
-- Axiom 2b, steps 17,25 
-- Axiom Sa 
-- Axiom 2d, steps 26,27 
-- Axiom lb 
This may at first seem like a much more detailed proof than is necessary to 
solve such a simple problem. This is the price that needs to be paid for an input 
form problem solver. There are however a few points to note. The number of nodes 
in a CES deduction is only a linear factor more than in the corresponding resolution 
proof. (For a more detailed analysis see section 4.7.1.) The number of alternative 
paths is not increased by the increased size of the deduction. The ability to 
incorporate a reasonable explanation facility is not diminished by the more detailed 
deduction. In fact very simple methods, like the simple tracing of axioms 1 b and Sb 
produce the exp lanations in the above deduction. If requested by the user the 
systen~ can give a more detail ed explanation of a particular step. More sophisticated 
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explanation schemes will give even better results (see section 4.6.3.1). 
Note that the abstraction of the binary logical connectives, and the 
completeness of the problem solver allow "=*", "and" and "or" to be equally easily 
used as an implication. In step 11 the disjunction of wff wl9 was used in exactly the 
same way as if it was an implication, except the extra step to take the negation into 
account (step 9). It is the philosophy of this problem solver that if the use of "=*" is 
to convey meaning as to how it is to be used differently form the corresponding 
disjunction, then that information should be separately and explicitly specified. 
This example shows one way that axiom 6 can be used. A CANCEL relation 
represents one signed wff implying another. So if the relation is used in proving the 
goal, in some sense, the right hand signed wff is closer to the goal than the left 
hand signed wff in the CANCEL. Forward chaining, on the axioms (apart from Sb 
and 6) only acts on the right hand signed wff, and can be seen as stepping towards 
the goal (that is forward chaining). Equivalent axioms operating on the left hand 
signed wffs in a CANCEL can be seen as stepping away from the goal, towards the 
facts (that. is backward chaining). Axiom 6 is used to change the focus of the 
problem solver to act on the left hand signed wff, instead of the right hand signed 
wff. It thus allows the problem solver to alternate between forward and backward 
chaining. 
2.6.4 Use of the Assumption Set in Forward Chaining 
The most difficult problem with the forward chaining approach is in knowing 
when it is appropriate to use the assumption set. The assumption set is used in the 
way of "Consider the case ... ". 
Here is an example that needs assumption sets (In fact it cannot be done 
without them). 
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Example 2.2 
Consider the facts: 
(a or (b or d)) 
( c and not a) or success 
b =} d 
( c and d) =} success 
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From these we can name each of the input wffs: Let the implicit input wff, 
which is an instance of "success" and is the goal be w20 and name the other input 
wffs as follows: 
(a or ( b or d)) 
w1 wS w2 w4 w3 
( c and not A) or success 
w6 w9 w8 w7 w11 w10 
b =} d 
w12 w14 w13 
( c and d) =} success 
w15 w17 w16 w19 w18 
Here is a forward chaining proof using these facts: 
1. CANCEL(<p,w2>, <p ,wl2> , {}) 
2. CANCEL(S, <p,wl4>, {}) 
3. CANCEL( <p,w2> , <p,wl3>, {}) 
"If B holds then D holds ." 
4. CANCEL(<p,w2> , <p ,wl6> , {}) 
5. CANCEL(<n,wl6> , <n ,w2>, {}) 
6. CANCEL(<p,w3>, <p,wl6> , {}) 
7. CANCEL( <n,wl6> , <n,w3> , {}) 
8. CANCEL(<n,wl6> , <n ,w4> , {}) 
9. CANCEL(<p,w4>, <p,wl6>, {}) 
IO .CANCEL( <p,w6> , <p ,wl5> , {}) 
II.CANCEL( <n ,wl5> , <n,w6> , {}) 
12.CA CEL( <n ,wl5> , <n,w9> , {}) 
13.CANCEL(S, <n,w20> , { <n ,w20> }) 
"Consider the case of success not holding." 
-- axiom la 
-- axiom 5a 
-- axiom 2d, steps 1,2 
-- axiom 1 b, step 3 
-- axiom 6, step 4 
-- axiom la 
-- axiom 6, step 6 
-- axiom 2b, steps 5,7 
-- axiom 6, step 8 
-- axiom l a 
-- axiom 6, step 10 
-- axiom 2a, step 11 
-- axiom 4b 
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14.CANCEL(S, <n,wI0>, { <n,w20> }) -- axiom lb, step 13 
· IS.CANCEL( <n,wl5>, <n,wll>, { <n,w20> }) 
-- axiom 2b, steps 12,14 
16.CANCEL(S, <p,wl5>, { <n,w20> }) -- axiom Sb, step 15 
17.CANCEL( <p,w4>, <p,wl 7>, { <n,w20>}) -- axiom 2b, steps 9,16 
18.CANCEL( S, <p,wl9>, {}) -- axiom Sa 
19.CANCEL( <p,w4>, <p,wl8>, { <n,w20>}) -- axiom 2d, steps 17,18 
20.CANCEL( <p,w4>, <p,w20>, { <n,w20>}) -- axiom lb, step 19 
21.CANCEL( <p,w4>, <p,w20>, {}) -- axiom 4a, step 20 
"If {B or D) holds then success holds." 
22.CANCEL( <n,w20>, <n,w4>, {}) 
23.CANCEL(<p,wl>, <p,w7>, {}) 
24.CANCEL( <p,wl>, <n,w8>, {}) 
25.CANCEL( <p,wl>, <n,w9>, {}) 
26.CANCEL(S, <p,wll>, {}) 
27.CANCEL(<p,wl>, <p,wI0>, {}) 
"If A holds then success holds ." 
28.CANCEL( <p,wl > , <p ,w20>, {}) 
29.CANCEL( <n,w2f"J> , <n,wl> , {}) 
30.CANCEL(<n,w20> , <n,w5> , {}) 
31.CANCEL(S, <p,w20>, {}) 
"The problem is solved" 
Q.E.D. 
2.6.5 Backward Chaining on the Axioms 
-- axiom 6, step 21 
-- axiom la 
-- axiom 3a, step 23 
-- axiom 2a, step 24 
-- axiom Sa 
-- axiom 2d, steps 25,26 
-- axiom 1 b, step 27 
-- axiom 6, step 28 
-- axiom 2b, steps 22,29 
-- axiom 5 b, step 30 
An alternate way to use these CANCEL axioms is to backward chain on them 
as would be done in a PROLOG type prover. Note that all of the axioms can be 
macroed into Horn clauses so this method is particularly suitable. This produces a 
bidirectional search. A different (but still useful) problem solver can be built using 
only axioms lb, 2, 3, 4 and Sa. This subset of the axioms defines a problem solver 
which does problem reduction, creating subgoals and finding facts to solve them. 
The use of axioms Sb and 6 allows the focus of the search to alternate from being 
backwards to forwards and vice versa. Either of these axioms being used for a 
particular CANCEL brings the left hand signed wff of the CANCEL into focus. 
This effectively allows forward chaining on facts as well as backward chaining on 
subgoals in the same problem solver. For a more detailed analysis see section 3.5. 
One refinement to the uninformed backward chaining can, however be made. 
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Notice that at each step, axiom 4a is available to be used. AB having too much in 
the assumption set does not restrict the use of any axiom at any time, and because 
axiom 4b can be better used with a larger assumption set, an implementation could 
implicitly use axiom 4a at each ·step. The resulting assumption set represents the set 
of possible assumptions that could be used in axiom 4b. 
Example 2.2, Backward Chaining 
AB an example consider the following proof of the Example 2.2. Note that 
axioms Sb and 6 are not used so the problem solver is always back chaining. The 
facts are as follows: 
(a or (b or d) 
w1 wS w2 w4 w3 
( C and not a) or success 
w6 w9 w8 w7 w11 w!0 
b :::} d 
w12 w14 w13 
(c and 'd) :::} success 
w15 w17 w16 w19 w18 
The deduction proceeds as follows . The comments are the explanations 
produced as described in section 4.6.3.1. 
1. goal is to prove CANCEL(S, <p,w20> , {}) 
2. to prove 1 prove CANCEL(S, <p,w18>, { <n,w20> }) 
-- axiom lb 
3. to prove 2 prove CANCEL( S, <p,w19>, { <n,w20> , <n ,w18>}) 
-- axiom 2d, holds by axiom Sa. 
4. and prove CANCEL(S, <p,w17>, { <n,w?.0>, <n,w18> }) 
-- axiom 2d 
"To prove success prove C and D." 
5. to prove 4 prove CANCEL(S, <p,w15>, { <n ,w20> , <n,w18>, <n,w17> }) 
-- axiom 2b 
6. and prove CANCEL(S, <p,w16>, { <n ,w20>, <n ,w18> , <n ,w17> }) 
-- axiom 2b 
7. to prove 5 prove CANCEL(S, <p,w6>, { <n ,w20> , <n ,wl8> , <n,wl7> , 
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<n,wl5>}) -- axiom lb 
8. to prove 7 prove CANCEL(S, <p,w9>, { <n,w20>, <n,wl8>, <n,w17> , 
<n,wl5>, <n,w6> }) -- axiom 2c 
9. to prove 8 prove CANCEL(S, <p,wll>, { <n,w20> , <n,w18>, <n,wl7> , 
<n,wl5>, <n,w6>, <n,w9> }) -- axiom 2d, holds by axiom 5a. 
"To prove C prove not success." 
IO.and prove CANCEL(S, <n,wlO>, { <n,w20> , <n ,wl8>, <n,wl7> , 
<n,wl5>, <n,w6>, <n,w9>}) -- axiom 2d 
11.to prove 10 prove CANCEL(S, <n,w20> , { <n,w20>, <n,wl8>, <n,w17> , 
<n ,wl5>, <n,w6> , <n,w9>, <p,wlO> }) 
-- axiom lb, holds by 4b 
"May assume not success." 
12.to prove 6 prove CANCEL(S, <p,wl3> , { <n,w20> , <n,w18> , <n,w17> , 
<n ,wl6> }) -- axiom lb 
13.to prove 12 prove CANCEL(S, <p,wl4> , { <n,w20>, <n ,w18> , <n,wl7> , 
<n,w16> , <n,w13> }) -- axiom 2d, holds by axiom 5a 
14.and prove CA CEL(S, <p,w12> , { <n ,w20> , <n ,w18> , <n,w17>, 
<n ,wl6> , <n ,wl3> }) -- axiom 2d 
15.to prove 14 prove CANCEL(S, <p,w2> , { <n ,w20> , <n ,w18> , <n ,w17>, 
<n,wl6> , <n ,w13> , <n ,w12> }) -- axiom lb 
"To prove B prove (B or DJ and not D." 
16.to prove 15 prove CANCEL(S, <n,w3> , { <n ,w20> , <n ,w18> , <n ,w17> , 
<n ,wl6>, <n,w13> , <n,wl2> , <n,w2> }) 
-- axiom 2d 
17.and prove CANCEL(S, <p ,w4> , { <n,w20> , <n,wl8> , <n ,w17>, 
<n ,w16> , <n ,w13> , <n,w12> , <n ,w2> }) 
-- axiom 2d 
"To Prove (B or DJ prove not A." 
18.to prove 16 prove CANCEL(S, <n,w16> , { <n ,w20> , <n ,wl8> , <n ,w17> , 
<n ,w16> , <n,w13> , <n,w12> , <n ,w2> , <p ,w3> }) 
-- axiom lb, holds by 4b 
"May assume not D." 
19.to prove 17 prove CANCEL(S, <p ,w5>, { <n,w20> , <n ,w18>, <n,w17>, 
<n,w16> , <n,wl3>, <n ,w12> , <n,w2> , <n,w4> }) 
-- axiom 2d, holds by axiom 5a 
20 .and prove CANCEL(S, <n,wl>, { <n ,w20>, <n ,w18> , <n ,w17> , 
<n ,w16> , <n ,w13> , <n,w1 2> , <n ,w2> , <n ,w4> }) 
-- axiom 2d 
21.to prove 20 prove CANCEL(S, <n,w7> , { <n ,w20> , <n,w18> , <n ,w17>, 
<n,w16>, <n,w13> , <n,w12> , <n,w2> , <n,w4> , <p,wl> }) 
-- axiom lb 
22.to prove 21 prove CANCEL(S, <p,w8>, { <n ,w20>, <n ,w18>, <n,w17>, 
<n,w16>, <n,w13>, <n,w12> , <n ,w2> , <n,w4> , <p,wl> , 
<p,w7>}) -- axiom 3b 
23.to prove 22 prove CANCEL(S, <p ,w9> , { <n,w20> , <n ,w18> , <n ,w17> , 
<n ,w16>, <n ,w13> , <n,wl2> , <n,w2> , <n,w4> , <p,wl> , 
<p ,w7>, <n,w8> }) -- axiom 2c 
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"To prove (not A} prove not success." 
24 .to prove 23 prove CANCEL(S, <p,wll>, { <n ,w20>, <n,wl8>, <n ,wl7> , 
<n,wl6>, <n,wl3>, <n,wl2>, <n,w2>, <n,w4>, <p,wl>, 
<p,w7>, <n,w8>, <n,w9> }) -- axiom 2d, holds by axiom 5a 
25.and prove CANCEL( S, <n,wlO>, { <n,w20>, <n ,w18> , <n,wl7> , 
<n,wl6>, <n,wl3>, <n,wl2>, <n,w2> , <n,w4>, <p,wl>, 
<p,w7>, <n,w8 > , <n,w9> }) -- axiom 2d 
26.to prove 25 prove CANCEL(S, <n,w20> , { <n,w20> , <n,wl8>, <n ,wl7>, 
<n ,wl6> , <n,wl3> , <n ,wl2 > , <n,w2> , <n ,w4 > , <p ,wl>, 
<p ,w7> , <n,w8 >, <n,w9> , <p ,wlO> }) 
-- axiom 1 b, holds by 4b 
"May assume not success." 
Q.E.D. 
In this backward chaining proof the assumption set is the set of parents in the 
and/or search tree. The assumption set thus need not be explicitly stored, but 
rather , it may be implicit in a tree built up to represent the search. This is much 
like building up a dependency network. The following and-tree rep resents the above 
solu tion, the leaves of the tree being solved: 
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<p ,w11> 
<p,w19> 
<p,w6> 
I 
<p,w9> 
I \ 
<p,w20> 
I 
<p,w18> 
I -- \ 
<p,w17> 
I \ 
<p,w15> 
I 
<p , w14> 
<p,w16> 
I 
<p,w13> 
I \ 
<p,w12> 
I 
<n,w10> <p,w2> 
I I \ 
<n,w20> <p,w4> <n.w3> 
I \ 
<p , w5> <n,w1> 
I 
<n,w7> 
I 
<p,w8> 
I 
<p,w9> 
I \ 
\ 
<n ,w16> 
<n,w10> <p ,w11> 
I 
<n,w20> 
Figure 2 . 1 
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Axiom 4a can be used if a node is the opposite in sign to a parent. This is 
exactly the same as marking solved nodes in an and/or tree that are the negation of 
an ancestor in and/or tree search, or removing literals that are opposite to framed 
literals to their left in Model Elimination (see section 4.6.1 ). 
Note that backward chaining on the CANCEL axioms does not imply 
backward chaining at the problem solving level. In the above proof axiom 6 was not 
used in any way. If the contrapositive of the axioms were however used, then a 
forward style proof would result. A bidirectional proof results by using axiom 6 to 
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alternate between forward and backward chaining. Restricting the CANCEL to 
have the first signed wff always free, as in the above example, does not allow the 
bidirectional search, however completeness of the proof is maintained (see Appendix 
C). 
2. 7 Restricting the CANCELS 
In this section a way to syntactically constrain the selection of an axiom 
during the search, without sacrificing completeness is presented. The resulting 
system is much more efficient, as looping, such as the repeated use of axioms 3a 
then 3b then 3a and so on continuously, is prevented. 
2.7.1 Parity of a wff 
Definition: Parity, 1r, is a function from input wffs into {even, odd, both}. 
The set { even, odd, both} is known as the set of parities. If w is an input wff then 
1r(w) is called the parity of w. Define the function opposite-parity on parities by: 
opposite-parity( even) = odd; 
opposite-parity(odd) = even; 
opposite-parity(both) = both. 
The function parity is defined as follows; w, x and y being input wffs: 
If w is a fact then 1r(w) = "even" 
If w is of form (x and y) then 1r(x) = 1r(y) = 1r(w) 
If w is of the form (x or y) then 1r(x) = 1r(y) = 7r(w) 
If w is of form (x =} y) then 1r(x) = opposite-parity(1r(w)); 1r(y) = 1r(w) 
If w is of form (not x) then 1r(x) = opposite-parity(w) 
If w is of the form (u = v) then 1r(u) = 1r(v) = "both" 
Informally , the parity of a wff represents whether there are an odd or an even 
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number of "not''s to the top level, when the definitions are mapped into 
disjunctions and negations. The equivalence relation , "=" (see section 2.8) makes 
wffs have a parity of "both", because two instances of each of the subwffs are 
created when its definition is expanded, and these are of opposite parity. By 
dividing the wffs into parities the number of possible relations considered is 
reduced, as only atoms of opposite parity need to be unified . This corresponds to 
only resolving on oppositely signed literals in resolution. 
2.7.2 Direction of a wff in a CANCEL 
Deductions in CES can be seen as moving up and down the parse trees of the 
facts. If a deduction is working down a parse tree, that is using a relation on a wff 
to deduce a relation on a subwff, then it is no use then working back up the parse 
tree in the next step, as that simply deduces a relation that was already known. 
Consequently the direction of deduction can be used to restrict axiom selection. The 
direction is a property of a signed index wff in a CANCEL. 
Definition: If C = CANCEL( S1, S2, A), is a cancel relation then the 
direction of Si in C is a value in { up, down}. 
Informally "up" means that the signed input wff in the CANCEL was derived 
from a subwff, or, if it is an atom, from another atom; "down" means that it was 
derived from a higher wff, or from the truth of a wff. Directions of wffs are also 
associated with the CANCELs in the axioms. It is proved (Lemma 2.4) that if the 
direction of a wff in a CANCEL relation is up then, using that relation in an axiom 
{n which the wff is expected to be down will not produce a useful deduction. 
The function direction( Si, C) is defined as follows: 
If C was derived using axiom la, then direction( S, C) = up 
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In axiom lb, direc tion(<s,x >, C1) = down if C1 is the first CANCEL in the axiom 
and direction( <s,y>, C2) = up if C2 is the second CANCEL. 
In axioms 2a and 2b direc tion(<si,xi>, C) = up for each relation in which the xi 
appear, and direction( <s,x >, C) = up in each of the CANCELs. 
In axiom 2c direction(< "-'OPo,x> , C 1) = down , and direction(< "-'OPi,xi , C2) = 
down where C 1 is the first CANCEL and C2 is the second CANCEL. 
In axiom 2d direction( <op0,x >, C1) = down for C1 the first CANCEL, 
direction(< "-'OPi ,xi > , C2) = up for C2 the second CANCEL, and 
direction(< opj ,xj > , C3) = down for C3 the third CANCEL in the axiom. 
In axiom 3a direction( <s,z> , C1) =up= direction( < "-'s,x > , C2); and in axiom 
3b direction( <s,x > , C1) =down= direction( <"-'s,z> , C2); where C1 and C2 are 
the first and second CANCELs respectively. 
In axiom 4a direction( <,....,_,s ,y> , C1) = direction( <"-'s,y> , C2) in 4b, direction(S2, 
C) is not defined . It can be either. 
In axiom Sa direction(<p ,f>, C) = down , and in axiom Sb direction(<n ,f>, C1) 
= up and direc tion( <s,y >, C1) = direction( <s,y>, C2)-
In axiom 6 direction(<si,w> , C1) = direction(<"-'sj ,w> , C2) , where w is one of 
{x,y}. That is directions are preserved under taking contrapositives. 
Lemma 2.4: If direction( S, C) = 8, then C need only be used in axioms 
which have corresponding direction 8. This is in the sense that if a proof can be 
obtained without following this rule, then a proof can be produced following this 
rule. 
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Proof: This follows directly from the completeness Theorem C.5, which proves 
completeness under this assumption. 
Q.E.D. 
The repeated use of say, axiom 3a then 3b then 3a etc. in an infinite loop is 
prevented as the wffs will not have the correct direction. 
2. 7 .3 The Parity Theorem 
Theorem 2.5: The direction of a wff in a CANCEL can be calculated as 
follows: If C = CANCEL(S1, S2, A), and if Si= <si,wi>, where 1r(wi) =;£, "both" 
then 
IF (i=2)=((si= "p")=( 1r(wi)= "odd" )) 
THEN direction( Si , C) = "up" 
ELSE direction( Si, C) = "down" 
So if i=2, .si= "p" and 1r(wi)= "odd" then the direction is "up" ; if any one of the 
position, sign, or parity reverses then the direction reverses. In the case of a wff 
having a parity of both, either direction can be used. ( ote that " " represents 
equivalence.) 
Proof: The proof proceeds by showing that if any other directions are used, a 
useful deduction cannot be obtained. This is proven by induc~ion on the depth of wi 
from the root wff. Rule 4a is ignored, as the direction is preserved, and the same 
argument is valid for the following step. 
If the depth is 0, then wi is a fact. Its parity is thus even. 
If \=2, and si= "p", and the direction( Si, C) = up, then it is a useless deduction, as 
it has just been proven that something implies a fact , which is already known 
(axiom Sa). It cannot happen that i=2, si= "n" and direction(Si ,C) = down , as 
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none of the axioms produce this situation. 
If i=l, then the only way it can be used is in axiom 5b or 6, in which case it is the 
same as i=2, with opposite sign, and these do not produce a useful deduction. 
Assume the depth of wi is n (>O) and the theorem holds for all wffs of lesser 
depths. First consider i=2. 
If direction(S2, C) = down, then C was derived from a CANCEL(S1, s3, 
A)=C', such that direction(S3, C') = down, with w3 being a wff at depth n-1. If 
(7r(w2)= "odd" and s2="p") or (7r(w2)="even" and s2="n") then (7r(w3)= "odd" 
and s3= "p" ) or (7r(w3)="even" and s3="n" ), as all of the axioms which deduce a 
direction of down preserve this relationship . This cannot happen by the induction 
assumption. 
If direction( S2, C) = up, then there are two cases: 
the first is that it is going to be used to deduce C'=CANCEL( S1, S3 , A), such that 
direction(S3, C') = up, such that w3 is a wff at depth n-1. If (7r(w2)= "odd" and 
s2="n") o.r (7r(w2)="even" and s2="n") all of the axioms imply that with 
(7r(w3)= "odd" and s3="n") or (7r(w3)="even" and s3="p") for w3 having depth 
n-1, which is useless by the inductive assumption . 
The other case is if C is used in axiom 2d, in which case it must be accompanied by 
a CANCEL( S1, S4, A4)=C4, such that w4 is of depth n-1 and (7r(w4)= "odd" and 
s4= "p") or (7r(w4)="cven" and s4="n") which cannot happen, by the inductive 
hypothesis. 
If i=l , then this is the same relationship as having i=2, and opposite sign , 
using rule Sb or 6. The theorem then follows this case. 
Q.E.D. 
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Corollary 2 .6 
a) Axiom la need only be considered when x is even, and y is odd. 
b) axiom 1 b need only be considered, if s2=p, when x is even and y is odd; and if 
s2=n when x is odd and y even. 
Proof: This follows directly from Theorem 2.5 and for the directions in 
axiom 1. 
Q.E.D. 
This means that pairs of wffs need only be unified if the are opposite in 
parity. This is equivalent to only unifying oppositely signed literals in connection 
graph proof procedures, and in resolution procedures. 
2.8 Expanding the CANCELS 
In this section it is shown how the CANCEL relation can be expanded to 
include other logical connectives. As the example consider the equivalence relation 
(=). 
Equivalence is symmetric in that if any two of the parts of the equivalence 
(the equivalence itself and its two components) have the same truth value then the 
other part is true, and if they have opposite truth values the other part is false. The 
axioms for this is as follows: 
2e) CANCEL on equivalences 
If x is of the form (x1 = x2) 
an_d if { u, v, w }={x, x1, x2} 
and if CANCEL(S, <s1,u>, A1) 
and CANCEL(S, <s2 ,v>, A2) 
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then CANCEL(S, <s,w>, A1 U A2) 
where IF (s1 =s2) THEN s= "p" ELSE s= "n" 
"If any two parts of an equivalence have the same truth value then the other part 
is true, if they have opposite truth values then the other part is false ." 
Proof of Correctness 
x is true iff x1 and x2 have the same truth value. (By definition of=). 
xi is true iff (x is true and xj is true or if x is false and xj is false) 
Thus equivalence is symmetric with respect to all three arguments. 
so if (s1 =s2) then 
r A1 * A. A2* A. S* ~ u and v have same truth value. 
so r A 1 * A. A2 * A. S* ~ w 
i.e. CANCEL(S, <p,w>, A1 U A2) 
if ( s1 ~s2) then 
r A1 * A. A2* A. S* ~ u and v have opposite truth values 
so r A1* A. A2* A. S* ~ (not w) 
i.e. QANCEL(S, <n,w>, A1 U A2) 
Q.E.D. 
It is straightforward to introduce new logical connectives, either the twelve 
other binary logical connectives in the propositional calculus, or a new binary 
connective as is done in Chapter 6 by defining a new axiom as above. If there is 
some automatic way to incorporate these axioms into the problem solver then 
maintenance of the problem solver consists of adding axioms as above for any new 
operator. 
Chapter 3 
Logical Basis for Predicate Calculus CES 
3.1 Overview 
In Chapter 2 the formal basis of a problem solver for the propositional 
calculus was given. In this chapter the basis is extended to a problem solver for the 
predicate calculus, incorporating the aims expressed in Chapter 1. The main 
difference between the predicate calculus problem solver and the propositional 
version is that it takes variables into account. 
3.2 Preliminary Definitions 
3.2.1 Predicate Calculus 
The normal definitions for the first order predicate calculus are used. Here is 
a brief review: 
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The following types of symbols are in the language: variables (names starting 
with a "?", eg "?x" ); function symbols ( eg "f", "parent"), niladic functions are called 
constants; predicate symbols (eq "P", "ON"); and logical connectives (and, or, not, 
::::}, =, V, 3). 
Definition: A term is defined as follows: 
(i) a variable is a term; 
(ii) if f is an n-place function symbol, and tl..tn are terms, then f(tl, .. ,tn) is a term. 
Niladic functions are written without the parentheses. 
Definition: an atomic formula, or simply an atom, is defined as follows: If 
P is an n-place predicate symbol, and tl..tn are terms then P(tl, .. ,tn) is an atomic 
formula. P() is often written simply as P. 
Definition: A Well formed formula (wff) for the predicate calculus is 
defined as follows: 
(i) an atomic formula is a wff 
(ii) if w is a wff then (not w) is a wff representing the negation of w; 
(iii) If u and v are wffs, then (u and v), (u or v), (u ::::} v) and (u = v) are wffs 
representing conjunction, disjunction, implication and equivalence respectively. 
(iv) If w is a wff, and x is a variable then (V?x w) and (3?x w) are wffs, representing 
universal and existential quantification respectively. 
Often the parentheses will be removed reflecting normal operator precedence. (not, 
and, or, ::::}, =, V and 3) 
The parity of a wff is as for the propositional wff, with 
1r(Q?x w) = 1r(w), for Q E {V,3}. 
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3.2.2 Transforming the input 
AB in the propositional calculus there are a set of distinguished wffs called 
facts , and an implicit wff that is the atom "success". The aim is to prove that 
success logically follows from the facts. 
Definition: An input wff is a fact or any subwff of a fact . Two input wffs 
are the same if and only if they are the same instance. 
Let S be the conjunction of all of the facts. The problem solver must prove 
SI- success 
Let S' be S with existential variables skolemised, then as skolemisation of existential 
variables preserves unsatisfiability and logical consequence (see Chang and Lee[73]) , 
then 
(SI- success) iff (S' I- success). 
The problem solver can work entirely within the skolemised form, and still produce 
correct results. 
Definition: An existential variable is a variable that is defined to be 
existentially quantified in a wff with even parity or is universally quantified in a wff 
with odd parity. Thus, they are variables that become existentially quantified if the 
wff is put in prenex normal form. Similarly ·universal variables are variables 
universally quantified at an even wff, or existentially quantified at an odd wff. 
By skolemisation of existential variables, it is meant replacing each existential 
variable by a unique function symbol, with the arguments the list of universal 
variab les in whose scope the existential variable is defined. Quant.ification can then 
be dropped, with the proviso that separately defined universal variables in the same 
fact with the same name have to be renamed (at most once for each input variable). 
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In the resulting system all free variables are universal variables, and variables of the 
same name are the same variable. 
The first and only transformation that is done to the input is to skolemise 
existential variables, and to rename repeated universal variables. This does not 
change the form of the input. All of the information necessary to rebuild the 
original input can be kept, so that reasoning can be expressed in terms of the 
original input. This is important in explaining the actions of the problem solver, as 
Skol em functions can be described as "the variable that exists for certain values of 
universally quantified variables ." Explanations of this sort need to be generated to 
explain the solution of many problems in the predicate calculus. 
One problem arises with the above transformation. If the quantification of a 
variable is defined within an equivalence, then there is no skolemisation which 
preserves both the input form and unsatisfiablity. The problem arises as the parity 
of quantified variables is "both". In any expansion of the equivalence into prenex 
normal form , a both existentially and universally quantified copies of the variable 
will be produced . For this reason a restriction in the input is imposed that variables 
may not be defined within an equivalence. Such knowledge must be split into two 
implications or other equivalent form. 
3.2.3 Instances of variables 
The main difference between CANCEL for the propositional calculus and the 
predicate calculus is an associated substitution. The predicate calculus CANCEL 
represents the fact that an instance of the left hand wff implies an instance of the 
right hand wff. 
Different instances of the same wff may need to be used to form a proof in 
some cases. For example consider the following facts: 
V?x P(?x) 
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P(a) and P(b) =} success 
There is no single substitution which defines ground instances of the facts to make 
success a logical consequence of ground instances. 
This is often overcome in deduction systems by making copies of wffs for each 
variable that could possibly change (Nilsson[79], Sickel[76], Andrews[81]). In CES 
this problem is overcome by the use of indexed wf fs . All of the substitutions are in 
terms of wffs with associated indexes. Renaming occurs by changing the index. 
There is no need to explicitly copy wffs, and the implicit copying consists of 
changing one number . The instances still refer to the input wffs, and so the solution 
can be expressed in terms of the input wffs. 
Definition: an index is a non-negative integer. 
Definition: An indexed variable is a pair consisting of a variable "v" and 
an index "i", written "v!i" . Two indexed variaLles are the same if the variable parts 
and the index parts are identical. 
Definition: If w is a wff, and i is an index, then w with index i, written 
"w!i" , is a copy of the wff w with all variables "v" in w renamed to "v! i". 
There are two, mutually exclusive classes of wffs and variables, namely 
indexed ones and non-indexed ones. All input is in terms of non-indexed wffs. 
Definition: an indexed substitution is a substitution in which all of the 
variables are indexed. All substitutions in the rest of the thesis are indexed 
substitutions, and will often be ref erred to simply as substitutions. For . definitions 
and theorems on substitutions, compositions and unifying compositions see appendix 
A. 
If 0 is an ind exed subst itution , and i and j are indexes, where j does not 
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appear as an index in 0, then 0!i-.j is an indexed substitution, which is a copy of 0 
with all variables having index i in 0 renamed to have index j . 
0!(i1 -h,i2-.j2,·· ·,in-.jn) is the indexed substitution formed by the simultaneous 
replacement of index ik with index jk , for k from 1 to n; where ik are unique; the jk 
a.re unique; and Vk (3m jk=im) or jk does not appear in 0. 
3.2.4 Signed Indexed Wffs 
Definition: A signed indexed wff is a triple <s,w,i> , wheres is a sign; w 
is an input wff; and i is an index. 
Definition: If W=<s ,w,i> is a signed index wff, then the value, W* of Wis 
(IF s= "p" THE w!i ELSE (not w!i)) 
Lemma 3.1: <s,(not w),i> = < '"'--s,w, i> 
Proof follows directly from Lemma 2.1 
3.3 CANCEL for the Predicate Calculus 
3 .3.l The CANCEL Relation 
The CANCEL relation for the predicate calculus is: 
CANCEL(W1, W2, A, 0) 
where W1 and W2 are signed indexed wffs with distinct indexes; 
A is a set of signed indexed wffs; 
0 is an indexed substitution. 
The relationship CANCEL models: 
f-- [A* /\ W1* =} W2* ]0 
where A* is the conjunction of the Wj* such that Wj EA. 
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3.3.2 Axioms for the Predicate Calculus CANCEL 
1. CANCEL on atoms 
If x and y are unifiable input atomic formulae, such that¢ is mgu(x!O,y!l) then 
la) Equality CANCEL Axiom 
If 0 = ¢!(O-i,l-j) where i and j are different indexes 
then CANCEL( <p,x,i>, <p,y,j>, A, 0) 
"If two atoms are unifiable then their most general unifier makes the two 
instances imply each other." 
Proof of Correctness 
(x!O)¢ = (y!l)¢> 
(x!i)0 = (y!j)0 
so [A* A x!i ==} y!i ]0 
. [ A* . * . * ]0 1.e. /\ <p ,x,1> ==} <P,Y,J > 
i.e. CANCEL(<p,x,i>, <p,y,j> , A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
lb) Equality Substitution Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <s,x,m>, A, 1/J) 
then CANCEL(W, <s,y,j>, A, 0) 
--as ¢ unifies them 
--renaming of variables 
--definition of * 
--defn of CANCEL 
where j is an index distinct from m not appearing in A, W or 1/J ; 
0=uc('I/J, ¢!(O-m,l-j)) 
and "uc" is the unifying composition function (see appendix A) 
To propagate CANCEL between two unifiable atomic formulae , their most general 
unifier must be incorporated into the resulting substitution . Nole that "¢" need 
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only be computed once for each pair of unifiable atoms . Each time the axiom is 
applied th ere is one renaming of variables and one uni f ying composition. "j " is a 
unique index to en sure that different variables are distinguished. 
Proof of Correctness 
¢>!(O-+m,l-+j) is the simultaneous replacement of index O with m, 
and index I with j in ¢> . 
so ¢>!(O-+m,l-+j) = mgu(x!m,y!j). 
CANCEL(W, <s,x,m> , A, 'If; ) 
means ~ [ A* AW*=} <s,x,m>* ]'If; 
applying 0 to this gives: 
~ [ A* AW*=} < s,x,m> * ]0 
-- defn of unifying composit ion (see Appendix A) 
so ~ A *0 A W*0 =} < s,x, m> *0 
(x!m)0 = (x!m) ¢>!(O-+m,l-+j) 0 
= (y!j) ¢> !(O-+m,l -+j) 0 
= (y!j)0 
so~ [ A* A W* =} < s,y,j> ]0 
i.e. CANCEL(W, <s,y,j >, A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
--distribu t ing substitution 
--defn of unifying composition 
--by definit ion of unifier 
--definition of uc 
2. CANCEL for Binary Logical Connectives 
Suppose x is of the form (x1 op x2), where op E {and, or, =}} and op has 
triple <opo ,0P1 ,0P2> -
Lemma 3.2: <opO,x,i> = <op1,x1,i> V < op2 ,x2 ,i> 
Proof follows directly from definition of opj in chapter 2. 
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2a) Upward Disjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2} 
if CANCEL(W, <opj ,xj ,i>, A; 0) 
then CANCEL(W, <opO,x,i>, A, 0) 
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"If an instance of a disjunct is implied then an instance of the disjunction is 
implied. The instance that is implied is given by the substitution that defines the 
original instance." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL(W, <opj ,xj ,i> , A, 0) 
means f- [A* /\ W* =} <opj ,xj ,i> * ]0 
for k E {1 ,2} , k ~ j , 
-- Defn of CAl CEL 
. * . * . * <opj ,xj ,1> =} <opj ,xj,1> V <opk,xk,1> 
-- defn of disjunction 
. * . * . * <opj ,xj,1> V <opk ,xk ,1> = <opO,x,1> 
so f- [A* /\ W* =} <opO,x,i>* ]0 
i.e. CANCEL(W, <opO,x,i> , A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
2b) Upward Conjunction Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <"'-'OP1 ,x1,i> , A1 , 01) 
and CANCEL(W, < "'-'OP2,x2,i>, A2, 02) 
and 01 and 02 are consistent 
then CANCEL(W, <"'-'opo ,x,i>, A, 0) 
wh ere A= A1 U A2 
an_d 0 = uc(01,02) 
-- Lemma 3.2 
-- transitivity of implication 
-- defn of CANCEL 
"If both wf fs of an instance of a conjunction is implied, then that instan ce of 
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the conjunction is implied. The most general instance that is implied is given by 
the unifying composition of the substitutions that define the instances of the 
conjuncts. The resulting CANCEL depends on the union of the two assumption 
sets." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL(W, <"-'OP1 ,x1,i > , A1 , 01) 
means ~ [ A1 * /\ W* ==> < '"'"'op1,x1,i> * ]01 -- (1) 
CANCEL(W, <,..__,op2 ,x2, i> , A2, 02) 
means~ [ A2* /\ W* ==> < '"'-'op2,x2,i>* ]Or- (2) 
so [ A1 * /\ A2* /\ W* ==> < '"'-'op1,x1,i> * /\ < "-'op2,x2,i> * ]0 
-- from (1) and (2) 
so [A* /\ W* ==> not( <op1,x1,i> * V <op2,x2 ,i> *) ]0 
so [A* /\ W* ==> < ,..__,opO,x,i> * ]0 
i.e. CANCEL( W, < "-'oPo ,x,i > , A, 0~ 
Q.E.D. 
2c) Downward Conjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2} 
If CANCEL(W, < "-'OPo ,x,i> , A, 0) 
then CANCEL(W, < '"'"'0Pj ,xj ,i>, A, 0) 
-- Lemma 3.1, De Morgan's Law 
-- Lemmas 3.2,3.1 
"If an instance of the conjunction of two wffs is implied then each conjunct of 
the ins tance is implied." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL(W, <"-'OPo ,x,i>, A, 0) 
means~ [A*/\ W* ==> < '"'-'opO,x,i>* ]0 
* ( . * . *) < ,..__,opO,x ,i> = not <op1,x1,1> V <op2,x2,1> 
-- Lemma 3. 1, 3.2 
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= < ,..___,op1,x1,i> * A <,..___,op2,x2,i>* 
-- De Morgan's Law, Lemma 3.1 
=} < ,.___,op · X· i>* .. J' J' 
so ~ [ A* AW*=} < ,..___,opj ,xj,i>* ]0 
i.e. CANCEL( W, < ,..___,opj ,xj ,i>, A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
2d} Implication Axiom 
If {j,k} = {1 ,2} 
and CANCEL( W, <opO,x,i> , A, 0) 
and CANCEL( W, < ,..___,opj ,xj ,i> , Aj, 0j ) 
and 0 and 0j are consistent 
then CANCEL( W, <opk,xk,i> , Ak, 0k ) 
where Ak = A U Aj 
and Ck= uc( 0,0j) 
-- definition of conjunction 
-- transitivity of =} 
"If it is implied that a disjunction holds, and one of the disjuncts does not hold, 
then an instance of the other disjunct holds. The resulting instance i s given by 
the unifying composition of the substitutions defining the original ins tances; the 
resulting CANCEL depends on all of the assumptions of the original two 
CANCELs." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( W, < opO,x,i>, A, 0) 
means ~ [ A* AW*=} <opO,x,i> * ]0 
CANCEL(W, < ,..___,opj ,xj ,i> , Aj, 0j) 
-- ( 1) 
means ~ [ A/ A W* =} < ,..___,opj ,xj,i>* ]0j -- {2) 
[ A* A A/ AW*=} < opO,x,i>* A < ,..___,opj ,xj, i> * ]0k -- from {l) and(~) 
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= ( <opj ,xj ,i>* V <opk,xk,i> *) /\ < '"'-'OPj ,xj ,i> * 
- < "> * A • * 
- opk,xk,I /\ < '"'-'OPj ,Xj ,I> 
::::} <opk,xk,i> * 
so r [ Ak * /\ W*::::} <opk,xk,i>* ]Ok 
i.e. CANCEL(W, <opk,xk,i> , Ak, Ok) 
Q.E.D. 
2e) CANCEL on equivalences 
If x is of the form (x 1 = x2) 
and if { u, v, w }={x, x1, x2} 
and if CANCEL( W, < s1,u,i> , A1, 81) 
and CANCEL (W, < s2,v,i > , A2, 82) 
and 01 and 02 are consistent 
then CANCEL(W, < s,w, i> , A, 0) 
where A= A1 U A2 
and 0 = u.c(01,02) 
and IF (s1 =s2) THE s= "p" ELSE s= "n" 
-- Lemma 3.2 
"If consistent ins tances of two parts of an equivalence have the same truth value 
th en the other part holds; if they have opposite truth values then other part does 
not hold. The ins tance is given by the unifying composition of the substitutions 
defining the original instances." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL(W, < s1,u,i> , A1, 81) 
means r [ A1 * /\ W* ::::} <s1,u,i> * ]81 
CANCEL(W, <s2 ,v, i> , A2, 82) 
means r [ A2* /\ W*::::} <s2,v, i> * ]82 
so r [ Al * /\ A2 * /\ W* ::::} < s 1, u, i > * /\ < s~, v, i > * ] 0 
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. * . * . * <s1,u,1> A. <s2,v,1> ::::} <p,w,1> 
-- defn of equivalence (see Chapter 2) 
so ~ [A* A. W* =} <p,w,i> * ]0 
i.e. CANCEL(W, <p,w,i> , A, 0) 
If s1~s2 
. * . * . * df f . 1 <s1,u,1> /\. <s2,v,1> ::::} <n,w,1> -- en o eqmva ence 
so ~ [A* A. W* =} <p,w,i>* ]0 
i.e. CANCEL(W, <p,w,i> , A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
3.CANCEL on negations 
If x is of the form ( not z) then 
3a) Upward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <s,z, i>, A, 0) 
then CANCEL( W, < '"'-'s,x,i > , A, 0) 
"If an instance of z is implied with sign s, then the same instance of the 
negation of z is implied with sign '"'-'S." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL(W, <s,z ,i>, A, 0) 
means~ [ A* A. W* =} <s,z,i> * ]0 
<s,z, i> * = <'"'"'s,(not z),i>* 
= < '"'-'S,x, i> * 
so~ [ A* A. W* =} < '"'"'s,x, i>* ]0 
i.e. CANCEL(W, <'"'"'s,x, i>, A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
--Lemma 3.1 
--Definition of x 
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3b) Downward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <s,x,i> , A, 0) 
then CANCEL(W, <'"'"'s,z,i> , ·A, 0) 
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"If an instance of {not z) is implied with sign s, then the same instance of z is 
implied with sign '"'-'S." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( W, <s,x,i> A, 0) 
means [ A* /\ W* =} < s,x,i > * ]0 
. * ( ) . * <s,x,1> = < s, not z ,1> 
= < '"'-'s,z,i > * 
so r [A* /\ W* =? < '"'-'S,z,i > * ]0 
i. e. CANCEL( W, < '"'"'s,z,i>, A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
4. Manipulation of Assumption Set 
--Lemma 3.1 
The assumption set for the predicate calculus CANCEL is a set of signed indexed 
wf f s, and is used in the same way as the propositional form . 
4a) The Unassuming Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, < '"'"'s,x, i> , AU { <s,x ,i> }, 0) 
then CANCEL( W, < '"'"'s,x, i> , A, 0) 
"In the case of assuming <s,x,i> *, i f <'"'-'s,x ,i> * can be proven then it can be 
proven without that assumption ." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( W, < '"'"'s,x,i>, AU { <s,x, i> }, 0) 
means r [ (AU { <s,x, i>} )* /\ W* =? < '"'-'S,x,i> * ]0 
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. [ A* . * W* . * ] 0 1.e. I\ <s,x,1> /\ =? <,._,_,s ,x,1 > 
so [ A* I\ W* =? <,._,_,s,x,i>* ]0 
i.e. CANCEL(W, <,._,_,s ,x, i>, A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
4b) The Assuming Axiom 
CANCEL(W, <s,x,j>, AU { <s,x,i > }, 1/J) 
where 1/J = {v!j/v!i: vis a variable in x} 
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"An instance of a signed indexed wf f can be assumed by adding a reindexed copy 
of it to the assumption set, with the substitution that is their most general 
unifier." 
Proof of Correctness 
.,. · ( r , .) 
'I-' IS mgu X.l,X.J 
so r [ <s,x,i> * =} < s,x ,j > * ]1/J 
so r [ A* I\ { <s,x,i > }* I\ W* =} <s,x,j>* ]1/J 
i.e. CANCEL( W, < s,x ,j >,AU { < s,x,i> }, 1/J) 
Q.E.D. 
5. CANCEL for Facts 
If f is a fact then 
5a) Fact Axiom 
CANCEL( W, <p,f,i>, A,{}) 
"Anything implies a fact ." 
Proof of Correctness 
f is a fact means r f 
so r r!i 
so r A* I\ W* =? <p,f,i>* 
--renaming of variables 
--defn of triple 
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i.e. CANCEL(W, <p,f,i>, A,{}) 
Q.E.D. 
Sb) Contradiction Axiom ·· 
If CANCEL( <s,x,i> , <n,f,j> , A, 0) 
then CANCEL(W, <'"'-'s,x,i> , A, 0) 
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"If an instance of x, together with the assumptions A, implies a fact is false , 
then given the assumptions, that instance of xis proven false." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( <s,x,i > , <n ,f,j> , A, 0) 
means f- [A*/\ <s,x,i > * =} <n,f,j> * ]0 
so f- not {A* /\ <s,x,i > * )0 
so f- [A*/\ W* =} <'"'-'s ,x,i>* ]0 
i.e. CANCEL(W, <'"'-'s,x ,i > , A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
6. Contrapositive Axiom 
CANCEL( <s1,w1,i> , <s2,w2,j> , A, 0) 
= CANCEL(<'"'-'s2,w2,j>, <,..__,s1,w1,i> , A, 0) 
--as <n ,f,j > * is unsatisfiabl e 
"To swap the sides of the signed indexed wffs, their signs must be negated. As 
the right hand signed indexed wf f s are the ones that are used by the other 
axioms, this axioms is used lo change the focus from one of the signed wf fs lo 
the other." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( <s1,w1,i>, <s2,w2,j>, A, 0) 
means f- [A* /\ < s1,w1,i>* =} <s2,w2,j>* ]0 
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so f- [A* /\ < ,..__,s2,w2,j > * =} < ,..__,s1,w1,i> * ]0 
--contrapositive of implication 
i.e. CANCEL(<,..__,s2,w2;j>, <"""s1,w1,j>, A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
3.3.3 Status of the Axioms 
These axioms are complete in the sense that if there is a consistent set of 
facts, and success logically follows from the facts then 
CANCEL(?W, <p,success,l>, {}, 0) 
can be deduced using the above axioms; where ?Wis free, meaning that anything 
implies success; and 0 is a substitution from which answers can be extracted. 
In fact axioms 1 b, 2, 3, 4 and 5a by themselves form a complete deduction 
system (proven in Appendix C). The problem solver restricted to these axioms is 
however only a unidirectional problem solver, either working from the facts 
forwards, or the goals backwards. Axioms la, 5b and 6 allow for a bidirectional 
deduction system, or a system that starts from the middle and works forwards and 
backwards. 
3.4 Use of the CANCEL relationship 
In this and the next two sections a brief overview of the use of the axioms 
defining the CANCEL relation is given. In chapter 4 a more detailed account of an 
actual system that uses the axioms is presented. 
There are many ways to use the axioms to form a problem solver. They can 
be put in a PROLOG-like horn clause interpreter, and used in a backward chaining 
manner. They can be used like production systems in a forward chaining manner . 
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In fact any other problem solving strategy for Horn clauses in the first order 
predicate calculus can be used. In any case, to make a reasonably effective problem 
solver they need to be compiled into a working system rather than being 
interpreted. As there are only a few of the axioms, and they are all horn clauses, it 
is straightforward to hand compile them into a finished product. The rest of this 
section examines ways to do this. An automatic compilation of the axioms is one of 
the aims of future research. 
3.4.1 Top Level Goal 
The aim of the problem solver is to prove 
VW 30 CANCEL(W, <p,success,l> , {} , 0) 
So when W is skolemised and 0 is made free , the top level goal is: 
CANCEL(W, <p ,success ,l>, {}, ?0) 
where success is an implicit odd input wff and W is an arbitrary signed indexed wff. 
These arbitrary wffs are introduced in axioms lb, 4a and 5. Thus in the top level 
goal W acts as a Skolem constant, and in ax·oms lb, 4a and 5 the Wis a free 
variable. I-Jere ?0 is a free variable in the top level goal which matches any 
substitution . When ?0 is instantiated, the answers can be extracted from the 
resulting substitution . 
- 3.4.2 Preprocessing 
In any implementation it is anticipated that unifications between input 
atomic formulae will only be done once for each pair of atoms. Thus the ¢> in axiom 
1 is computed once and stored for each pair of input wffs. It only needs to be done 
for atoms of opposite parity. During the deduction phase there is no searching for 
unifications, rather reindexing of substitutions and unifying compositions are all 
that need to be done. 
The information that needs to be stored for each wff is: 
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1. The operator of the wff, one of {and, or, ===}, =, not, atom}, "atom" signifying 
that the wff is atomic; 
2. The superwff of the wff. If there is not one then the wff is a fact. 
3. The parity of the wff. This is a static property of the input wff, that could either 
be stored or calculated when necessary, but as it is only a boolean value its storage 
does not have much overhead. The parity is important as it restricts the axioms 
that need to be considered, thus making the resulting system more efficient (section 
2.7) . 
4. The set of variables in the wff. This is needed for axiom 4b . It could either be 
stored for all wffs or stored only for the atomic formulae and calculated on demand 
for the other wffs. If it is more efficient, it could be transformed into a substitution, 
which could then be reindexed to use in axiom 4b. 
5. For wffs which are not atoms, the set of subwffs need to be stored. 
6. For an atom, the set of atoms of opposite parity with which it unifies, together 
with the unifying compositions should be stored. It is anticipated that this 
information is stored rather than calculated each time as it involves a potentially 
expensive search, and the information may need to be used a number of times. To 
ensure only useful computation is done, the set can be computed the first time that 
it is needed. The book keeping for this is more difficult as the one unifying 
composition needs to be referenced by the two unified atoms. 
This is all of the syntactic information for wffs that is necessary _to use a 
minimal system based on the axioms. This is however not enough information to 
reconstruct the wffs. So to explain the reasoning in terms of input more information 
needs to be provided, namely the actual form of the atoms, and the positions where 
variables were defined. With this information the input can be reconstructed, so 
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that all of the deduction can be explained in terms of the input. An english form of 
any subwff may also be given to enhance explanation (see section 4.6.3.1) . 
3.4.3 Use of Axiom 6 
Without axioms 5b and 6 the problem solver could not use the first argument 
of the CANCEL relation. Without them, forward chaining on the axioms could only 
produce forward proofs, and backward chaining only goal directed, backward 
searching. The use of these axioms allows the problem solver to work both forwards 
and backwards. 
The first argument of the relation can be looked at, in some sense, as the 
facts and the second as the goal. CANCEL then represents the implication of a 
(sub)goal by a fact. Working on the first argument of the relation can be seen as 
manipulating the facts, and on the second argument, the goals . The use of axiom 6 
allows the change in focus from the first argument to the second argument. 
Axiom 6 may be used in a number of formally equivalent, but effectively 
different ways: 
l. The first way is to use it as another axiom in the system. In this case an 
application of the axiom alternates the focus of the problem solver between the 
facts and the goals for that CANCEL. Using this method CES can work in forward 
and backward phases, changing phases by the use of axiom 6. 
2. In any system that uses the axioms there must be some form of (perhaps 
hypothetical) matcher that finds an appropriate axiom for an instantiated 
CANCEL. Another way to use axiom 6 is to incorporate it into the matcher by 
allowing the match.er to return all equivalent matches to a CANCEL, using ax iom 6 
as the definin g equivalence relation. This may produce problems if there was not 
some external mechanism to decide which relat ion is appropriate to use at any time 
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because undirected, there are any number of different paths to the same relation all 
of which would be generated. 
3. Axiom 6 could be used as ari · equivalence relation in another way by applying it 
to the axioms as they stand, thus producing equivalent relations, but acting on the 
first argument of the CANCEL instead of the second. This would produce separate 
axioms working on the facts and the goals. For example, axiom 3a would produce 
the following axiom: 
3a') If x is of the form "(not z)" 
and CANCEL( <s,z,i>, W, A, 0) 
then CANCEL(< "-'S,x,i>, W, A, 0) 
Each of the existing axioms produces one more axiom, except for axioms 2b and 2d 
which produce three more, namely with each CANCEL in the antecedent acting on 
the first or the second argument. Such a problem solver has forward and backward 
axioms to use each at the appropriate time with the appropriate heuristic . The 
axioms produced by this equivalence relation are used as a basis for more advanced 
problem solvers where there is no corresponding contrapositive axiom (see Chapter 
6). 
3.5 Backward Chaining on the Axioms 
One obvious way to use the CANCEL relation is to do a backward chaining, 
or a goal directed search on the axioms. This is the sort of search that would be 
done if the axioms were put into a PROLOG (Warren and Pereira[77]) system. It is 
a suitab le·way to proceed as each of the axioms is expressed as a Horn Clause (see 
Kowalski[74]). And/ or search techniques can be employed to find a solu tion given a 
particular set of facts. A number of refin ements can be made to improve the search . 
The following sections give some of these refinements. 
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3.5.1 Choosing a unique index 
In axiom 1 b, it suffices to choose m to be a unique index not appearing in any 
other CANCEL. This can be done by first choosing m to be 2, and then each 
subsequent value for mis one plus the previous value. This ensures that all values 
are umque. 
Lemma 3.2 If m is chosen as above, then there is no possibility that j is the 
same as m, or that j will appear in A, W or 1/J. So choosing m in this way , ensures 
that the second condition of axiom lb holds. 
Proof: Firstly j -=j, m, by the definition of how m was chosen to be one 
greater than the highest index in the system. The only place that a change of index 
can occur is in axiom 1. o indexes apart from the ones in the CANCEL, and the 
ones produced by subsequent applications of axiom 1 can occur in the substitution 
or the assumption set. This is because· union or unifying composition cannot add 
different variables, and the only other place they can be added is in axiom 1. This 
means that only indexes of i, m, or greater than m can appear. None of these can 
be j , as j :/: i, and j < m. 
Q.E.D. 
3.5.2 Building up possible assumption sets 
In a straight back chaining system axiom 4a can be used on each new 
CANCEL generated as a subgoal. Once it has been used once on a particular 
subgoal, then another reduction using axiom 4a will produce the same subgoal, and 
so .need not be done. At one extreme it could be used on every newly produ ced 
subgoal (except for the ones produced by the use of axiom 4a). If this is done then 
the assumption set built up , , would be the maximal set of assumptions on which 
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axiom 4b would be applicable. Any subset of A could also be generated by the 
application of axiom 4a at the appropriate subgoals. Having the maximal possible 
assumption set does not restrict the possible applicable axioms, however having a 
smaller assumption set may . 
Thus for every newly generated subgoal, axiom 4a should be used. This 
produces the maximal possible assumption set A, so that axiom 4b can be used 
whenever possible. In axioms 2b, 2d and 2e, the whole assumption set of the goal is 
made the assumption set of each subgoal. This is equivalent to incorporating axiom 
4a into every other axiom, and then building up a new set of axioms. For example 
2b would become 
2b
2) If CANCEL(W, <"-'OP1 ,X1 ,i> , AU { <opo ,x, i> }, 01) 
and CANCEL(W, <,..___,op 2,x2,i>, AU { <opo,x, i> }, 02) 
then CANCEL(W, <"-'op0,x,i> , A, uc(01,02)) 
If this is done the assumption set for any subgoal is the set of oppositely 
signed indexed wffs that are higher level subgoals. This is the set of signed indexed 
wffs that can be assumed using axiom 4a. 
3.5.3 Use of Substitutions 
One of the main questions in designing a problem solver based on the 
backward chaining of the axioms is the method of checking the consistency of the 
substitutions. Included in this is the calculation of the unifying compositions. The 
three following methods can be used. The first two represent different ways that 
unifying composition can be incorporated into a PROLOG-type system, and the 
third utilises the commutativity and associativity of unifying composition . 
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1. Compute unifying compositions at the end 
One of the ways to put these axioms into PROLOG is to have unifying 
composition as a function of two arguments. Let "uc(0,'lj!)" be a function which 
returns the unifying composition of substitutions "0" and "1/J". 0 and 1/J are 
consistent if the unifying composition is defined. For example, using this , axiom 2b 
becomes: 
CANCEL(W, <,...,_,op1,x1 ,i>, A1, </>1) 
and CANCEL(W, <,...,_,op2,x2 ,i>, A2, </>2) 
=} CANCEL(W, <,...,_,op0,x,i> , A1 U A2, uc(¢>1,¢>2)) 
The resultant substitution will be a term consisting of substitutions from 
axioms 1,4,Sa and combined with the function "uc". This can be seen as having a 
planning phase where a possible solution is found, without a consistency check, 
followed by a verification phase in which the substitutions are checked for 
consistency. This method of having a planning phase separate from the consistency 
checking v.erification phase has been advocated by a number of people ( eg 
Klahr[78]). 
This seems to be a good way to search if the planning is cheap relative to the 
verification , and the planning phase runs into many dead ends. The verification of 
consistency is only done when it can possibly lead to a solution, and does not need 
to be done for those search paths that lead to dead ends. This method does not 
allow the use of inconsistencies to prune the search tree. It can also be used when 
all possible solutions, or a generator of all possible solutions is returned, so that the 
verification phase can search using the terms of the unifying composition, without 
needing to return to the planning phase. 
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2. Evaluation on the way forwards 
One way to look at backward chaining is as a way of planning the forward 
application of the axioms, so that only relevant axioms are tried. In this case the 
unifying compositions can be done during the forward chaining phase of the 
composition. That is once two substitutions that need to be unified are generated 
then their unifying composition is computed. This means that, if a backtracking 
method is used, the search can continue from the place where the inconsistency was 
generated. Thus inconsistencies can be used to prune the search space. 
This is the way that unifying compositions would be checked if the other 
method of using unifying compositions is used in PROLOG. In this UC is a 
predicate of three arguments, UC(</> ,7/),0) meaning that 0 is the unifying composition 
of </J and 7/). This predicate would then be axiomatised within the system. 
For ~xample, axiom 2b becomes: 
CANCEL(W, <,..__,op1,x1,i>, A1 , </>1) 
and CANCEL(W, <,..__,op2,x2,i> , A2, </>2) 
and UC(¢1, ¢>2, </>) 
=? CANCEL(W, <,..__,op0,x,i>, A1 U A2, </>) 
Effectively, when the two CANCELS have been deduced, the unifying 
composition of the two substitutions is computed, (or perhaps looked up if it has 
been computed before), and then the resultant CANCEL is deduced. 
3. Unifying during the backchaining 
Both of the previous methods suffer from the fact that they do not recognise 
inconsistencies until after they cause problems on the way up , or even later. For 
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example if a substitution in CANCEL C is inconsistent with the substitutions of 
CANCELs heiger in the search tree then C can never appear in a solution, as in any 
solution it must appear with the higher level goals, and all the substitutions must be 
consistent. This is because unifying composition is associative and commutative 
{Theorem A.6) . Thus the search tree can be pruned when a substitution that is 
inconsistent with the substitutions of higher level goals is generated. 
If the search proceeds by maintaining consistent and-trees, then by noting 
that the unifying composition is commutative and associative, and that all of the 
substitutions generated must be consistent then, whenever a substitution comes into 
the system (at axioms la, lb, 4b) it must be consistent with the other substitutions 
in the system. The solution substitution is the unifying composition of all of the 
substitutions in the system. So the unifying composition of the substitutions in the 
current and-tree is kept, and updated when a new substitution is added. 
For a more detailed de!:icription of how this can be done see the next chapter, 
where a system that uses this method will be described. 
Example 3 .1 
Consider the fact: 
P(a) or P(b) 
and the goal: 
3x P(x) 
This goal then becomes the fact : 
P(?x) ::::} success 
The input wffs can be named as follows: 
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P(a) or P(b) 
w1 w3 w2 
P (?x) ::::} success 
w4 w6 w5 
The implicit odd goal "success" is wff w7. 
The aim of the problem solver is to prove 
1) CANCEL(W, <p,w7,l>, {}, ?0) 
to prove 1 use axiom lb, ¢>={}, m=2, and produce subgoal 
2) CANCEL(W, <p,w5,2 >, { <n,w7,l> }, ?0) 
to prove 2 use axiom 2d producing 
3) CANCEL(W, <p,w6 ,2 >, { <n,w7,l> , <n,w6,2> }, ?01) 
and 
4) CANCEL( W, <p,w4,2>, { <n ,w7,l>, <n,w6,2>} ?02) 
where ?0 = uc(?01 ,?82) 
step 3 holds by axiom 5, ?01 ={} 
"To prove success prove P(?x!2}." 
to prove 4 use axiom lb , x=w1, m=3, ¢>={a/x!2} producing 
5) CANCEL(W, <p,wl ,3> , { <n,w7,l> , <n ,w6,2> , <n,w4,2 >} ?03) 
where ?01 =uc(?03,{a/x!2}) 
or to prove 4 use axiom lb, x=w2, m=4, ¢>={b/x!2} producing 
6) CANCEL( W, <p,w2,4 > , { <n,w7,l> , <n,w6,2 > , <n,w4,2 > }, ?03) 
to prove 5, use axiom 2d, and prove 
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7) CANCEL( W, <p,w3,3 > , { <n,w7,l>, <n,w5,2> , <n,w4,2>, <n,wl ,3 > },?04) 
which holds by axiom Sa as w3 is a fact, 04={} 
and prove 
8) CANCEL(W, <n,w2,3> , { <n ,w7,l > , <n,w5,2>, <n,w4 ,2 >, <n,wl,3> },?05) 
where ?03=uc(?04,?05) 
"To prove P(a) prove not P(b)." 
to prove 8, use axiom 1 b, x=w4, m=5, ?05=uc(?06, { a/x!5}) producing 
9) CANCEL(W, <n,w4,5 >, { <n,w7,l> , <n ,w5,2>, <n ,w4,2 > , <n,wl ,3 >, 
<p,w2,3> }, ?06) 
to prove 9, use axiom 2d, producing 
10) CA CEL( W, <p,w6,5>, { <n,w7,l> , <n,w5,2 >, <n,w4,2 > , <n ,w l ,3> , 
<p,w2,3>, <p,w4,5> }, 07) 
which holds by axiom Sa, ?07={}. 
and prove 
11) CANCEL(W, <n,w5,5 >, { <n,w7,l>, <n ,w5 ,2>, <n,w4,2 > , <n,wl ,3>, 
<p,w2,3 > , <p,w4,5> }, ?08) 
where ?06=uc(?07,?08) 
"To prove not P(b) prove not success." 
to prove 11, use axiom lb, x=w7, m=6, ?08=uc({},?07) producing 
12) CANCEL(W, <n ,w7,6> , { <n ,w7,l> , <n ,w5 ,2 >, <n ,w4,2 > , <n ,wl ,3 > , 
<p ,w2 ,3 >, <p,w4,5>, <p,w5 ,5> }, ?09) 
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which holds by axiom 4b, ?09={} 
"Not success may be assumed when trying to prove success." 
Thus the problem is solved with resulting substitution ?0={a/x!2, b/x!S} 
The solut ion tree for the search can be represented as follows: 
(7) 
(4) 
(1) <p .w7 . 1> 
! {} 
(2) <p . w5. 2> 
I \ 
<p,w4.2> 
*l{a/x'2} 
<p.w6 , 2> (3) 
(5) <p . w1. 3> 
<p. w3 , 3> 
(10) 
I \ 
<n ,w2 . 3> (8) 
l{b/x!S} 
<n .w4 . 5> (9) 
I \ 
<p.w6.5> <n .w5 , 5> (11) 
I{} 
<n.w7,6> (12) 
Page 3-28 
In this tree "*" represents the on ly choice point reached. The alternative, namely 
step 6 in the proof, is not represented on this tree. The bracketed numbers 
correspond to the step numbers. The substitutions next to the arcs represent 
substitutions that must be consistent for t hat node to be in the possible solut ion 
tree. Note that axiom 4b is not applicab le at steps 9 and 11 as the resulting 
substitution is not consistent with the higher level substitut ions. 
3.6 Forward Chaining on the Axioms 
Another obvious way to use these axioms is to use them as production rules, 
and forward chain on them. Apart from the problem of when to use a ·part icul ar 
axiom, one of the main problems in forward chaining is to .ensure that the indexes 
m~tch in the axioms with two CANCELs producing a third, wi thout repeated 
rei ndex in g of the C CEL. Changing indexes in the substitu tion and the 
assumption set at every app lication of an ax iom would be very expensive. 
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To overcome this problem, restrict the CANCEL so that i1 is always 0, and i2 
is always 1. If this is done then the reindexing is only done when necessary, and the 
rules when to reindex are well defined. Less information needs to be carried around 
with each relation, as the indexes can be left implicit. 
The following lemma shows how reindexing of the CANCEL could proceed if 
there was no restriction as above. 
Lemma 3.3: 
If CA CEL( W, < s,w,i> , A, 0), 
and m is an index distinct from i, and not appearing in W, A or 0; 
then CANCEL( W, < s,w,m> , A!i-+m, 0!i-+m) 
where A!i-+m = { <sj ,wj ,(IF ij=i THEN m ELSE ij)> : < sj ,wj,ij> E A} 
Proof: This is a complete renaming of all instances of index i to index m in 
the relation where mis an index which does not appear in the original relation . By 
the definition of CANCEL i does not appear in W. 
Q.E.D. 
Various of the axioms can be modified to incorporate the above restriction on 
the relation. Section E.3 gives the complete list of the modified axioms. The 
following describes the axioms that are changed: 
la) Equality CANCEL Axiom 
If x and z are input atoms and ¢ is mgu(x!O ,Y!l) 
then CANCEL( <p,x,O>, <p,y, l> , {} , ¢) 
Axiom la is thus greatly simpli fied by not needing to rename variables at all. In 
fact all of the ins tances of axiom la can be ca lcu lated at inpu t . 
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Proof follows directly from the definition of CANCEL. 
1 b) Equality Substitution Axiom 
If¢> = mgu(x!O , y!l) 
and CANCEL(W, <s,x,l>, A, 1/J) 
then CANCEL(W, <s,y, l>, A!l-m, 0) 
where 0 = uc( 1/)!l-tm, ¢>!O-tm) 
and m is a unique index. 
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Axiom 1b has been changed by changing index 1 to a new index in the original 
substitution. 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( W, <s,x,l > , A, 1/J) 
means f- [A* /\ W* =? <s,x,l > * ]1/J 
so f- [ A!l-m* /\ W* =? <s,x,m>* ]0 --renaming variables, Jefn of uc 
<s,x,m> *0 = <s,x,m> *(</>!O-tmYo0 --defn of UC 
. . = <s,y,1> *(¢>!0-m)o0 --as ¢;!O-in=mgu(x!m,y!l) 
= <s,y,1> *0 --by definition of 0 
so f- [ A!l-m* /\ W* =? <s,y,l> * ]0 
i.e. CANCEL(W, <s,y,m>, A!l-m, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
Axioms 2,3,Sa do not change apart from being restricted to have O in the i1 
position, and 1 in the i2 position . 
4. The changes to the manipulation of the assumption set allow the assumption 
of the wff, without knowing the exact index that is needed to be assumed. The 
value of the index is only derived when i t is required. The axiom becomes as 
follo ws: 
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4a) The Unassuming Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, < s,y,1> , AU { < '"'"'s,y,j> }, t/J) 
th en CANCEL(W, < s,y,1> , A, 0) 
where 0 = uc( t/J ,¢ ) 
where ¢ = { v!j/v!l : v is a variable in y} 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL(W, < s,y,1> , A U { < '"'"'s,j ,y> }, t/;) 
means f- [ A* /\ < '"'"'s,y ,j> * /\ W* =} < s,y,1> Jt/J 
so f- [ A* /\ W* =} < s,y ,j> * V < s,y,1> * ]t/J 
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-- cont raposit ive of implication 
¢ = mgu(y!j ,Y!l ) 
t/Jo0 = ¢00 = 0 
so 0 unifies y!j with y!l 
applying 0 to above implication 
gives f- [ A* ;\ W* =} < s,y,1> * ]0 
i.e. CANCEL(W, < s,y, 1> , A, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
4b) The A ssuming Axiom 
CANCEL(W1, W2, {W2}, {}) 
-- defini t ion of unifying composition 
Proof fo llows directly from the defini t ion of CANCEL. 
Axiom Sb becomes: 
IF CANCEL( < s,x,O> , <n ,f,1> , A,¢) 
then CANCEL(W, < '""'s,x ,1> , A!(O->1,1- m) , ¢ !(O- 1,1- m)) 
w~ere m is a unique ind ex. 
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Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL(<s,x,O>, <n,f,l>, A,¢) 
means f- [A*/\ <s,x,O>* =? <n,f,l>* ]¢ 
so f- [A*=? <""s,x,O>* ]¢ --as f is a fact 
so f- [ A!(0-+1,1-+m) /\ W* =? <""s,x,l>* ]¢!(0-+1,1-+m) 
--renaming vars 
i.e. CANCEL(W, < ""s,x,l>, A!(0-+1,1-+m), <,b!(0-+1,1-+m)) 
Q.E.D. 
6. Contrapositive Axiom 
becomes slightly more complicated: 
CANCEL( <s1,w 1,0>, <s2,w2,I> , A, 0) 
= CANCEL(<""s2,w2,0>, <,..__,s1,w1,I > , A!(0-+1,1->0), 0!(0-+1,1-+0)) 
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This is a straight renaming of variables, its correctness follows directly from axiom 
6 and Lemma 3.3. 
In this forward system, the indexes only need to be defined as needed. There 
is no restriction on possible deductions because the corresponding indexes do not 
match. Note that all of the renaming of indexes only changes indexes O and l. 
These can be treated as special cases so the overhead of renaming is greatly 
reduced . For example the assumption set could be stored as a set of pairs < i, S> , 
where S is the set of <s,w> such that <s,w,i> EA. Each index i could have a 
unique pair in the implementation. Reindexing then consists of finding the 
corresponding pair , and changing its first value. As the only indexes changes are 0 
and 1, and t he on ly new assumptions added to the assumption set are of index 1, 
these indexes cou ld be treated separately in the assumption set making reindex ing 
even more efficient. 
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Example 3.2 
This example shows the .use of indices to neatly solve a problem which, in 
similar systems, requires the use of "high complexity proofs" (Nilsson[79], 
Sickel[76]). 
Consider the problem given in example 3.1 with the input wffs named as 
follows: 
P(a) or P(b) 
w1 w3 w2 
P ( ?x) ==} success 
w4 w6 w5 
Let the implicit goal "success" be input wff w7. 
The forward proof proceeds as follows: 
1) CANCEL( <p,wl ,O> , <p ,w4,1> , {} , {a/?x!l}) --Axiom la 
2) CANCEL(W, <p ,w6,1> , {} , {}) -- Axiom Sa 
3) CANCEL( <p ,w l ,O > , <p ,w5, 1 > , {} , {a/?x!l}) -- Axiom 2d, steps 1,2 
"If P(a) holds then success holds ." 
4) CANCEL(<p,wl,O> , <p ,w7,1> , {} , {a/?x!2}) -- Axiom 1 b, step 3, m=2 
5) CANCEL( <p ,w2,0> , <p ,w4, l > , {}, {b/?x!l}) -- Axiom la 
6) CANCEL( <p,w2,0> , <p ,w5,l>, {}, {b/?x!l}) -- Axiom 2d, steps 2,4 
"if P(b) holds then success holds." 
7) CANCEL(<p,w2,0>, <p ,w7,1>, {}, {b/?x!3}) --Axiom lb, step 6, m=3 
8) CA CEL( <n,w7,0>, <n,wl,1 > , {} , {a/?x!2}) -- Axiom 6, step 4 
9) CANCEL( <n ,w7,0> , <n ,w2, 1 > , {}, {b/?x!3}) -- Axiom 6, step 7 
lO)CANCEL( <n ,w7,0> , <n,w3,1 >, {}, {a/?x!2, b/?x!3}) 
-- Axiom 2b, steps 8,9 
ll)CA CEL(W, <p ,w7,1> , {} , {a/?x!2, b/?x!3}) -- Axiom Sb, step 10 
"success holds" 
Q.E.D. 
Note that the system automatically allows for different instances of the variable ?x 
by use of the index system. 
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Example 3.3 
The following shows how indexing solves the problem of one wff implying 
different instances of another wff. 
Consider the problem with the implication: V?x [P(?x) ===? P(f(?x))] 
and the fact P(b) 
with the goal P(f(f(f(b)))) 
Name each of the input wffs as follows: 
P(b) 
wl 
P(?x) ===? P(f(?x)) 
w2 w4 w3 
P(f(f(f(b)))) ===? s11ccess 
w5 w7 w6 
Let the implicit goal "success" be input wff w8. 
A proof proceeds as follows : 
1) CANCEL( <p,w l ,O> , <p ,w2, l> , {}, {b/?x!l}) 
-- Axiom la 
2) CANCEL(W, <p,w4,l>, {}, {}) 
-- Axiom 5a 
3) CANCEL( <p,wl ,O> , <p,w3, l>, {} , {b/?x!l}) 
-- Axiom 2d, steps 1,2 
"If P(b) holds then P(f(b)) holds ." 
4) CANCEL( <p,wl ,O> , <p ,w2, l >, {}, {b/?x!2, f(b)/?x!l}) 
-- Axiom lb, step 3, m=2 , </>={f(?x!O)/?x!l} 
5) CANCEL( <p,wl,O>, <p ,w3,l >, {}, {b/?x!2, f(b)/?x!l}) 
-- Axiom 2d, steps 2,4 
"If P(b) holds then P(f(f(b))) holds." 
-6) CANCEL( <p,wl ,O>, <p,w2 ,l >, {}, {b/?x!2, f(b)/?x!3 , f(f(b))/?x!l}) 
-- Axiom lb, step 5, m=3, </>={ f(?x!O)/?x!l} 
7) CANCEL( <p,w l ,O> , <p,w3,l>, {}, {b/?x!2, f(b)/ ?x!3, f(f(b))/?x!l}) 
-- Axiom 2d, steps 2,6 
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"If P(b) holds then P(J(J(J(b)))) holds ." 
8) CANCEL( <p,w l ,O> , <p,w5 ,l> , {} , {b/?x!2, f(b)/?x!3, f(f(b))/ ?x!4}) 
-- Axiom lb, step 7, m=4, u={f(f(b))/?x!O} 
9) CANCEL(W, <p,w7,l > , {}, {}) 
-- Axiom Sa 
lO)CANCEL( <p ,w l ,O> , <p,w6,l> , {} , {b/?x!2, f(b)/?x!3 , f(f(b))/?x!4}) 
-- Axiom 2d, steps 8,9 
"If P(b) holds the success holds ." 
ll)CANCEL( <p ,w l ,O> , <p ,w8, l> , {}, {b/?x!2, f(b)/?x!3, f(f(b))/?x!4} , {}) 
-- Axiom lb, step 11 , m=5, ¢,={} 
12)CANCEL(W, <p ,w8,l > , {}, {b/?x!2, f(b )/?x!3, f(f(b ))/?x!4}) 
-- Axioms 6,5b ; step 11 
"Success holds ." 
Q.E.D. 
3.7 A Comparison With Other Systems 
3.7.1 The Production System for Automatic Deduction of Nilsson[79] 
Th e system proposed in Nilsson[79] is one of the systems on which CES is 
based. In this section some of the areas where CES has improved on his system are 
outlined. 
Nilsson[79] proposes a system with a CANCEL relation much like that 
proposed here. His works on two and/or tree structu res, called the goal tree, and 
the fact tree. The fact tree is built up by rules called operators, and the goal tree is 
built up by rules called reducers. His CANCEL is a relation between nodes in these 
two t rees. 
The system proposed here can be seen as an extension of the ideas of ilsson, 
but it differs in a number of respects. 
CES is designed to be complete (see Appendix C). Nilsson's is not. His system 
breaks down on some very simple proofs, for example in proving half the 
distribu tive law , Nilsson's system cannot prove: 
(( a and b) or (a and c)) follows from (a and (b or c)) . 
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This seems to be a major deficiency, as it does not allow for the possibility of 
finding a proof when only distributive variants are present. 
CES has an explicit logical relationship that CANCEL models. This makes it 
possible to prove that the axioms are correct and complete. It also allow a more 
natural expression of what the CANCEL relation means. A CANCEL can be 
described in terms of an implication, rather than just a CANCEL. This allows for a 
much more usable system as the user need know nothing about the internal 
structure of the system to use or follow its reasoning. 
The only transformation of the input in CES is to skolemise existential 
variables and to rename some universally quantified variables, but this only occurs 
once. Implications are kept, and negations are not moved in as in ilsson 's system. 
Once the initial wffs are set up there is no more renaming of variables, or copying 
of wffs , as is needed for the "high complexity proofs" of Nilsson. There is also a 
canonical isomorphism between the internal and external forms, so that explanation 
can be done in terms of the input. Much more book keeping needs to be done to do 
this in ilsson's system. CES allows virtually any first order predicate calculus 
formula, rather than the restricted forms allowed by ilsson. 
The copying of variables in CES system is done automatically. There is no 
need to worry about rewriting wffs as conjunctions or disjunctions for variables to 
rewrite, as is needed for "high complexity proofs". There is not the resultant 
problem of finding the "obvious" clues of which variables to rewrite, and the 
resulting restructuring of the trees. Reasoning is done in terms of the input wffs, 
and copying of variables may only happen once on input. The use of indexed 
variables does not impose much overhead. 
The system described here is more flexible than Nilsson's, as there is no need 
to rigidly impose a strict fact-tree and goal-tree approach with operators and 
reducers, although these restrictions can be imposed within the system if it is seen 
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to be appropriate for the problem. 
However Nilsson's system is a member of the CES family. Nilsson's system 
can be derived from CES by defining a control component with suitable restrictions 
on the relations. The following shows how Nilsson's ideas could be incorporated into 
a deduction scheme using the above axioms: 
First of all, the assumption set is always left empty, so axiom 4 is never used. 
The wffs are restricted to the forms of operators, reducers, facts and goals. Thus 
there are four types of objects instead of one. The system maintains a list of what 
instances of axiom 1 b can be used. The user adds a new allowable instance of the 
axiom by applying an operator to the fact tree or a reducer to the goal tree. 
Applying these allows that match to be used in axiom 1 b. Axiom la is only allowed 
for atoms that are the leaves of the fact or goal trees. The system then proceeds by 
forward chaining. 
3. 7 .2 Linear Resolution 
Over the last years automatic deduction systems called theorem provers have 
been very popular. These have mostly been based on the resolution principle 
(Robinson[65]). Many of these have relied on knowledge being in conjunctive 
normal form. Converting to CNF has the disadvantages of multiplying out subterms 
by use of the distributive law, and the loss of the input form. 
One of the most successful of these methods is Linear Resolution (Chang and 
Lee[73]), and the related Model Elimination (Loveland[79]) . 
Linear resolution can be seen as a more restricted form of the backward 
chaining CANCEL. Linear resolution can be simulated in CES by having a right 
first preorder traversal of the search tree. The boxed literals represent the higher 
level goals, and correspond to the elements of the assumption set. Resolving an 
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unboxed literal , is equivalent to using axiom 4a to add the wff to the assumption set 
(boxing the literal) , together with axiom 1 b, of generating a new cancel relation 
with that atom, and applying the substitution (generating a new clause, with the 
atom on the right hand side, and applying the substitution). Deleting an unboxed 
literal that resolved with a boxed literal to the left of it corresponds to the use of 
axiom 4b. 
The system described here does not require the use of a strict right to left 
preorder traversal of the solution tree, as does Linear resolution , but rather the 
search can proceed along the most desirable ordering for the given problem. The 
syntactic advantages in the reduction of the combinatorial explosion of linear 
resolution are available in the system here. For a more detailed comparison see 
section 4.6.1 
3. 7 .3 Connection Graph Proof Procedures 
CES can be seen as a connection graph proof procedure for wffs in their input 
form. To do this wffs can be seen to· be nodes. Unifications are only done once for 
each pair of unifiable atoms. This can either be done during inpat or on demand, 
and the proof procedure finds unifying compositions of these substitutions. Once 
these unifications are carried out, the internal forms of the atoms never need be 
taken into account, so that we could be working with graphs with structureless 
nodes. That is the parse tree of the wffs, with atoms being single nodes. This 
enables there to be no searching for unifiers of an atom, and no unifications during 
processmg. 
3. 7 .3 .1 Clause Interconnectivity Graph of Sickel 
Sickel[76] describes a search technique for a graphical representation of \\·ffs 
in conjunctive normal form called a "clause interconnectivity graph" (CIC). Our 
system can be seen to be an extension of this technique without transforming the 
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wffs to cnf. 
The CIG is the set of clauses with the unifications of matching atoms being 
the edges in the graph. This corresponds to the initial working out of the 
unifications for axiom 1. 
The linear equations for the partial solutions of a node correspond to the 
instances of the axioms above. The only difference is that as Sickel's system only 
works on wffs in CNF, there is no need to explicitly represent conjunctions and 
disjunctions, and so the facts can be more uniform in nature. 
The merge loops of Sickel correspond to the use of assumption sets. If there is 
a walk from node n down the solution tree to itself in the form of a merge loop, 
then that path of the search tree in Sickel is terminated corresponding to axiom 4b. 
The tautology loops of Sickel correspond to the pruning of the search tree 
according to Theorem B.3. 
The use of indexed variables removes the need for creating new instances of 
clauses, and the need for high complexity level proofs. Section 4.5 describes how 
complexity level proofs can be done if it is decided that it is an appropriate way to 
do the search. 
Chapter 4 
From Axio·ms to Working System 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter shows how a particular control component can be added to the 
logical description of CES in Chapter 3 to 'produce an implementation of CES. It 
should be noted that CES does not prejudice the choice of control structure, and 
the control component described here is only one of many possible. The 
implementation is the one used for the expert system on student enrolment given in 
Appendix D. The problem solver is shown to embrace the techniques of Linear 
Resolution (Chang and Lee[73]); Connection Graph Proof Procedures (particularly 
Sickel[76]) and the problem reduction problem solvers (Nilsson[80]) . Ways to 
incorporate the explanation capabilities of expert systems, such as Emycin (van 
Melle[79,80]) are also described. 
The implementation is based on a restricted form of CANCEL which only 
uses a subset of the axioms. This is the restriction that is proven complete in 
Appendix C. The last section describes how the problem solver can be extended to 
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the full CANCEL. 
Define a projection of the predicate calculus CANCEL, "PROVEN" by 
PROVEN( W,A, 0) 
means VW1 CANCEL(W1, W,A,0) 
where W1 and W are signed indexed wffs; 
A is an assumption set; 
0 is an indexed substitution. 
PROVEN(W,A, 0) is defined to model 
f- [A*::::} W* ]0 
The axioms used are projections of axioms 1 b, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 3, 4, and Sa for 
the PROVEN relation. 
The implementation presented here is based on back ward chaining on these 
axioms. 
The system bas two independent parts, namely an algorithm to build an 
and/or tree (given by expand), and and algorithm to search the and/or tree (given 
by search). 
The aim of the search is to find an and-subtree of the and/or tree with all 
substitutions consistent. Substitutions are used as in section 3.5.3.3. The search 
proceeds by maintaining a consistent partial and-subtree. Consistency is maintained 
using non-chronological backtracking. The procedure expand is used to expand 
unexpanded nodes. Once a choice has been made it may have to be undone if 
subsequent substitutions are found to be inconsistent. 
The following definitions are used in this chapter: an or-node is a node, one 
of whose offspring must hold for it to hold ; an and-node is a node, all of whose 
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offspring must hold for the node to hold; the special case of an and-node with no 
off spring is separated as a special case called a solved node. Solved nodes are tips 
of candidate solution trees, and are produced, for example by axioms 4b and Sa. 
The term and-node wil'l not be used for nodes with no offspring. An or-offspring is 
an offspring of an or-node, and an and-offspring is an offspring of an and-node. 
4.2 Using the Axioms 
When backward chaining, axioms 1 b, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 3a, 3b and Sa are 
mutually exclusive. The applicable axiom is determined by the sign, the direction 
and the logical connective of the input wff in the subgoal PROVEN relation . 
Axioms 2, 3, and Sa match in one way only if they match at all. An or-node in the 
search tree does not need to be produced for the choice of the appropriate axiom. 
There may be many instances of axiom lb which are applicable, one for each 
matching atorr., so axiom lb produces an or-node. 
Axic:im 4 acts quite differently. Axiom 4a is applicable for every subgoal, and 
is used at every subgoal to produce a maximal assumption set so that axiom 4b is 
used whenever it can be. Axiom 4b is used to form a solved terminal node, with 
each applicable instance of axiom 4b forming an alternative to using one of the 
other axioms. Thus, in general, when axiom 4b is applicable, an or-node is created 
with one offspring for each applicable instance of axiom 4b and one offspring for 
the back chaining on axioms lb , 2, 3 or Sa. There is however one source of pruning 
that can be carried out at the time of building the and/or tree. If the substitution 
introduced by axiom 4b is more general than any other substitution that could 
possibly be used in a solution with the subgoal, then only that instance of the 
axioms needs to be considered (see section 4.4.1). 
The and/or tree is built up with axiom lb producing an or-node with one 
alternative for each matching atom; axiom 2a produces an or-node with two 
Chapter 4 - From Axioms to Working System Page 4-4 
offspring; axioms 2b and 2d produce and-nodes each with two offspring; axioms 2c, 
3a and 3b each produce nodes with only one offspring; axiom 5a produces one 
terminal solved node; and axiom 4b either produces one solved node or an or-node 
with all but one offspring bein·g a solved node. 
Axiom 4a is used for each subgoal to build up the set of all possible 
assumptions. 
4.3 Data Structures 
The system uses two structures, one the set of facts which are made up of 
wffs, and the other is the and/or tree which is used to search for a solution. The 
two basic data structures are the wf J, used to build the facts, and the node used to 
build the and/or tree. 
4.3.1 Wffs 
Facts are built up using wffs. Wf fs form a recursive data structure 
corresponding to the recursive definition of an input wffs as defined in Chapter 3. 
The information used for defining a wff consists of: 
· · .. ,- operator: whether the wff is a disjunction, a conjunction, an implication, a 
negation or an atomic formula. 
parent of the wff: is the wff which the current wff is a subwff. Not having a parent 
means that the wff is a fact. 
side: for for binary logical connectives it is necessary to say whether a subwff is the 
left offspring or the right offspring, as, for example implication is not commutative. 
parity: the parity of-the wff (see section 2.7.1) can either be stored or calculated 
when needed. 
vars: similarly, the set of free variables for the wff, used in axiom 4b, can either be 
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stored or calculated when needed. 
offspring: for wffs which are not atomic the offspring, that is the subwffs of the 
wff, are used to build the wff. 
matches: for each atom, the set of atoms with which it unifies together with their 
corresponding most general unifier needs to be stored. 
input: the input form needs to be stored for atoms, and may be stored for non 
atomic formulae. This is only used for communicating with the user and takes no 
other part in this algorithm. 
Wffs can be defined in an ADA-like notation as follows . Assume that term, 
variable and text are predefined types; angle brackets represent ordered tuples 
(records); and SET OF is a legal type constructor. 
TYPE 
side_type IS (left, right) ; 
operator_type IS (and, or, implies, not , atom) ; 
parity_type IS (odd, even) ; 
substitution_type IS SET OF< t : term , v :variable >; 
wff_type IS RECORD 
operator : operator_type ; 
parent : ACCESS wff_type ; 
side : side_type ; 
parity : parity_type ; 
vars : SET OF variable ; 
CASE operator OF 
WHEN and I or I implies=> 
offspring : ARRAY [side_type] of wff_type ; 
WHEN not=> 
offspring : wff_type ; 
WHEN atom=> 
matches : SET OF< match : wff_type . 
mgu : substitution_type> ; 
END CASE ; 
input : text ; 
END RECORD ; 
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4.3.2 Nodes 
The and/or tree used for the search is built up from nodes. Each node 
represents a PROVEN subgoal. 
There are two classes of information necessary to define a node. The first is 
the information necessary to define the PROVEN subgoal: 
sign: is the sign of the input wff that is the subgoal. 
wff: is the wff that is a subgoal. 
index: is the index of the subgoal. These three represent the signed indexed wff 
that is the subgoal to be proven. 
assumption_set: is the maximal assumption set that can be assumed to prove the 
top level goal. Thus it represents the ancestors of the node (with opposite sign). In 
fact tb.is need not be explicitly stored but can be derived by using the parent 
relation between nodes. 
new _sub; is the substitution introduced by the PROVEN relation . It is 
"¢!(0-+m,1-+j)" in axiom lb, and "1/J" in axiom 4b. 
sub: is the unifying composition of all of the new_subs of ancestors of the node. Sub 
is a substitution which represents the instance of the node, and so is more general 
than any substitution of a solution which includes the node. It is defined by 
node.sub = unifying-composition(node.parent.sub, node.new_sub) 
if node.parent is defined and is {} otherwise. 
The other class of information necessary to define a node in the information 
necessary for it to build an and/or tree. The following is that information: 
parent: is the parent of the node in the and/or tree. If it does not have a parent 
then it is the root of the tree (the top level goal). 
offspring: is the set of offspring of the node in the and/or tree. 
status: is the type of the node in the partially built and/or tree. If its status is 
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unexpanded then it has no offspring and needs to be expanded to be used in the 
search. The and/or tree is built by expanding unexpanded nodes. If the node is not 
unexpanded then it is either an and-node, an or-node or is solved. Solved nodes are 
formally and-nodes with no offspring, but are separated here as a special case. So 
all and-nodes with no offspring have a status of solved. 
TYPE 
The record structure for a node is defined as follows: 
sign_type IS (p.n); 
status_type IS (unexpanded, and_node, or_node , solved); 
node_type IS RECORD 
sign : sign_type ; 
wff : wff _type ; 
index : integer; 
assumption_set : SET OF< sign : sign_type; 
wff : wff_ type; 
index : integer> · 
sub , 
new_sub : substitution; 
- patent : ACCESS node_type ; 
offspring : SET OF node_type ; 
status : status_type; 
ENDS RECORD; 
: 4.4 Building the And/Or Tree 
The implementation is based on searching an and/or tree built up from the 
nodes defined in the last section. Each node represents a subgoal formed by 
backchaining on the projections of the axioms. This section presents a procedure to 
expand any node with a status of unexpanded. This is first considered without 
axiom 4b, then axiom 4b is incorporated into the tree build er. 
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4.4.1 Pruning the And/Or Tree 
This section shows how the and/or tree can be pruned at the building stage, 
independently of the searching algorithm. 
Whenever a node is used in a solution then so will all of its ancestors. AB the 
solution must have all of its substitutions consist~nt, if the substitution introduced 
by a node is inconsistent with the substitutions of its ancestors, then that node can 
never appear in a solution. In this algorithm such nodes are not produced. 
If an or-node has one offspring which is a solved node with a new_sub which 
is a more general substitution than the unifying composition of the substitutions of 
its ancestors, then that is the only choice that needs to be considered. If there is a 
solution with any of the other alternatives then there is a solution with the 
alternative that has the more general substitution. 
4.4.2 Expanding with no Assuming 
The algorithm to expand a node without the use of axiom 4b is presented in 
two parts . The first shows how the appropriate axiom can be selected, and the 
second shows how the selected axiom is used to build the tree. 
4.4.2.1 Selecting the Appropriate Axiom 
Given a subgoal the choice of which axiom can be used is deterministic. The 
choice depends of the sign and parity (which determine direction - see section 2.7) , 
and on the relevant operator of the wff. The algorithm expand_no_assum shows 
how this selection can be made. The variable node is of type node_type and has 
status "unexpanded". The function "op" corresponds to the opi used in Chapter 2, 
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and is predefined with the following header: 
FUNCTION op(operator : (and.or.implies) ; position : (top.left.right)) 
RETIJRNS sign; 
PROCEDURE expand_no_assum(node :node_type) ; 
IF (node .sign=p EQUIV node .wff .parity=odd) 
THEN --by parity theorem the forward direction must be up . 
CASE node .wff .operator OF 
WHEN and I or I implies=> 
IF node . sign=op(node .wff .operator.top) 
THEN use axiom 2a 
ELSE use axiom 2b 
END IF ; 
WHEN not=> use axiom 3a 
WHEN atom=> use axiom lb 
END CASE ; 
ELSIF node .wff .parent=null 
THEN use axiom Sa 
ELSE CASE node .wff .parent .operator OF 
WHEN and I or I implies=> 
IF node . sign=op(node .wff .parent .operator. node .wff side) 
THEN use axiom 2d 
ELSE use axiom 2c 
END IF ; 
WHEN not=> use axiom 3b 
. END CASE ; 
END IF ; 
END expand_no_assum; 
4.4.2.2 .Usir.g the Chosen Axiom 
Once the appropriate axiom has been found it can then be used to build the 
search tree by expanding the node. There may be many instances of axiom lb 
which are applicable, but there can only be one instance of any of the other axioms. 
The use of the axioms fits into three moulds. 
To use axiom Sa, the node is made solved. This is achieved with 
node .status :=solved; 
Axioms 2 and 3 produce offsp rin g, with only one instance of any atom 
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applicable. Axiom 2a produces an or-node with two offspring. Axioms 2b and 2d 
each produce an and-node with two offspring. Axioms 2c, 3a and 3b produce nodes 
with one offspring. These will be and-nodes for efficiency reasons. Each of these 
axioms follows a common pattern. As an example consider the most complicated, 
namely axiom 2d, producing an and-node with two offspring: 
node . status := and_node ; 
node .offspring := { node_type( 
sign= op(node .wff .operator. top) . 
wff =. node .wff .parent. 
index= node . index. 
assumption_set = new_assum. 
sub= node . sub . 
new_sub = n . 
parent= node . 
off spring = {} . 
status= unexpanded) . 
node _type( 
s i gn= opp_sign(op(node .wff .operator . 
opp_side(node .wff . side))) . 
wff = node .wff .parent .offspring[ 
opp_side(node .wff . side)]. 
index= node . index . 
assumpti on_set. ~ new_as sum. 
sub = node . sub . 
new_ sub = {} . 
parent= node . 
off spring = {} . 
status= unexpanded) }; 
Where opp_ side is a func t ion which returns the opposite side of a side; 
opp_sign returns the opposite sign of a sign ; and new_assum is t he new assumpt ion 
set which incorporates the use of axiom 4a, and is defin ed to be 
node . assumption_set u <opp_sign(node . sign) . node .wff . node . index> 
The oth er possible applicable axiom is ax iom 1 b. In this case there may be a 
number of altern at ives corresponding to each matc hing atom. Thus an or _node 
wi th an indetermin ate number of offspring is produced. 
Given the following procedures: 
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FUNCTION consistent(sub1, sub2 :substitution) RETURNS boolean ; 
determines if subl and sub2 are consistent (see Appendix A) 
FUNCTION uc(sub1, sub2 :substitution) RE'TIJRNS substitution ; 
returns the unifying composition of subl and sub2 
FUNCTION select_new_index RETURNS integer ; 
returns a unique index 
FUNCTION change_index(sub :substitution ; i O,i1 : integer) 
RE'TIJRNS substituti on; 
changes index O to io and index 1 to i1 in sub. 
To use axiom 1 b the following code is used: 
node . status := or_node 
node .offspri ng := UNION FOR <w , s> IN node .wff .~atches OF 
{node_type( sign= node . sign ; 
index= m; 
wff = w; 
assumption_set = new_assum ; 
sub= uc(ns , node . sub) ; 
new_sub = ns ; 
parent= node ; 
offspring={} ; 
status= unexpanded) 
SUCH THAT m = select_new_index 
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AND ns = change _index(s, m, node . index) 
AND consistent(ns, node . sub) } ; 
4.4.3 Building the Tree with Possible Assumptions 
Axiom 4b may be applicable for any subgoal. Thus it is checked at every 
node. E ac h match with ax iom 4b produces an alte rnative to t he ot her ways of 
expanding the node. E ac h application of axiom 4b produces a solved node wi t h a 
correspondin g new substi t ut ion (n amely "'1/J" in ax iom 4b) , given by new_sub. In 
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general if axiom 4b is applicable an or-node should be created with offspring 
representing each possible application of that axiom, together with the alternative 
of using one of the other axioms. 
There is however, one special case. If the substitution introduced by one 
possible application of axiom 4b is more general than node.sub then no other 
alternative needs to be considered. If that choice is inconsistent then so will any 
other choice. The test for this is very similar to the test for identical descendent 
subgoals, and so the Identical Subgoal Deletion Theorem (Theorem B.3) may be 
incorporated into the algorithm at this point. 
The algorithm first checks if the node to expand can possibly have only one 
offspring, or if Theorem B.3 is applicable. If this is not the case it checks to see if 
axiom 4b can be used at all. If it can then an or-node is created with all offspring 
but one being solved; the remaining alternative being the no assumptions option. If 
axiom 4b is not applicable then the algorithm works as though no assumptions were 
used . 
The algorithm uses the following predefined function: 
FUNCTION is_more_general_subst(s1,s2 :substitution) RETURNS boolean ; 
see Appendix A for definition of more general substitutions 
The algorithm is given here and followed by a more detailed explanation : 
PROCEDURE expand(node : node_type) 
LET poss_ass = {<ns.s> SUCH THAT <s,w,i> IN node . assumption_set 
AND w = node .wff -- same input wff 
AND ns = {<vii. vlnode . index> SUCH THAT 
v IN node .wff . vars} 
AND consistent(ns,node . sub) } 
IF EXISTS <ns,s> IN poss_ass 
SUCH THAT is_more_general_subst(ns,node . sub) 
THEN IF s=node . sign 
THEN node . status := solved; 
ELSE node . status := or_node ; 
node .offspring :={}; -- thus node fails 
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END IF; 
ELSIF EXISTS <ns,s> IN poss_ass 
SUCH THAT s=node . sign 
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THEN LET new_node= COPY node, parent=node , status=unexpanded; 
node .status := or_node ; 
node .offspring := {new_node} u 
{node_type( parent= node ; 
new_sub = ns; 
sub= uc(ns,node . sub) ; 
status= solved) 
SUCH THAT <ns,s> IN poss_ass 
AND s=node . sign}; 
expand_no_assum(new_node) ; 
ELSE expand_no_assum(node); 
END IF; 
END expand ; 
Expand is the implementation of axiom 4b. 
"poss_ass" is a set representing the possible assumptions that can be made. 
"ns" is the substitution t/; in axiom 4b. 
"s" is the sign of the matching assumption in the assumption set. 
-There are three cases to consider: 
(1) If there exists <ns,s> E poss_ass such that ns is a more general substitution 
than node.sub. In this case uc(ns,node.sub)=node.sub (Lemma A.10). 
If s=node.sign then node is solved. No other expansions of node need to be done as 
no more general solutions for node can be found. 
If s=......,node.sign then by Theorem B.3 extended to the predicate calculus, there is 
no need to search below node as this will not produce results that could not be 
found otherwise. Thus node fails. 
(2) If there is a possible assumption, that is if there exists <ns,s> E poss_ass such 
that s=node.sign, then axiom 4b is applicable, but the other alternative solutions 
must also be tried. Each of the <ns,s> E poss_ass such that s=node.sign 
r~presents an application of axiom 4b. Thus a new solved alternative node is 
created for each. Another alternative node, "new_node" is a copy of node, except 
that it is an offspring of node, and is expanded using the other axioms. 
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(3) The other case is if there is no possible application of axiom 4b. In this case 
node is expanded using the other axioms, by calling procedure expand_no_assum . 
4.4.4 Properties of the Node Expansion 
The preceeding sections show how the axioms can be used to build an and/or 
search tree. The problem now is to search the and/or tree. There are many possible 
solutions to this problem. One is presented here. 
The following lemma states the properties of the node expansion that will be 
used in the searching algorithm. The searching algorithm works for any expansion 
algorithm that satisfies the lemma. 
Lemma 4.1 
a) all and_nodes have at least one offspring; 
b) only expanding or _nodes produce new substitutions. That is only or-offspring 
have associated new_subs. (An or-offspring is an offspring of an or .. node.) 
Proof: 
a) This follows from observing every case where an and_node can be generated, and 
at each of these one or two offspring are produced. 
b) The only axioms which produce substitutions are axioms lb and 4b. These both 
produce or _nodes. So nodes with associated new_subs are or-offspring. The only 
exception is when the new_sub is subsumed by sub in which case the effect is 
exactly the same as having no new_sub. 
Q.E.D. 
4A.5 A Detailed Example 
This example shows the detail of a portion of an and/or tree built for the 
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expert system described in Appendix D. The following facts are used: 
( minor(DM, ?dep) =? success ) 
( enr(?st,yl, ?dep) and enr(?st,y2, ?dep) =} minor(?st, ?dep) ) 
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( enr(?st,y2,?dep) and enr(?st,yl,?dep2) and no-first-year(?dep) =} minor(?st,?dep)) 
( planc(?st , ?status, ?crs) and course(?crs, ?level, ?dep) =? enr(?st, ?level, ?dep) ) 
The following diagrams show the trees built. The right hand trees are (parts 
of) the parse trees for the facts, and the left hand tree is part of the search tree 
built up during the deduction stage. The wi are the names of the wf fs that are used 
to mark the nodes in which they are the node.wff. Note that for each of the nodes 
sign= "p", and index is given by the value of i in the box of the tree. ote that 
different indexes correspond to different instances of each fact. The 
assumption_set, sub and new_sub are given for the or-offspring. None of the other 
nodes have a non-null new_sub. The status of a node is given by the branches 
leading from below the node. Arced branches represent and-nodes and non-arced 
branches represent or-nodes. Solved nodes are marked as such. 
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i=1 w1 
[success] 
w4 
w9 
w10 w8 
minor(7st.7dep) 
wS w6 
enr(7st,y1. 7dep) enr(7st , y2 , 7dep) 
w17 
enr(7st.?level,7dep) 
The interesting nodes are the or-offspring. These are the only nodes which 
incorporate a new_sub, and are the nodes which do not directly inherit both their 
index and their sub from their parent. These are the nodes that correspond to the 
wffs w3, w8, wlO and wl 7. 
Node whose wff is w3: 
a$sumpt£on_set = { <n,wl,l >} 
sub={} 
new_sub = {} 
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Node whose wff is w8: 
assumption_set = { <n,w2,2 >, <n,w3,2 > , <n,wl ,1>} 
sub = { dm/?st!3, ?dep!2/?dep!3 } 
new_sub = { dm/?st!3, ?dep!2/?dep!3 } 
Node whose wff is wlO: 
assumption_set = { <n,w2,2>, <n ,w3,2 > , <n,w l ,1>} 
sub = { dm/?st!4, ?dep!2/?dep!4 } 
new_sub = { dm/?st!4 , ?dep!2/?dep!4 } 
Right hand node whose wff is wl 7: 
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assumption_set = { <n,w6,3 > , <n,w7,3>, < v. ,w8,3>, <n ,w2,2 > , <n ,w3,2 > , 
<n,wl ,1>} 
sub = { dm/?st!3, dm/?st!5, y2/?level!5, ?dep!2/?dep!3, ?dep!2/?dep!5 } 
new_sub = { ?st!3/ ?st!5, y2/?level!5 , ?dep!3/?dep!5 } 
Left hand. node whose wff is w17: 
assumption_set = { <n,w5,3>, <n ,w7,3 > , <n,w8,3>, <n,w2,2 > , <n ,w3,2>, 
<n ,wl,1>} 
sub = { dm/?st!3, dm/?st!6, yl/?level!6, ?dep!2/?dep!3, ?dep!2/?dep!6 } 
new_sub = { ?st!3/?st!6, yl/?level!6, ?dep!3/?dep!6 } 
4.5 The Searching Program 
In this section an algorithm to search the and /or tree is presented. It uses a 
non-chronological backtracking algorithm (for different, but related, algorithms see 
Doyle[78], Pereira and Porto[80], Stallman and Sussman[76], Stanton[81]) . 
The algori thm main tains a consistent partial and-subtree of the and/or t ree. 
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That is all and-nodes in the interior of the subtree have all of their offspring in the 
subtree, and all or-nodes in the interior of the subtree have one offspring in the 
subtree. The algorithm grows this subtree until all terminal nodes are solved or 
until no consistent choice can be made at some point. In the latter case an 
alternative subtree is generated by non-chronological backtracking. The and/or tree 
is built by calling expand when needed. 
In the algorithm, solved is the set of leaves of the current and-tree with status 
of solved; open is the set of leaves of the current and-tree that are not solved; closed 
is the set of nodes of the current and-tree that are not in open. A solution has been 
found if all leaves of the and-tree are solved, that is if open is empty. Note that not 
all members of open are necessarily unexpanded, the backtracking may cause 
expanded nodes to be returned to open . 
At the top level the search works as follows: 
WHILE open t {} 
choose an element in open ; remove it from open; add it to closed; 
IF the status of the node is unexpanded THEN expand the node ; 
depending on the status of the node. do one of the following cases : 
IF status= sol ved THEN add the node to solved 
IF status= and node THEN add all of its offspring to open 
IF status= or node THEN 
choose an offspring that keeps the and_tree consistent; 
IF one can be found THEN add it to open; 
IF none exist THEN construct a new consistent and_tree . 
To check consistency, a global substitution global_sub is maintained which is 
the unifying composition of all of the substitutions in the and-tree. That is 
global_sub is the unifying composition of then.sub for n E open U solved, and also 
the unifying composition of the n.new_sub for n E open U closed. This is well 
defined as unifying composition is commutative, ass<;>ciative and nilpotent (Theorem 
A6). 
A contradiction is a set of nodes that cannot be in any consistent solution 
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and-tree . A set of contradictions is maintained to limit the search , and to prevent 
looping of the algorithm. 
If the chosen node from open is an or-node then one of its offspring can be 
chosen to be in the and-tree if new_sub for the offspring is consistent with 
global_sub, and no subset of the nodes in open U closed, together with the offspring 
form a member of the current set of contradictions. If no offspring of the or-node 
can be chosen, then a new contradiction is formed. This contradiction consists of 
the lowest ancestor (ancestor being the transitive closure of the parent relation) of 
the chosen node that is an or-offspring (perhaps the node itself), together with a 
minimal subset of open U closed that produces a contradiction or an inconsistency 
with all offspring. If there is no ancestor of the chosen node that is an or-offspring 
then the node must be in any solution , so the contradiction is the subset of open U 
closed as above. One of the nodes that forms a contradiction is chosen to be 
removed from the and-tree, and the search continues. 
The · following algorithm produces the described search. A proof of correctness 
of .the algorithm follows it. 
VAR open, closed, solved : SET OF node_type; 
node : node_type; 
global_sub :substitution ; 
:open :~ { node_type(sign=p; index=1 ; wff=succ; assum_set={}; sub={} ; 
new_sub={}; parent={}; status=unexpanded) } ; 
closed : = {} ; 
· solved := {}; 
global_sub := {}; 
WHILE open f. {} 
CHOOSE node IN open ; 
open := open - {node}; 
closed := closed u {node}; 
IF node .status= unexpanded THEN expand(node); END IF ; 
CASE node . status OF 
and_node => open := open u node .offspring ; 
solved=> solved_nodes := solved_nodes u {node}; 
or node=> 
LET poss= {n IN node .offspring 
SUCH THAT consistent(n .new_sub, global_sub) 
/ 
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AND NOT contradicts(n.openuclosed)}; 
IF poss # {} 
THEN CHOOSE n IN poss; 
open := open u {n}; 
global_sub := uc(global_sub. n .new_sub); 
ELSE blame := UNION {nodes IN openuclosed that lead to 
END IF ; 
END CASE; 
END WHILE; 
n being inconsistent or contradictory} 
FOR n IN node .offspring; 
IF node has an ancestor that is an or-offspring 
THEN contra := blame u 
{node's lowest or-offspring ancestor}; 
ELSE contra :=blame; 
END IF; 
declare_contra(contra) 
IF contra={} THEN exit(no_solution); END IF; 
CHOOSE rem IN contra ; 
open := open u {node} ; 
closed := closed - {node} ; 
remove rem's subtree from open. closed and solved ; 
open := open u {rem .parent} ; 
closed := closed - {rem .parent} ; 
global_sub := uc of n . sub for all n in openusolved; 
The following functions and forms were used in the algorithm: 
PROCEDURE declare_contra(nodes : SET OF node) ; 
--declare nodes to be a contradiction . 
FUNCTION contradicts(n :node; allnodes : SET OF node) RETURNS boolean ; 
--returns true if {n}us is a contradiction for any s c allnodes . 
CHOOSE elt IN set; 
--assigned to elt an element of set. according to some heuristic . 
In the current implementation the contradiction sets are stored as inverted 
lists. A contradiction is a list of nodes; node_type in expanded to have a new 
property, contras, which is the set of contradictions in which the node is involved. 
The implementation of the procedures declare_contra and contradicts is not a 
problem using such a data structure. 
One problem area is, however, in the use of global_sub. The current 
implementation recalculates global_sub from scratch after each contra.diction. There 
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does not seem to be a simple way out of this problem without carrying the 
information of the nodes responsible for each binding in the substitution. This 
information is also needed to find the blame sets for inconsistent substitutions. 
There are unsophisticated algorithms for finding the set of substitutions involved in 
unification conflicts (Pereira and Porto[80]), and these are used in the current 
implementation. However, they also virtually require the recalculation of global_sub 
from scratch. 
Lemma 4.2: 
a) contradictions are only between or-offspring; 
b) blame consists only of or-offspring. 
c) rem is an or_ offspring. 
Proof: a) is proved by induction on the number of contradictions. If there are 
no contradictions then a) trivially holds. Assume a) holds at the start of the loop. 
-The nodes that lead to contradictions are all or-offspring by the assumption. The 
nodes that lead to inconsistencies are all or-offspring by lemma 4.l(b ). So blame 
consists oi;ily of or-offspring, so b) holds. The lowest ancestor that is an or-offspring 
by definition is an or-offspring. As the new contradiction is only between members 
of blame with perhaps the ancestor as well, then it can only be between 
or-ancestors, so a) holds. As rem is an element of the contradiction it must be an 
or-off spring, so c) holds. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4 .3: closed U open is an and-subtree of the and-or tree, as produced 
by expand, with the following properties holding each time through the while loop: 
a) open U solved are the leaves of the and tree. 
b) every and_node in closed has all its offspring in open U closed. 
c)_ every or _node in closed has one, and only one of its offspring in open U closed. 
d) solved is a subset of closed, and consists only of nodes marked solved by expand . 
e) open and closed are disjoint sets. 
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Proof: This is proven by induction on the number of times through the while 
loop. 
The lemma holds at the start of the while loop for the first time, as closed 
and solved are empty, and open has one element. This element is the only node of 
the tree, and so is a leaf of the tree, thus a) holds. b), c) , d), and e) hold by default 
as closed and solved are empty. 
Assume that the lemma holds at the start of the while loop. It is now shown 
that it holds the next time through the while loop. Node is an element of open , and 
is removed from open, and added to closed. Three cases must be considered: 
(i) node is an and-node: Then all of its offspring are added to open. There are at 
least one of these by lemma 4.l(a). So they are part of the leaves of the tree, and 
node is not, so, a) holds by the induction principle. b) now holds, by the induction 
principle, and as node has all its offspring in open U closed, and di other members 
of closed still follow b ), as open U closed is expanded. c) and d) trivially hold by the 
induction principle, as closed, and open U closed are expanding. e) holds as node is 
removed from open to be added to closed, none of its offspring are in closed by a) , 
so open and closed remain disjoint. 
(ii) node is solved: in this case node is added to solved. a) holds as node is still a 
leaf, and is still in open U solved, and all other leaves remain in open U solved. b) 
and c) hold by the induction assumption, as there are the same and_nodes, and 
or _nodes in closed, and open U closed is preserved. d) still holds, as node is added 
to solved and to closed, and is marked solved by expand. e) holds as node is 
removed from open, added to closed, and apart from that, open and closed remain 
the same. 
(iii) node is an or-node: Either 
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poss~{} in which case one of node's offspring is added to open. In this case a) 
holds as the added node is a leaf, and is now in open, and node is not a leaf and has 
been deleted from open . b) and c) still hold by the inductive assumption, and as 
node is an or-node in closed aiid one and only one of its offspring are in open u 
closed. e) holds as in case (i). 
Alternatively poss={} in which case none of node's offspring can be added in 
which case rem is chosen such that rem is an or-offspring of a node in closed 
(Lemma 4.2c) and its parent must be in closed by inductive assumption on part a. 
The and tree is now pruned back to rem . rem's parent is added to open , and 
removed from closed , all of its descendents are removed from open, closed and 
solved. The rest of the subtree is preserved, so a) holds as the only new leaf is in 
open, and all the subtree from this have been removed. b) and c) hold as all of the 
current nodes in closed, were previously in closed, and the lemma held for them, 
and the only members of open U closed removed had parents which were also 
removed, except for rem, and its parent is now not in closed. d) holds as all nodes 
removed from closed were also removed from solved. e) holds as open and closed 
are subsets of the previous open and closed which were disjoint , apart from rem's 
parent which was removed from closed, and added to open. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4.4: closed U open is consistent (i.e. all substitutions are consistent), 
and no subset forms a contradiction. global_sub is always the unifying composition 
of the node.new _sub for node in open U closed, which is the unifying composition of 
the node.sub for node in open U solved. 
Proof: This is also proved by induction on the number of times through the 
while loop . This holds first through the loop , as global_sub is null, as are all of the 
unifying compositions, closed U open is trivially consistent, and as there are no 
contradictions, no subset forms a contradiction. 
Assume that the lemma holds at the start of the while loop. To prove that it 
r 
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holds at the end of the while loop. The only way that the consistency can change, 
and for the unifying compositions to change is if node is an or _node. This is because 
only expanding an or _node can produce new substitutions (Lemma 4.1 b ), and 
contradictions only occur when expanding or _nodes (By Lemma 4.2a). If node is an 
or _node, then it is expanded only if n.new _sub is consistent with global_sub, and n 
does not produce a contradiction with the rest of open U closed, where n is an 
offspring of node. If it is expanded global_sub is made to be the unifying 
composition of n, the new node, and global_sub. So global_sub is preserved as being 
the unifying composition of all of the node.new _sub for node in open U closed. As 
unifying composition is associative, commutative and nilpotent (theorem A.6), 
global_sub is the unifying composition of all of the node.sub for node in open U 
solved. This is because node.sub is the unifying composition of all of the a.new _sub 
for all ancestors a of node (by definition of node.sub) , and only the ordering has 
been changed. This covers the whole tree as open U solved form the leaves of the 
tree (Lemma 4.3a). If node is not expanded, then a subtree of the original tree is 
mace open U closed, and so this must be consistent and non-contradictory , by the 
inductive assumption. The produced contradiction contains rem, which is not in 
open U cl~sed, and so does not produce a contradiction with any subset of open U 
closed. global_sub is explicitly evaluated, and so follow the lemma. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemm.a 4 .5: No solution tree can .form a solution if a subset of the nodes 
form a contradiction . 
Proof: This is proven by induction on the number of contradictions. If there 
are no contradictions the lemma holds vacuously . Assume that there are m 
contradictions, and the lemma holds for all cases where there are less then m 
contradictions. Assume a subset· of-the nod es form a contradiction. To show that no 
solution tree can be formed. This contradiction must have been form ed in the 
declare_contra function . Either the lowest ancestor of node that is an or-offspring 
must be in the solution, in which case so must node; or just elements of blame form 
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the contradiction, in which case node must be in the solution tree as it need to be 
proven for the top level goal to be proven, as none of its ancestors are or-nodes. 
Each possible offspring of node is impossible, as it produces an inconsistency or a 
contradiction with nodes in the solution tree. This is impossible as node must have 
one offspring in the tree, as it is and or _node. 
Q.E.D. 
Corollary 4.6: An internal exit is only done when there are no possible 
solutions. 
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 4.5, as the internal exit is done only 
when the empty set forms a contradiction, and so no solution tree exists (as empty 
set is a subset of every set) . 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4. 7: The pair <number of contradictions, size of closed> , taken 
lexicographically, is monotonically increasing through the while loop. That is if 
there are c contradictions, and n elements of closed at the start of the while loop , 
then after going through the loop, either c has increased, or c has remained 
constant and n has increased. 
Proof: Through the while loop the number of contradictions cannot decrease. 
The number of elements of closed always increases by one (namely the element 
node, which could not be in closed, as it was in open, by lemma 4.3e), except when 
node is an or _node, and poss={}. In this case the number of contradictions is 
increased by one. This was not an existing contradiction as it is a contradiction 
between nodes which were previously members of open U closed, which were not 
contradictory by Lemma 4.4. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4.8: The while loop is only normally exited if there is a solution. In 
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this case the solution is the and-tree defined by closed. 
Proof: The while loop is only normally exited if open={}. In this case closed 
forms an and-subtree of the arid-or tree (by lemma 4.3a), with each of its leaves 
marked solved (by Lernrna 4.3, parts a and d). It has a consistent substitution given 
be global_sub (by Lemma 4.4). So closed forms a consistent solution tree. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 4 .9 : Total Correctness for bounded tree. If the and/or tree is of 
bounded size, then the program will stop, either with a solution, or by announcing 
that there is no solution. 
Proof: If the size of the tree is bounded by n, then number of contradictions 
is bounded by 2n (number of subsets of n elements), and the size of closed is 
bounded by n. By lemma 4.7, there can only be n*2n possible times through the 
loop . So it must terminate. By lemmas 4.6 and 4.8, it only stops when there are no 
solutions, or when a solution is found . 
Q.E.D . . 
4.6 Completing the Algorithm 
The algorithm as presented does not necessarily, (for the predicate calculus) , 
find a solution if one exists. This is because it only tries a new and-tree in the 
and/or tree if it finds an inconsistency. This may not happen even if the and-tree 
currently being examined is not in a solution tree, as it may be infinite without any 
contradictions. To make the algorithm find a solution if one exists, a way to 
systematically search each path is given in this section. This is done by not allowing 
the search to continue down an infinite path without trying other possibilities. 
Assume that there is a function "CL" from nodes in the tree into the 
non-negative integers , with the following properties: 
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a) CL is monotonically non decreasing going down the tree. That is for all nodes n 
' 
CL(n) > CL(n.parent). 
b) every finite integer defines a finite number of nodes. That is for each integer k, 
{n:CL(n)=k} is finite. 
There are many examples of such CL functions. Some are given in the next 
subsection. 
Informally the proof proceeds by searching all of the nodes that return less 
than a particular value of CL at a time, and then increasing the value so that more 
nodes can be considered. This ensures that all possible proofs will be systematically 
searched. The choice of the particular CL function has a great effect on the 
behavior of the system. 
The system works as though the following were done: For each integer k, a 
new node marked "CLk" is formed . This node is only consistent with an and-tree 
having CL(n)<k for all nodes n. A disjunction of all the CLk nodes is formed, 
which is conjoined to the top level goal to form a new top level goal. Node CLk 
contradicts with any or-offspring n for which CL(n)>k. When choosing a node to 
remove from the blame set, CLk is only chosen if it is the only possible choice. In 
this case the next choice to be open should be CLk+ 1. The first choice should be 
CL0. Note that these nodes can be considered as normal nodes in the system, with 
predefined contradictions, but as they are special nodes they will be considered 
separately. 
The algorithm for searching is modified as follows: Form a pseudo-node CL0, 
add it to closed, and set the current complexity level to 0. Suppose the current 
complexity level is k. In this case CLk will be in closed. If for some node n, 
CL(n)>k, then n is not consistent with CLk, and so {n, CLk} forms a 
contradiction. When rem is chosen in blame, CLk is chosen only when it is the only 
element in blame. In this case the complexity level is increased to k+l, and CLk+l 
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replaces CLk in closed. All contradictions which contain CLk can be removed from 
the system, as CLk can never appear in closed. 
Following that algorithm means that the complexity level is only increased 
past k when there is no solution using nodes n for which CL{n) is less than or equal 
to k. As each finite tree has some integer k for which CL{n) is less than or equal to 
k for all nodes n in the tree, and any solution tree if finite, then the solution will be 
found before the complexity level is increased past the maximal complexity level of 
any node in the solution tree. 
As each finite integer defines a finite number of nodes, this means that the 
algorithm keeps increasing the complexity level unless it finds a solution or proves 
that no solution exists. So if there is a solution then it must be found eventually. 
4.5.1 Examples of CL functions 
The only thing to do now is to define some functions that meet the criteria 
for CL. The choice of this function will have far reaching effects on the behavior of 
the algorithm. Examples of legal CL functions are: the depth of the node; the 
number of or-ancestors of the node; the maximum function nesting for functions in 
the substitution of the node; the maximum number of nested appearances of any 
particular function in the substitution of the node. 
Another contender is the Complexity Level of Sickel[76] and ilsson[79], 
which is the limit of the number of instances of facts that have to be replicated. 
This is equivalent to the number of occurences of any fact in a chain of the proof 
tree. It can be defined as follows: for any node n in the tree define CL(n) as one less 
than the maximum over all pairs <s,w> of the number of occurences of <s,w,i> 
E. n.assumption_set. This function fits in with the definition of CL. It is evaluated 
within EXPAND, as 
CL(n) = max{ CL(n.parent), number of occurences of < '"'-'n.sign,n.wff,i> E 
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n.assumption_set}. 
4.7 Comparison with Other Systems 
In this section a comparison is given of this implementation of CES with 
Linear Resolution, Sickel[76]'s search technique for clause interconnectivity graphs, 
and Emycin (van Melle[79,80]). 
4.7.1 Linear Resolution 
This implementation shows how an appropriate control structure, together 
with clause form input can produce linear resolution {Chang and Lee[73]). 
In linear resolution there are ordered clauses which contain unframed literals 
that need to be resolved away, and framed literals that have been resolved away. 
The framed literals are the higher level subgoals that are being proven. 
An OL-Deduction can be simulated by a CES deduction in the following way, 
(using the notation introduced above): 
Associate unframed literals in an ordered clause with the nodes in open. 
Only use open as a stack. This corresponds to only expanding rightmost literals in 
Linear resolution; open corresponds to the unframed literals in the ordered clause. 
For each node in open, the members of its assumption set correspond to the framed 
literals to the left in the ordered clause. 
Resolving a rightmost literal in a clause corresponds to the use of axiom 1 b in CES. 
The literal in the OL-Deduction is then framed, and the residual literals in the 
resolved clause are added to the right of the framed li teral. This is simulated by 
using open as a stack; the chosen node being the top of the stack; and adding the 
wff for that node to the assumption sets of the subgoals that are added to open. 
The use of axiom 4b in the CES implementation corresponds to the reduction of a 
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reducible ordered clause in Linear Resolution . 
There are a few differences to note: CES pays the price of using input form 
by acting at a slightly lower level than linear resolution . To use a fact in CES the 
total number of nodes created is, in general, the number of input wffs in the fact 
that are used in the deduction. That is, it does not include the input wffs on unused 
choices. In Linear resolution the number of ordered clauses created, in general, is 
the number of literals in the clause. Thus if the wff is directly translatable into 
clause form, each fact forming only one clause, then the number of nodes created is 
(2a-l+n), where a is the number of atoms and a is the number of negations. If it is 
not directly translatable into clause form, then the linear resolution form will 
multiply out subterms and increase the search not by a linear factor, but by an 
exponential factor. 
So linear resolution can be simulated in CES with a small linear factor more 
nodes than linear resolution has ordered clauses. However a CES implementation , 
using input form, has the potential to associate semantic constraints with the forms 
used for processing, which can potentially cut down on the combinatorial explosion 
more significantly than the price of the linear factor. 
The CES implementation is more flexible in the search allowable as any open 
node can be expanded whereas linear resolution only allows the rightmost literal to 
be resolved upon. Thus CES is better able to exploit different strategies, for 
example the strategy of expanding the node most likely to fail at any time. The 
implementation also allows open to be partially modified in repairing failures , as 
opposed to having an ordered clause as a single entity and using chronological 
backtracking. 
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4. 7 .2 Clause Interconnectivity Graphs 
This implementation of CES can be seen as an extension of the search 
technique for clause interconnectivity graphs of Sickel[76] into input form predicate 
calculus. A walk in Sickel's system is equivalent to a branch of CES's search tree; 
the markers are equivalent to open leaves of a partial search tree; a partial solution 
for a literal in her system is equivalent to an and-subtree of the corresponding node 
in the CES implementation; a merge loop corresponds to a solved node due to 
axiom 4b; a tautology loop corresponds to an application of the deletion of identical 
subgoals (Appendix B). 
4. 7 .3 The Mycin Family of Expert Systems 
All of the explanation and meta rules components of Teiresias (Davis[76 ,80]) 
and Emycin (van Melle[79,80]) derive from the and/or tree that represents the 
working o_f the problem solver. From this and/or tree the user input structure can 
be derived. Thus all of the explanation and control structures of these expert 
systems can be used by CES. 
If Emycin-type rules are added to CES, the search trees produced in the 
Emycin program corresponds to a subset of the search tree produced by the 
equivalent CES problem. The Emycin subtree can be produced by restricting the 
CES subtree to the nodes that were created using. the implication, and paths 
between these nodes in the CES tree become branches in the Emycin tree. The 
explanation, debugging and control meta knowledge of Mycin (Davis[76]) depend 
almost entirely on the structure of this tree and so can be incorporated into a CES 
system. 
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4.7 .3.1 Explanation in CES 
Extracting explanations from the CES search tree in the same way as from an 
equivalent and/or tree produced by Emycin gives explanations at a very low level, 
and so are difficult to follow . The current experimental implementation of CES 
incorporates two quite different explanation capabilities to produce higher level 
explanations from the search tree. These can be used in tracing the search for a 
solution, or in explaining how a particular solution was derived . 
The first of these is a purely syntactic scheme. Only nodes that correspond to 
applications of axioms 1 b and 4b are used in an explanation. Thus whenever the 
wf f of a subgoal is an atom, the subtree consisting of nodes corresponding to the 
same instance of the input wff is used to construct an explanation of the form: 
"To prove <atom that is subgoal> prove each of <leaves of that subtree> by 
fact <fact name>." 
These leayes of the subtree are atoms that are then expanded by axiom lb. This is 
stating the whole effect of a fact in one step, following the assumption that each 
fact is a modular entity, and can be understood as a whole. The use of axiom 4 in a 
proof would not fit into such an explanation mechanism and so is treated 
separately, by explaining each assumption independently. The explanation 
capabilities of this syntactic scheme without the use of axiom 4 would correspond to 
those of Emycin, and the same explanation capabilities can be used. This is the 
explanation scheme that was used to produce the explanations in Appendix D. 
The above explanation scheme is purely syntactic and does not fully utilise 
the input form that is used throughout the system. The second explanation scheme 
in_corporates the simple use of user given semantics. It allows the user to specify 
certain logical operators in a fact to be critical. The explanations are then 
structured around these critical operators. Whenever that operator is the principal 
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operator in a node (that is it was the operator used in expand to make that node) 
then the particular explanation for that operator may be given to the user. This 
allows the use of more natural and structured explanations to be given and for the 
user to be able to direct the explanation of the system. To simulate the Emycin 
explanation scheme all of the implications in the rules could be used as critical 
operators. A more sophisticated explanation scheme could be incorporated in the 
system by allowing different levels of explanations to be given depending on the 
detail requested by the user. When inputting the facts, the user may say how to 
explain the reasoning when a particular operator is used, and when to explain it in 
this way. This allows for a much more versatile explanation scheme than is 
otherwise available in a non input form system where any high level explanations 
have to be mapped into the internal form of the problem solver. The further from 
input form the problem solver is the more difficult this will be. 
Most importantly is the fact that CES has proven to be adaptable to different 
• explanation schemes. As in expert systems, all reasoning is done in terms of the 
input form, so effective explanation schemes may be developed using CES as a 
basis, as t~ey are for expert systems. CES, hopefully, should prove to be an 
effective bed for future research into explanation of problem solving as in the work 
on Teiresias (Davis[76]) or BLAH (Weiner[80]). 
4. 7 .3.2 Certainty Factors 
The part of Emycin that cannot be directly incorporated in CES is the use of 
certainty factors (Shortliffe[76], or the sufficiency measure and the necessity 
measure of Prospector - Duda et al[78]) . CES can be adapted to include certainty 
factors by associating a number with each CANCEL relation, representing the 
certainty or probability of the relation. The certainty factors would be combined 
from the bottom to the top of the search tree, using, for example, Bayesian methods 
(see Appendix D in Duda et al[79]) . A certainty for each goal could thus be 
produced. Combining the certainty factors in and-nodes and or-nodes to produce 
Chapter 4 - From Axioms to Working System Page 4-34 
new certainty factors for nodes would have to be incorporated into the searching 
program. 
4.8 Expanding the Implementation 
The implementation can be expanded to the full CANCEL relation by 
changing expand to use the full axiomatisation of CANCEL. In doing this axiom 6 
could be used in a number of ways, as described in section 3.4.3. Here these ideas 
are applied to the preceeding algorithm. 
It could be used as a normal implication rule, thus expand will always 
produce the alternative of using axiom 6. 
An alternate way to use axiom 6 is to modify expand to return the alternative 
CANCEL relations that match either of the equivalent forms. Thus all matches 
would be found every time by the expand algorithm, and the responsibility for 
finding which relation involved a change of focus is given to the searching 
algorithm. On average twice as many alternatives as before will be produced by 
expand. 
The other method of using axiom 6 is to incorporate the equivalence into the 
other axioms. Thus new axioms are created for axioms 1-5, incorporating different 
orderings of the arguments. There would be separate forward and backward 
chaining axioms. Which one to use would have to be chosen by the searching 
algorithm. This transformation on the other axioms needs to be done when the 
CANCEL becomes asymmetric in Chapter 6. 
To use the equivalence relation, using axiom 2e, the type node_type needs to 
be expanded to include a direction. There would thus be redundant information for 
wffs that are not part of an equivalence relation. A provision for having free signs 
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as subgoals would also have to be made. Checking for consistent signs can be 
incorporated into the substitutions, with instances of signs being variable instances 
that must have consistent values. With these modifications axiom 2e can be 
included in expand as any other axiom. 
Chapter 5 
A Def a ult Logic Problem Solver 
There are some kinds of everyday reasoning that cannot be easily done in the 
formalism of the first order predicate calculus. 
For example the following are types of statements that people can and do use, 
but are not expressible in the predicate calculus: 
exceptions: B irds, in general, can fly, but there are some that cannot. 
closed world assumption: If something is not explicitly derivable from the data 
base then it is not true. 
frame rule: An event only af feels an object if the effect can be explicitly derived. 
generalisation: It is usual for a person to work and live in the same city. 
circumscription: the objects that can be shown to have a certain property P by 
reasoning from certain f acts A are all the objects that satisfy P. (from 
McCarthy[80]) 
The kind of reasoning that uses statements of the above sort to jump t.o 
conclusions that may later be withdrawn when new evidence comes to light is very 
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common in human reasoning, and is called default reasoning, or sometimes 
non-monotonic reasoning (Reiter[80], McDermott and Doyle[80]) . In this chapter 
CES is expanded to include such default reasoning. 
5.1 Default Logic 
To allow statements of the above sort, the predicate calculus is expanded to 
include default reasoning. The extended language is called "Default Language" 
(DL). 
DL inherits all syntactic objects of the predicate calculus. In DL there is a 
new syntactic object, the top_level_w ff, defined as follows: 
<top_level_w ff> ::= <wff> 
::= <q-uanti f iers > ASSUME <wff> 
Thus there are two types of top_level_wf f s, elements of the first type are 
called facts. Elements of the second type are called defaults. 
An instance of a default (i.e . the variables universally quantified before the 
"ASSIBv1E" are instantiated) may be used in a solution if that instance is consistent 
with the facts and all other defaults used in the solution. 
As examples consider the following: 
exceptions: assume that a part icu lar bird can fly unless it can be proven that it 
cannot fly . 
Vb ASSUME BIRD(b) =} CAN_FLY(b) 
closed world assumption: assume that a relation does not hold ttnless it can be 
explicitly derived to hold from the data base. 
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\fp IN_DATA_BASE(p) =} HOLDS(p) 
\fp ASSUME not HOLDS(p) 
generalisation: assume that a person works in all cities that they live . 
\fp ASSUME Ve LIVE-IN(p,c) =} WORK-IN(p,c) 
circumscription: "the tuple x satisfies predicate P only if it has to." 
(McCarthy[80]) 
\f x ASSUME not P(x) 
DL is able to express knowledge of the form: 
"Assume ... holds unless it is proven that is does not hold." 
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These examples are all normal defaults (Reiter[80]) . Normal defaults 
account for the most common types of default reasoning (Reiter[80]). A normal 
default is a statement of the form: 
a(x): M w(x) / w(x) 
where "M'.' is the modal operator denoting consistency. This means 
"If a(x) holds then if w(x) is consistent then infer w(x)." 
This statement in DL is given as: 
\fx ASSUME a(x) =} w(x) 
w( €) can only be derived if a(€) holds and the default for € can be assumed. If for 
any value of €, not w( €) can be deduced with a(~) holding, then the default will not 
be consistent and so cannot be assumed for that value of f 
The aim of the problem solver is to prove: 
f- D =} success 
from the facts, where D, a set of instances of defaults , together with the facts , is 
consistent. 
In the terms of Mc Dermott and Doyle[80], 
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Vx ASSUME d(x) 
is written "Vx M d(x) =? d(x)". 
The problem solver is to prove that success is "arguable". 
In summary the user supplies a number of defaults that may be used to form 
a solution if the instances of defaults used, together with the facts , are consistent. 
Proving consistency is undecidable for the first order predicate calculus. Proving 
inconsistency is semidecidable. Any complete deduction system can be looked at as 
a system for proving inconsistency. In this chapter an extension to CES, namely 
def-CES is presented. def-CES works by allowing defaults to be used in a proof 
unless they can be proven to be inconsistent. The same axioms are used to both 
derive the goal and to prove inconsistency. 
5.2 Def a ult Reasoning in the Propositional Calculus 
In the propositional calculus version of def-CES there is a goal, "success", a 
set of facts, and a set Ll of defaults. The aim of the problem solver is to find a 
subset D of ..1, such that D is consistent with the facts and (f- D =? success). 
CANCEL can be extended to include default reasoning in the following way: 
To the propositional CANCEL add an extra argument, namely a default set D. 
CANCEL then becomes: 
CANCEL(S1, S2, A, D) 
where D is a subset of ..1. If D* is the conjunction of the elements of D, then the 
CANCEL is modelled to mean: 
f-A* /\ D* /\ S1* =? S2* 
The only elements that are added to D are elements of the set of defaults. 
There are no axioms to remove an element from a default set. D represents the set 
of defaults on which the CANCEL depends. 
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The default set acts in exactly the same way as the assumption set, except 
there is no axiom corresponding to axiom 4 for default sets, and there is a new 
axiom 7, corresponding to axiom 5 for defaults: 
Q27 a. If d E ..1 then 
CANCEL( S, <p,d>, A, DU {d}) 
"A default can be assumed by adding it to the default set." 
Proof of Correctness 
I- A* /\ D * /\ d /\ S* =} d 
so I- A* /\(DU { d} )* /\ S* =} <p,d>* 
ie CANCEL( S, <p ,d>, A, DU {d}) 
Q.E.D. 
7b. If d E ..1 then 
If CANCEL( S1, <n ,d> , A, D) 
then CANCEL(S1, S2, A, DU {d}) 
"If the negation of a default can be proven, then if that default is assumed, 
anyth in g can be proven." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL( S1, <n ,d> , A, D) 
means I- A* /\ D* /\ S1 * =} <n,d > * 
so I- A* /\ D * /\ d /\ S 1 * =} S 2 * 
so I-A* /\ (DU {d})* /\ S1 * =} S2* 
ie CANCEL(S1, S2, A, DU {d}) 
Q.E.D. 
--for any s2, contrapositive of =} 
--by defini tion of D* 
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With the new CANCEL, the top level goal becomes: 
VS CANCEL(S, <p,success>, {}, D) --Formula 1 
This means that if the D are assumed as defaults, success can be deduced. To be 
able to deduce success, D must be consistent with the facts. By completeness of 
CANCEL, if D is not consistent then there is some subset C of D for which 
VS1 VS2 CANCEL(S1, S2, {}, C) 
can be deduced. 
--Formula 2 
If formula 2 can be deduced then the set C is said to form an inconsistency. If C 
C D then C is said to contradict D. 
There is a solution if there is a set of defaults D from which success can be 
deduced, which has no contradictions. 
One control strategy is to find a set of defaults from which success can be 
deduced, and then fail in a search for a contradiction to the set of defaults . 
Alternatively the search for solutions, and the search for contradictions can proceed 
concurrently. If ever a contradiction to a set of defaults is found then the search 
may be pruned as that set of defaults cannot appear in a solution or in a useful 
inconsistency . 
5.3 Adding Defaults to the Predicate Calculus 
The problem of adding defaults to the predicate calculus CES is complicated 
by the interaction of quantification, variables and Skolem functions with defaults. 
Definition: A default pair is a pair <w,f> where "w" is an input wff and 
"f" is a set of variables. "w" is a Skolemised default, and "f" is the set of 
universally quantified variables within whose scope w is assumed. Thus the top level 
wff: 
(Qi vj) ASSUME a 
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produces the default pair <w,f> where w is Skolemised form of (Qi vJt; and 
f={vi:Qi="V"} 
The informal meaning of default pair <w,f> is: If f={v 1, ... ,vn} , then 
Vv1 ... Vv n [(Vx w) may be assumed if it is consistent]. 
where x is the set of free variables of w not in f. 
In order to more precisely define the semantics of defaults, for default pair 
8=<w,f> define the following: If f={v1, ... ,vn}, then form a unique n-place 
predicate symbol P8, and an atomic formula a8 (the default atom) defined to be 
P8(v1 ,···,vn) . 
Let ( a8 ~ w) be an implicit fact. 
Definition: an indexed default is a pair <8,i> where 8 is a default pair 
and i is an index. The value <8,i>* of <8,i> is defined to be a8!i. 
In a proof success will depend on particular instances of t he defaul t atom a8, 
and to prove a contradiction, those particular instances must be inconsistent. 
5.3.1 The new CANCEL 
An extra argument, a default set D, is added to CANCEL, forming the 
relation 
CANCEL(W1, W2, A, D, 0) 
Where Dis a set of indexed defaul ts, <8,index > , with 8 E .:1. This means: 
f- [A*/\ D* /\ W1 * ~ W2* ]0 
where D* is the conjunction of all d* for d ED. 
A complete axiomatisation appears in Appendix E. This new CANCEL 
relat ion follows the axioms for the predicate calculus CANCEL, with the default 
set, D, acting exactly t he same as the assumption set in axioms 1, 2, 3, and 6. D is 
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f~ee in both sides of axiom 4a, and is free in axiom 4b and axiom 5. A new axiom, 
corresponding to axiom 5 for defaults is used: 
,7a. If o=<w,f> E Ll, then 
CANCEL(W, <p,w,i>, A, DU { <6,j> }, ¢,) 
where ¢, = { v!i/v!j: v E f} 
"Any instance of a default may be assumed by adding an instance to the default 
set under an appropriate substitution." 
Proof of Correctness 
As there is the implicit fact a0 ==} w. 
so [ a0!j =* w!i ]¢, --as ¢,=mgu(a0!i ,a0!j) 
so [A* /\ (DU { <o,j> })* /\ W =* <p,w,i> * ]¢, 
ie CANCEL(W, <p ,w,i> , A, DU { <6,j> }, ¢, ) 
Q.E.D. 
7b. If o=<w,f> E Ll then 
If CANCEL(W1 , <n,w,i>, A, D, 0) 
then CANCEL(W1, W2, A, D U { <6,i> }, 0) 
"If the negation of a default is proven then, if assumed, that default can prove 
anything." 
Proof of Correctness 
CANCEL(W1, <n,w,i> , A, D, 0) 
means I- [A* /\ D* /\ W1 * =* <n,w,i> * ]0 
so I- [A* /\ D* /\ <p ,w,i> * /\ W1 * =* W2* ]0 -- for arbitrary W2* 
<6,i>* = a0!i ==} w!i = <p,w ,i> * 
so 1- [A* /\ D* /\ <6,i> * /\ W1 * =* W2 * ]0 
so I- [A* /\ (D U { <6,i>} )* /\ W1 * ==} W2* ]0 -- definition of* 
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ie CANCEL(W1, W2, A, D U { <8,i> }, 0) 
Q.E.D. 
5.3.2 Goal of the Problem ·Solver 
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The aim of the problem solver is to prove success, perhaps depending on 
some defaults. The problem solver tries to deduce 
'v'W CANCEL(W, <p,success,I>, {}, D, 0) 
where D*0 is consistent with the facts . 
By the undecidibility of the first order predicate calculus, it is not possible to 
find a general solution to the problem of checking if D*0 is consistent with the 
facts . Instead failure to find an inconsistency after some reasonable effort will be 
taken to mean that the problem is solved. 
A set of indexed defaults, C, is inconsistent if 
'v'W1 'v'W2 CANCEL(W1, W2, {}, C, ¢) 
can be deduced. If such a relation can be deduced then C*</> is said to form an 
inconsistency. A contradiction will be found if it is shown that D*0 is an 
instance of C*</>, that is if D*0 ===} C*</>. 
Example 5.1 
Consider the following facts. 
1. Something has a clear top if there is nothing on it: 
'<ix ('v'y not ON(y,x)) ===} CLEARTOP(x) 
The Skolemised form of which is (not ON(f(?x), ?x) ===} CLEARTOP(?x)) 
where f is a Skolem function . 
2. unless otherwise stated things are not on each other: 
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Vu \Iv ASSUME not ON(u,v) 
the corresponding default pair 8 = <not ON(?u,?v), {?u,?v}> 
3. A is on B 
ON(A,B) 
4. the goal is to prove B bas a clear top: 
CLEARTOP(B) =? success 
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The proof should not of course succeed. Fact 1 means that if not ON(f(?x),?x) 
bolds for an arbitrary value of function f, then CLEARTOP(?x) may be concluded. 
If there is a value for f for which (not ON(f(?x),?x)) does not bold, then 
CLEARTOP(?x) cannot be deduced with this fact. 
Success can be deduced, assuming the default instance {a8(f(B),B)}, meaning 
(not ON(f(B),B)). The CANCEL produced is: 
CANCEL(W, <p,success,1 >, {}, { <8,4> }, { f(B)/u!4 , B/v!4, B/x!3 } ) 
An inconsistency can be deduced using the default instance {a8(A,B)}, meaning (not 
ON(A,B)). The CANCEL produced being: 
CANCEL(W1, W2, {}, { <8,6> }, { A/u!6, B/v!6 } ) 
This contradiction should not allow the deduction of success , as if f is defined to 
allow f(B)=A, and the indexes 4 and 6 are equated, then the default instances 
should be able to be matched, thus forming a contradiction. 
Example 5.2 
This is another example to show how the consistency checking must work. 
Consider the following facts: 
1. assume that a person bas a pet unless it can be proven otherwise: 
Vy ASSUME :lp PET(y,p) 
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the default pair produced being 8 = <PET(?y,f(?y)) ,{?y} > 
2. the goal is to prove that everyone has a pet: 
(\fx 3z PET(x ,z)) =} success 
Skolemising gives: PET(h, ?z) =} success 
That is if any arbitrary person h has a pet then the problem is solved. 
3. either george or harry does not have a pet: 
not (3v PET(george,v)) or not (3v PET(harry,v)) 
Skolemising and renaming repeated variables gives: 
not PET(george, ?v) or not PET(harry, ?w) 
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Using these facts success should not be derivable, as fact 3 says that there is 
someone who does not have a PET. "Success" can be deduced considering the 
following deduction , naming the input wffs as: 
8 = <PET(?y.f(?y)). {?y}> 
w4 
PET (h. ? z) =} success 
wl w3 w2 
not PET(george, ?v) or not PET(harry,?w) 
w6 w5 w9 w8 w7 
implicit goal success is wO 
Backward chaining (ignoring assumption sets) gives 
1. CANCEL(W, <p ,wO,l> , {} , D, 0) 
to prove 1, use axiom lb and prove 
2. CANCEL(W, <p ,w2 ,2 > , {}, D, 0) 
to prove 2, use axiom 2d and prove steps 3 and 4 
3. CANCEL(W, <p,w3,2> , {}, D1 , 01) 
which holds by axiom Sa 
4._ CANCEL(W, <p,wl,2>, {} , D2, 02) 
wh ere D=D1 U D2, and 0=uc(01 ,02) 
to prove 4, use axiom 1 b and prove 5 
5. CANCEL(W, <p ,w4 ,3 >, {}, D2 , 03) 
where 02=uc(03,{ h/?y!3, f(h)/ ?z! 2 } ) 
Chapter 5 - A Default Logic Problem Solver 
which holds by axiom 7a if D2={ <6,3>} 
So the goal is proven with D={ <6,3>} and 
0 = { h/ ?y!3, f(h)/?z!2 } 
r -
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That is the goal can be proven if {a6(h)} is assumed, where h is a skolem constant. 
Thus success can be deduced if the default holds for an arbitary person h. 
To show that an inconsistency can be deduced prove 
1. CANCEL(W1, W2, {}, C, ¢) 
to prove 1, with 6 in a possible inconsistency, use axiom 7b, and prove: 
2. CANCEL(W1, <n,w4,4>, {} , C1, ¢) 
where C = c1 U <6,4 > 
to prove 2, use axiom lb and prove 
3. CANCEL(W1, <n,w5,5 > , {}, C1, ¢1) 
where¢ = uc(¢ 1, { george/?y!4, f(george)/?v!5 } 
to prove 3 use axiom 3b and prove 
4. CANCEL(W1, <p ,w6,5 > , {}, C1, ¢1) 
to prove 4 use axiom 2d and prove steps 5 and 6 
5. CANCEL(W1, <p ,w9,5 > , {}, C2, ¢2) 
holds by axiom Sa, with C2={}, ¢2={} 
6. CANCEL( W1, <n,w8,5 > , {} , C3, ¢3) 
where c1 =C2UC3 and ¢1 =uc( ¢2,¢3) 
to prove 6 use axiom 3a, and prove 
7. CANCEL( W1, <p ,w7,5 > , {}, C3, ¢3) 
to prove 7 use axiom 1 b and prove 
8. CANCEL(W1, <p,w4,6 >, {}, C3, ¢4) 
where ¢3 = uc(¢4, { harry/?y!6, f(harry)/?w!5} 
holds by axiom 7a with C3={ <6,6 >} 
There is an inconsistency with C = { <6,4> , <6,6 >} 
with ¢ = { george/?y!4, f(george)/?v!5, harry /?y!6 , f(harry)/?w!5 } 
Thus an inconsistency can be deduced assuming {a6(george),a6(harry)} . 
To find a contradiction (which does exist) the Skolem constant h must be george or 
harry . The matching algorithm for finding contradictions must therefore look at 
different interpretations for Skolem functions. 
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5.3.3 Finding the Contradictions 
The problem solver can find instances of defaults that lead to the goal. The 
goal can then be deduced if these instances are consistent with the facts. Proving 
consistency is, an undecidable problem. By completeness, an inconsistency in a set 
of instances of inconsistent defaults can be deduced using the axioms of def-CES. 
The problem is to determine if any inconsistent set of default instances form a 
contradiction with the instances that lead to the goal. 
If D leads to the goal then 
CANCEL(W, <p,success ,l> , {}, D, 0) 
can be deduced. If D*0 is inconsistent with the facts then 
CANCEL(W1, W2 , {} , C, ¢) 
can be deduced where D*0 implies C*¢. 
Consequently the problem is to show that one default set implies another. To 
show D*0 implies C*¢. Suppose C*=c1A ... ;\ck, D*=d1A ... Adm, then it is known 
that in the context of the facts 
(c1 ¢ A ... A ck¢=} false), and 
(d10 A ... A dm0 =} success). 
Consequently D*0 leads to inconsistency if 
(d 10 A ... A dm0 =} c1¢ A ... A ck¢) 
That is Vi (d 10 A ... A dm0 =} ci¢). 
This occurs if Vi 3j ( dl is an instance of ci<P ). 
Thus to prove a contradiction it suffices to show that for each element, c, of 
the contradicting default set there is an element, d, of the proving default set such 
that d0 is an instance of c¢. 
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Furthurmore, this condition holds for all contradictable default sets. To show 
this, suppose there is a contradiction without just one element of D*0 being an 
instance of an element, ci</> E C*¢,. Suppose 3i Vj not( d/ is an instance of ci</> ). It is 
known that 3i ( d 10 I\ ... I\ dm0 ==} ci</> ). By completeness, a new contradiction can 
be formed, using a deduction proving ci</> from some dj'I/', where d/ is an instance 
of dj'I/'· With this new deduction, the resulting default set forms a contradiction for 
the D*0 for which the above instance check works. The instance checker need not 
do any deduction, this can be left to the top level system. 
Considering the implication ( d/ ==} ci</>) as a goal; dj is in the opposite parity 
in this goal to where its variables were defined, so it needs to, in some sense, have 
its Skolemisation reversed. One possible way to proceed may be to have an 
algorithm that reversed the Skolemisation of d/, and then formed a match if the 
reverse Skolemised form unifies with ci</> · This does not in practice work (see section 
5.5.3) 
To see how the algorithm to check instances must work examine the variables 
and constants in ci</> and d/: 
Suppose x is free in D*0. This means that, for any value of x, success ca1:1 be 
proven. So to get a contradiction, the contradiction must occur for every value of x, 
thus it must occur for an arbitrary value of x. So in any match the x must be 
treated as a unique constant, as is done in normal Skolemisation. It will be known 
as a reversed free variable. Alternatively consider that for d0 to be an instance 
of c¢,, c¢, must have free variables in the corresponding positions to the free 
variables in d0. To enforce this, x should be regarded as a constant. 
Suppose f is a Skolem function in D*0. This means that success follows if D*0 
holds for an arbitrary function f, so it must hold for any value of the function f. So 
if one (partial) interpretation for f can be found that leads to a contradiction then 
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success cannot be deduced. f is then known as a reversed Skolem function. For 
d0 to be an instance of c,p, this Skolem function is an arbitrary function that may 
be any fun ction that has the desired properties. So the function should be regard ed 
as a free variable in some sens·e. 
If f is a normal function in D*0, then a contradiction occurs if the particular 
value can be shown to lead to a contradiction. So f is treated in the match as a 
normal function . This is different to a Skolem function as it is a specific fun ction 
(rather than an arbitrary Skolem function). 
In contrast to variables and functions in D*0, variables and fun ctions in C*,p 
act like normal variables and functions. This is because a normal substitution can 
be applied to c</J to determine instances. 
5.3.4 The Reverse Match 
This section considers the problem of finding if one element of a default set is 
an instance of another element of a default set. It determines if d0 is an instance of 
c,p, by finding substitutions for free variables in c</J, and generalising Skolem 
functions in d0 to make them equal. The free variables in d0 are reversed free 
variables, and the Skolem functions in d0 are reversed Skolem functions. All other 
fun ctions are normal functions and all free variables in c¢ are normal free variables. 
The matcher works much like a unification algorithm by maintaining a list of 
pairs of terms that must be equal for d0 to match c,p. Two terms match if normal 
free variables can be instantiated , and values found for reverse Skolem fun ctions to 
make the two terms equal. 
If the equality of two terms, that cannot be equal, is proven to be necessary 
for the match then the match is said to fail, implying that c¢ cannot match d0. 
Two different reversed fr ee variables or normal fun ctions cannot be equal. If a fail 
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is deduced then no match can occur. A match is found if no fail can be deduced. In 
general, the matching problem is unsolvable, as it is equivalent to the word problem 
of semi-Thue systems (Manna[7 4]). So, in general, to ensure that a solution is found , 
the match may at any time tentatively succeed if no failure has occured using the 
resources allocated to the match. 
The matcher works as follows: suppose that the equality of x and y has been 
derived from the equality of c</> and d0. The following cases need to be considered: 
If x and y are both normal functions or reversed free variables, then they must be 
the same variable or the same function to match. If they are not then the match 
fails. If they are the same function then the corresponding arguments can be 
equated. 
If x is a normal free variable, then, similarly to the unification algorithm, if x is 
different to y and appears in y ( except within a reverse Skolem function) then the 
match fails. If this is not the case then x should be replaced everywhere it appears 
by y. 
If x is a reversed Skolem function then y is the value of x. If x is different toy and 
appears in y ( except within a reversed Skolem function) then the match fails. Any 
instance of x must have the value of the corresponding instance of y. So if an 
instance of x appears in an instance of v, then it should be replaced by the instance 
of y, to check for a failure from the resulting equality. 
If none of the above occured, or the last one occured, then the roles of x and y 
should be reversed . 
Here, instead of giving an algorithm for the matcher, it is written as a wff in 
the first order predicate calculus. This is the natural way to specify if two terms do 
match, and can be used in a number of ways, for example by giving it as a problem 
to CES, PROLOG, a resolution theorem prover, or by forwards chaining on the 
implications. 
The following predicates are used: 
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eq(x1,x2) means that x1 =x2 can be derived from c¢=d0. 
diff( x1,x2) means that x1 and x2 are not identical. 
free(x) means that x is a normal free variable 
rev-free(x) means that x is a reversed free variable 
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function(x ,f,(a1 ,a2 ,··· ,an)) means that xis an application of a normal function , or a 
predicate f to arguments (a1,a2, ... ,an) - A list is represented as the pair 
"<first element>.<rest of list>" . 
rev-Skolem-fn(x) means that x is a reversed Skolem function. 
appears-in(x,y) means that x appears somewhere in y, not within a reverse Skolem 
fun ction. 
subterm(s ,t,1r,0) means that 0 is the most general substitution (in the reverse 
Skolemised system) that makes s0 a subterm of t0 at position 1r (position is defined 
to mark the position to be used in the following function .) 
the fun ction replace-subterm(t,1r,s) returns the term made by replacing the 
subterm of t at position 1r with s. 
The match then becomes: 
eq(x,y) ===? [free(x) or 
rev-Skolem-fn(x) =? [diff(x,y) and appears-in(x,y) =? fail] 
and [eq(u,v) and subterm(x,u,1r,0) 
=? eq(replace-subterm(u,1r,y)0,v0)]] 
and [rev-free(x) =? [rev-free(y) =? [diff(x,y) =? fail]] 
and [function(y,f,args) =? fail]] 
and [function(x,f1,args1) =? 
[rev-free(y) =? fail] 
and [function(y , f2,args2) =? [diff(f1,f2) =? fail] 
and args-eq(args1,args2)]] 
and eq(y,x) 
args-eq(a1 . r1,a2 . r2) =? args - eq(r1,r2) and eq(a1,a2) 
At the top level the input is to mark the Skolem fun ctions and the free 
variables in d0 as reversed, and if d=<o,i>, where o=<w1,f1> and c=<x,j> , 
where x=<w2,f2> then there is a match if w1=w2 and 
args-eq(( f1!i)0, (f2!j)¢) does not fail. 
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5.4 Using Def a ult Reasoning in a Problem Solver 
The above default reasoning theory can be incorporated into a practical 
problem solving system in a number of ways. The main decisions to be made are: 
when to search for a solution; when to search for a contradiction; and how many 
resources to allocate to each activity, knowing that the problem, in general, is 
undecidable. Unsure answers must be anticipated, and it will be up to the users to 
determine how certain they want the answers to be. 
The explanations generated from the default logic problem solver can 
incorporate not only how the results were obtained, but ;-,lso the basis for belief in 
an answer. Thus the system may output "the goal depends on assuming a which 
was not found to be inconsistent with the facts." or "success was believed because 
a was believed.". The basis , a, will be the set of instances of defaults (the D*0) in 
the solution CANCEL. That is, the user is given the set of defaults needed to be 
used to prove the goal, and any explanation can be in terms of instances of defaults 
given by the user. By associating English text with each default canned English 
justification can be generated. 
One method of using the default axioms in a practical problem solver is to 
search for a solution, finding a set of instances of defaults sufficient to prove the 
problem; and then checking if they are consistent. 
Searching for a solution using defaults can be incorporated into the system 
described in chapter 4, by using axiom 7a to form a solved node when a default is 
set up as a subgoal. The default set is maintained in a similar way to the global 
substitution. Whenever axiom 7a is used to make a node solved , the corresponding 
default pair is added to the global default set. Thus a global default set, D, is built 
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up, together with the global substitution 0, upon which the top level goal depends. 
If D={} then success has been proven, as it is assumed that the facts are 
consistent. 
If D~{} then with each dED, the algorithm is used to prove (not d), by use of 
axiom 7b. If a default set C, with substitution ¢>, is built up such that C*¢> 
contradicts D*0, then the search for a new solution to the top level goal is 
commenced. This searching process continues until a solution without a 
contradiction is found; until all solutions are contradicted; or until it is deemed that 
enough resources have been allocated to either task to make a tentative decision 
that the problem is solved or cannot be solved. 
The searching for solutions and the searching for contradictions can be seen 
as two concurrent processes, with results in either search pruning the search for the 
other. 
In searching for a contradiction the only nodes that need to be checked are 
those nodes that use defaults that could possibly be instances of elements of D*0. In 
particular., only those elements c¢>EC*¢> for which there is a corresponding d0ED*0, 
such that d0 is an instance of c¢>, need be considered as possible defaults in axiom 
7a when searching for a contradiction. Thus the solution is used to prune the search 
for contradictions. The search for contradictions can be pruned in one other 
significant way. If there is an inconsistency with a default set containing instances 
of defaults d1 and d2, then that default set will be generated when either {not d1) 
or (not d2) is set up as a subgoal. To prevent finding redundant proofs for the same 
default set, an arbitary ordering on the defaults can be defined, so when (not d) is 
set up as a subgoal, no defaults greater than d need be considered as part of the 
contradicting default set. 
If an inconsistent set of instances of defaults, C*¢>, has been found, then in 
any subsequent search, with default set D, and substitution 0, if C*¢> contradicts 
D*0 then the search can be pruned at that point. To prove this there are two cases 
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to consider, the first is if the D is to be used in a solution of the top level goal, and 
the other is if D is to be used in another inconsistency. Any solution derived from D 
will have a default set which is an instance of D*0, and so will also be an instance 
of C*¢, and will thus be contradicted by C*¢. If a new inconsistency is formed from 
D, then it will also be an instance of C*¢, and so can never be used when C*¢ will 
not form a contradiction. Finding a contradiction in the sense of default logic is 
another instance of a contradiction in the sense of Chapter 4, and is used in the 
same way to constrain the search. The algorithm of Chapter 4 is particularly 
suitable for this type of reasoning. 
There still remains the problem of how to deal with the undecidability of the 
whole system. This is a major problem, and one which can only be solved by 
experience. For the system to be usable there must be some way to decide how 
many of the resources should be channelled into searching for solutions and in 
searching for contradictions. There is no problem if one of these searches finds a 
definitive answer. If neither do, the system should come up either with the answer 
that "no solution has not been found", or "the tentative solution is et, depending 
on /3; no contradictions have been found". The user should be allowed to allocate 
more resources to the goal searching or the contradiction searching as deemed 
necessary, and add new facts or assumptions. The allocation of resources into 
finding acceptably certain solutions would presumably be a matter of experience, 
dependent on the implementation, the problem domain and the search strategy 
used. 
5.5 A Comparison with Other Systems 
5.5.1 Negation as Failure 
The simplest form of default reasoning is of the form: "If P cannot be proven 
then infer (not P)". This is the sort of reasoning that is used in PROLOG (Warren 
and Pereira[77]), in PLANNER (Hewitt[72]), and in negation as failure (Clark[78]) . 
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These systems change the meaning of "not P" from meaning "the negation of P can 
be proven" to meaning "P cannot be proven". This statement can be added to CES 
by allowing the top level wff: 
ASSUME not P 
for each P for which the negation as failure is to work. 
In all of these systems there is no quantification before the ASSUME so that 
there are no problems about finding if an inconsistency is a contradiction, as set 
inclusion can be used. 
The closed world assumption in data bases (Reiter[78]) is also of the form 
Vx ASSUME not P( x) 
It does not have problems finding instances of defaults, as inferring (not P) from the 
lack of proof of P can only occur if P is a positive ground literal. 
5.5.2 Dependency Directed Backtracking 
Another form of default reasoning was the mechanisms developed at M.I.T. in 
the late 70's called dependency directed backtracking. This was first developed as 
an efficient searching method by Stallman and Sussman[76], and was later 
incorporated into truth maintenance systems (Doyle[78,79], McA1laster[78]). The 
SEARCH procedure in Chapter 4 can be seen as an extension of these ideas to the 
searching of and/or trees with substitutions providing the initial contradictions. 
Truth maintenance systems provide a package for maintaining dependency 
networks and for efficiently searching them. The users of such packages must define 
all deduction steps and detect contradictions. 
Truth maintenance systems have been incorporated into the language 
AMORD (de Kleer et al[77,78]) . AMORD can be seen as a procedural form of 
def-CES, with facts, rules and assumptions. The assumptions are all unquantified, 
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thus avoiding the problems of checking if one atomic formula is an instance of 
another. How a piece of knowledge is to be used is completely determined by the 
way it is added to the system. It is constrained to do forward chaining in the rules 
it is given, although the show· predicate allows the explicit introduction of backward 
reasoning. AMORD differs markedly in its philosophy from CES in that each piece 
of knowledge and the control information on how it is to be used are inextricably 
intertwined. 
5.5.3 Reverse Skolemisation 
The problem of finding a match between two Skolemised expressions, one of 
which requires reverse quantification also arises in mechanical hypothesis formation 
(Pietrzykowski[79]) , and in generating counterexamples (Ballantyne and 
Bledsoe[80]). Generating counter examples is equivalent to what is happening when 
finding a contradiction prunes the search tree for a solution. Mechanical hypothesis 
formation is finding the reasons for believing a hypothesis. This can be simulated in 
a CES-like system by adding unmatched atoms that are the leaves of the search 
tree to the default set. The solution is a consistent set of such causes of the top 
level goal , the ef feet . 
Such systems have spawned the use of reverse Skolemisation (Cox and 
Pietrzykowski[80], Bledsoe and Ballantyne[78]). Reverse Skolemisation is an 
algorithm which, in the terms given in this chapter is applied to d0, forming an 
oppositely Skolemised form, such that d0=}c¢, iff the reversed Skolemised form of d0 
unifies with c¢,. Such a reverse Skolemisation algorithm cannot, however work. The 
reverse Skolemised form cannot convey enough information to allow the unification 
of only those forms for which the implication should hold , as the following example 
shows. 
Consider the following form leading to the goal: 
P( f(g( x) ), g(x), f( a) ) 
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where f and g are Skolem functions; x is a free variable; and a is a constant. This 
means that if the above holds for arbitrary functions f and g, and for any x then 
the goal holds. Consider the following default leading to an inconsistency: 
P(a, b, c) 
In this case a contradiction occurs, as the function g being the constant function 
with value b, and f defined to have f(b)=a and f(a)=c, allows the match to occur, 
and so the top level goal cannot be derived as P(f(g(x)),g(x) ,f(a)) does not hold for 
arbitrary fun ctions f and g. 
If the inconsistency was however: 
P(b, a, c) 
Then no contradiction occurs, as for a contradiction to occur, "g" must be the 
constant function equal to "a", however no f can exist for which f(a) is both "b" 
and "c". A reverse Skolemisation on the first form would have to convey the 
information that it matches anything of the form P(a,,B,,), except when /J=a and 
a-=/:-1- This information cannot be used by a unification algorithm, thus this version 
of reverse Skolemisation together with the traditional unification algorithm cannot 
work as the information that needs to be used to prune possible matches cannot be 
used by the unification algorithm. 
Chapter 6 
Extending CES to Reason About Actions 
One of the design goals of CES was that it be versatile enou!sh to be able to 
be extended to more complex language constructs . One of these is problem solving 
with actions ( events, operators) that change the state of the world being modelled. 
Humans reason with and about actions as explicit objects and can use them to solve 
problems and form plans much more effectively than any computer system 
currently can. Problems in this domain usually consist of finding a plan (sequence of 
actions) to achieve some goal. 
This chapter presents a preliminary design of an extension of CES to include 
such reasoning. This design is the subject of future research, and although not fully 
developed, is interesting in itself, as it indicates how CES might be expanded to use 
more powerfu l language constructs. 
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6.1 Historical Context 
Reasoning about actions, forming plans, and solving problems which involve 
state changes have long been problems in Artificial Intelligence. 
In the earliest attempts, for example GPS (Ernst and Newell[69]), the 
operators (modelling actions) on the models of the world had to specify completely 
how to construct a new model of the world for each application of an operation. 
Actions were incorporated into theorem proving methods (McCarthy[68], 
McCarthy and Hayes[69], Green[69]) by adding a state variable to each predicate. 
These methods suffer from the use of a homogeneous theorem prover and the lack 
of domain specific heuristics resulting in combinatorial explosions; and from the 
frame problem . The frame problem is the problem of how to specify the effect of 
an action . In these systems for each action, and for each relation the effect of the 
action on the relation must be specified. This becomes a serious problem when then 
number of relations or operators becomes large. A number of solutions to the frame 
problem have been proposed. 
One suggested partial solution is to split the predicates into primitive and 
non primitive predicates, or into derived and explicitly asserted predicates, and 
only specify the effect of actions on primitive or explicitly asserted predicates (Fikes 
and Nilsson[71], Fikes[75]). Deciding which predicates are to be primitive, and 
which predicates are to be derived is not a trivial problem. There may not exist a 
set of independent primitive predicates, so that maintaining a consistent model of 
the world becomes a large problem. Each action must know about the 
interdependencies of the primitive predicates. If there are still a large number of 
primitive predicates the frame problem still exists. 
r -
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Kowalski[79] suggests a solution of having separate HOLDS(relation,state) 
relations in the Horn Clause problem solver, and adding an explicit frame axiom 
for each action, specifying the ·predicates not explicitly changed. The frame axiom 
states that all relations except for the ones explicitly specified are not changed by 
the action. All of the changed predicates must be specified at once, and listed in the 
rule. Circumscription (McCarthy[80]) is a way of automatically generating these 
rules. 
To help solve the frame problem STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson[71]) was 
designed. In this problem solver there is a resolution theorem prover within each 
world model; primitive and non primitive predicates are used; as is the so called 
STRIPS assumption . The STRIPS assumption is: any primitive relation that holds 
in one world model holds in the world following an operator unless there is an 
explicit specification to the contrary. In STRIPS the operators have preconditions 
which must hold in one world before the operator is applicable. The effect of an 
operator is specified by two sets of ground instance primitive relations: one of which 
is the add. list of those relations that are true in the subsequent state; and the other 
is the delete list of those primitive relations that no longer hold in the subsequent 
state. There were a number of problems with STRIPS: The effect of an operator 
must be specified in a single step, and all primitive relations affected by the 
operator must be specified. This leads to many problems if the operator affects a 
number of relations; that is if there are catastrophic events or sensitive conditions. 
All of the changed relations must be updated after each event. Problems arise if 
new primitive relations are subsequently added to the system. The add and delete 
list mechanism does not allow complex interactions between operators and relations 
without contrived relations being formed . STRIPS is also not complete in that there 
are many problems that can be given to it that it cannot solve. (For an overview of 
problems see Nilsson[80].) These are mainly problems of interacting subgoals that 
must be achieved concurrently. 
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Waldinger[77] defines a strategy for achieving several goals simultaneously. 
His strategy is to achieve one goal and then modify that plan to solve the other 
goals. To do this he uses the notion of regression, which is finding the weakest 
precondition for a particular relation to hold after an action. This is specified as 
regression rules which, given a relation and an action returns a wff that is the 
weakest statement that must hold before the action for the relation to hold after. 
The user must add these rules explicitly for each action and relation. This approach 
suffers from the lack of formal semantics of procedural knowledge, and the resulting 
difficulty in defining and proving correct such procedures. There are still a number 
of problems that Waldinger 's system cannot handle. 
An alternative way of solving the simultaneous goal problem is described in 
Sacerdoti[75]. In his system partially ordered plans are built up to solve the problem 
and subproblems; and constructive critics are used to add new orderings to the 
partial ordering. At all times the system tries to maintain the least ordered partial 
ordering to solved the problem and subproblems, that does not lead to difficulties. 
His system still uses add and delete lists as in STRIPS; and although it suffers from 
not having conditionals, and only having one alternative plan being able to be 
generated, it is able to solve many problems that its predecessors could not. 
The prototype system described in this chapter takes ideas from each of these 
systems, and shows how they can be combined into a problem solving framework. 
6.2 Design Goals 
In the design of a problem solver for reasoning in domains with actions that 
change the state of the world, the following criteria were taken into account: 
The problem solver must be an extension of the problem solver for the 
predicate calculus, in the sense that restricting reasoning to one of the states should 
Chapter 6 - Extending CES to Reason About Actions Page 6-5 
produce an equivalent problem solver, and the extensions to incorporating state 
changes must follow the philosophy of the original design. 
The Language must be a natural extension of the first order predicate 
calculus. The way people think about actions should be reflected in the language so 
that the users can input knowledge in their own terms, and an explanation can be 
given in terms they can understand. 
Actions should be explicit objects that can be reasoned about and 
manipulated. They must be able to be used as terms as well as sequenced together, 
and be incorporated into conditional statements. 
The problem solver must incorporate a solution to the frame problem in that 
the effect of an action must be easily specified for a simple action. This does not 
preclude the fact that an intricate, complex action may require a detailed 
specification. The difficulty in characterising the action should approxin1ate the 
complexity of the action modelled . The problem solver should be able to effectively 
use these specifications. 
The problem solver must be efficient; be general and powerful enough to 
solve the types of problems that it may be given; be able to concisely and 
understandably explain its reasoning; and be amenable to the introduction of 
domain specific heuristics of the type that people naturally use. 
6.3 The Language 
For this problem solver the language used , the State Change Language (SCL) 
is an extension of the first order predicate calculus, to include ASSUME ( Chapter 
5), and new objects called actions (or events). There is a new binary logical 
connective, namely "-+" . 
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Actions have the same syntax as predicates, and can be used wherever 
predicates can be used. An action holding shall mean that the action can now 
occur. So to incorporate the statement "p is a sufficient condition for action e to 
occur.", "p =? e" is added as a fact. 
The new wff "e - w", where e is an action and w is a wff, is taken to mean 
"a f ter e occurs w holds". This is the only form of the new connective. A formal 
definition is given in section 6.3.3. 
The statement "If (bis true before e oc·curs) then (a is true after e)." can be 
written as: 
b::::} (e-+ a) 
a partial correctness version of 
The logical operator "-+" can be regarded asJthe weakest precondition (wp) 
of Dijkstra[76] . Thus the fact b~ eA(e-a) 1 can be taken to mean that b implies 
the weakest precondition for a to hold after e. The statement (b =? ( e -+ a)) is 
equivalent, in the terms of Hoare[69], to 
b {e} a 
So the generality of this syntactic addition can be gauged by the fact that it is 
sufficiently powerful to form a basis for Hoare's axiomatic semantics. For example 
the semantics of assignment can be given by the axiom schema 
P 0 =? ((v := x)-+ P), 
where P O is obtained from P by substituting x for all occurences of v. 
One restriction can be placed on the connective "-+" to improve efficiency 
and simplify the problem solver, namely to restrict it to be only used in the even 
position (see section 2.7.1) . This does not allow the deduction that if not e-+w is 
deduced, then e holds and w does not hold after e; and the deduction that ·re does 
not hold then e-+w holds; and if w holds after e then e-+w holds. These are 
contorted ways to use the operator, and disallowing them lets the problem solver be 
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simpler, without apparently losing the ability to do all useful deductions. None of 
the proofs in Dijkstra[76] are disallowed by this restriction. 
In SCL the definition of the precondition of an action is separated from the 
definition of the effect of the action. Different effects of the same action and 
different sufficient conditions for an action may be defined independently. This 
means that the preconditions need not be specified and reevaluated each time the 
action is mentioned, as can happen in state variable approaches. It also means the 
precondition needed for the action to occur at all, and the precondition needed for 
a particular condition to hold after the action has occured, are recognised as 
different. Very little is lost by separating the precondition from the effect of an 
action except that both have to be specified. If this separation is not desired the 
precondition could be stated as a fact. 
For example, a precondition of an explosion may be that the fuse is alight and 
the safety switch is off. The effect of the explosion may however be quite 
independent, for example buildings close by get destroyed. Another effect of an 
explosion may be that people further away get frightened . These effects and 
preconditions can be expressed independently and modularly. 
The effect rules are actually explicit regression rules (Waldinger[77]). The 
weakest precondition of a wff w through an action e is obtained by finding the 
precondition for 
"(e-+w)" . 
6.3.1 Some Examples 
As an example consider an alternative to the axiom schema defined above for 
the assignment statement v := x, written here as assign(?v,?x). The effect is 
variable v gets the value of expression x. This means if x has the value a then after 
the assignment statement v has the value a . This is expressed as: 
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value(?x,?o) ::::} (assign(?v,?x) --+ value(?v,?o)) 
All of the other variables keep their values: 
diff(?w,?v) and value(?w,?,B) ::::} (assign(?v,?x) --+ value(?w,?,B)) 
where diff means w and v are different, taking into account aliasing etc. 
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The prerequisite of the assignment, independent of the effects, is that v and x are 
the same type 
type(?v,?t) and type(?x,?t) ::::} assign(?v,?x) 
Consider the blocks world with the action puton(x,y), meaning "put block x 
on blocky." The precondition is that x and y are different blocks and have clear 
tops: 
diff(x,y) and cleartop(x) and cleartop(y) ::::} puton(x ,y) 
The effect of puton is however independent of this. After puton(x ,y) , xis on y: 
puton(x,y) --+ on(x,y) 
All relations are preserved by the action unless they can be proven otherwise: 
Vx Vy VC ASSUME C ::::} (puton(x,y) --+ C) 
An inconsistency can be derived from the fact that something cannot be on two 
different blocks: 
not( on(?x, ?y) and diff(?x, ?y) and on(?x, ?z) ) 
A block has a clear top if nothing is on it: 
Vx (V z not on(z,x)) ::::} cleartop(x) 
6.3.2 The Frame Problem 
The proposed system offers a solution to the frame problem (for discrete 
actions) by use of the default logic described in chapter 5. 
The general statement "for all predicates and all actions assume that if the 
predicate holds before the action then it holds after" can be expressed as: 
(VP) (Ve) ASSUME (P::::} (e--+ P)) 
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This means that if an instance of P, and an instance of e lead to a 
contradiction then this rule will not be used for those instances. In that case the 
truth of P will not be derivable after e. If no contradiction occurs then the truth of 
P after e can be derived from the truth before e. The formal definition of the state 
change language in the next section allows the quantification over variables that 
can take atomic formulae as values. 
In many cases the general frame rule is neither required nor desired. In these 
cases specialised frame rules can be built, by adapting the above default, for 
catastrophic actions, sensitive conditions, or for minor actions or very stable 
situations. 
6.3.3 Formal Semantics 
In this section the semantics of the state change language (SCL), informally 
given above, are defined. A mapping from SCL into the delfault language is used to 
define SCL. 
The syntax of SCL is defined as follows: 
Terms, functions and variables are defined as in the predicate calculus. An atomic 
formula (atom) is a term. Actions are terms such that the set of top level 
function symbols for atoms and actions are disjoint. 
A wff is defined as follows: An atom is a wff; An action is a wff; If u and v are wffs 
then (u and v), (u or v), (u =} v), (not u) are wffs; If e is an action and u is a wff 
then ( e -+ u) is a wff; If x is a variable and u is a wff then (V x u) and (3 x u) are 
wffs. 
A top level wff is either a wff; or "ASSUME w" where w is a wff; or "V x w" or 
"3 x w" where x is a variable and w a top level wff. A top level wff containing an 
"ASSUME" is called a default and one without an "ASSUME" is called a fact. 
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If w is a wff in SCL, ands is a state (a term) then w[s] is a wff in the first 
order predicate calculus defined as follows: 
If u and v are wff s in SCL, and s is a state then 
(u and v)[s] = u[s] and v[s] 
(u or v)[s] = u[s] or v[s] 
(u ::::} v)[s] = u[s] ::::} v[s] 
(not u)[s] = not u[s] 
If x is a variable then 
(Vx u)[s] = (Vx u[s]) 
(3x u)[s] = (3x u[s]) 
If a is an atom in SCL then 
a[s] = HOLDS(a,s) 
If e is an action in SCL then 
e[s] = HOLDS(precond(e) ,s) 
If e is an action, u is a wff in SCL and s is a state then 
(e-+ u)[s] = HOLDS(precond(e),s)::::} u[do(e,s)] 
(ASSUME w)[s] = (ASSUME w[s]) 
In the above "HOLDS" is a new binary predicate symbol and "precond" and 
"do" are new function symbols in the predicate calculus. 
A top level wff, "r', in SCL is defined to mean (Vs f[s]) is a top level wff in 
the transformed predicate calculus. 
For example the fact (b ::::} ( e -+ a)) where a and b are atomic formulae and e 
is an action means 
Vs HOLDS(b,s) and HOLDS(precond(e) ,s)::::} HOLDS(a,do(e,s)} 
There is an implicit fact in the predicate calculus form , namely 
HOLDS(INIT,s0), for some constant INIT and some implicit initial state s0. In SCL, 
/_ -
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INIT holds at the start. Thus the statement "Initially A is on Band Bis on C." 
would be written as: 
INIT =} on(A,B) and on(B,C) 
The aim of the problem solver is to prove that success can be reached by a 
sequence of actions from the initial state s0. Thus the aim is to find some state s 
such that 
HOLDS(init ,s0) =} HOLDS(success ,s) 
s will then be the required solution. In general there may not be one solution, but 
rather the right hand side will be a disjunction of such forms . Each solution will be 
a sequence of "do" functions with either s0 or a free variable appearing at the 
bottom level. The form of this is much simplified by the use of paths. 
6.3.4 Paths 
Paths are sequences 01 actions with alternatives. They are basically partial 
plans or loop free programs. 
A path is defined as follows: 
"SKIP" is a path; 
an action is a path; 
If P and Q are paths and c is an atomic formula ( called a condition) then 
P;Q is a path; and 
(IF c THEN P ELSE Q) is a path. 
The semantics of these paths are given by their effect on states. "do" is 
extended to be applicable on all paths, not just actions. 
do(SKIP,s) = s 
do(P;Q,s) = do(Q,do(P,s)) 
w[do((IF c THEN P ELSE Q),s)D 
= (c[sD =} w[do(P,s)D) and 
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(not c[sil =} w[do(Q,s)Il) 
The ";" and "IF-THEN-ELSE" constructs are exactly the same as in 
procedural languages, and the above definitions correspond to the axiomatic 
semantics of the construct in the procedural languages (Dijkstra[76]). 
The following identities hold for these constructs, with straightforward proofs: 
skip;P=P;skip=P for all paths P 
(IF c THEN P ELSE P)=P for all paths P and conditions c 
(IF c THEN (P;R) ELSE (Q;R)) = (IF c THEN P ELSE Q);R 
for all conditions c and paths P,Q and R. 
6.4 Act-CES: CES with Actions 
One simple way to define a problem solver for problems stated in the state 
change language is to apply the transformations to convert them into first order 
predicate .calculus statements and use CES on this form. This however goes against 
the philosophy of CES as it: reduces the explanation capabilities of using the special 
constructs; and reduces the information in those constructs that could be used to 
speed up the search for a solution. Higher level descriptive apparatus can be used . 
One of the main reasons for designing a new problem solver for a different 
domain is that special features of that domain may be used to restrict the possible 
reasoning available to reduce the combinatorial explosion of the search without 
prohibiting the possibility of finding reasonable solutions. One example of this in 
state change problem solvers is in reasoning with hypothetical futures. This is 
reasoning with constructs of the following type: "If after Q occurs c holds, then if 
Q is not done , but instead Pis done then d must hold." This seems like contorted 
reasoning, and is not the type of reasoning that humans would use, but would be 
readily generated by a straight theorem prover type problem solver. Disallowing 
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such constructs does not seem to reduce the ability of the problem solver to solve 
problems that humans solve, but reduces the combinatorial explosion. It does not 
however preclude such reasoning as "If c holds, then after P occurs, d holds." or 
"If d holds after P then c must hold before P." 
Using a specially designed problem solver for the state change language allows 
the use of special features of state changes, namely the use of concaternation ( ";") 
and alternation ("IF-THEN-ELSE" ) constructs instead of the more obscure 
constructs that would be produced by a classical deduction system. 
6.4.1 CANCEL with Actions 
In this section a way to extend the CANCEL relation for default reasoning for 
domains with state changes is presented. The CANCEL relation for state change 
logic differs from the default logic CANCEL in having the relation between two 
input wffs representing the fact that the right hand side input wff can be produced 
by a sequence of actionsfrom the left hand one rather than one implying the other. 
The new CANCEL has no general contrapositive form. 
In act-CES the CANCEL relation is extended to include a path (P) between 
the two wffs as well as an initial path (I). 
If the left signed index wff is W1, and the right one is W2, then the CANCEL 
relation will represent the fact that "If the def au/ts and the assumptions hold 
then if w10 holds in the state after I has occured, then after P subsequently 
occurs w20 holds." The default sets and the assumption sets are extended to 
include paths. 
More formally CANCEL is extended to: 
CANCEL(W1, W2, A, D, I, P, 0) 
where W1 and w2 are signed indexed wffs; 
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A is a set of < W,Q> where Wis a signed indexed wff and Q is a path; 
D is a set of < d ,Q> where d is an indexed default and Q is a path; 
I and P are paths; 
and 0 is an indexed substitution. 
This relation is axiomatised to model the relation: 
I- Vs [ A*[sD and D*[sD and W1 *[do(I,s)D =* W2*[do(I;P,s)D ]0 
where D*[sD is the conjunction of d*[do(Q,s)D for <d,Q> ED; 
A*[sD is the conjunction of the W*[do(Q,s)D for <W,Q> EA. 
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In the rest of this chapter a diagramatic abbreviation of the above relation is 
used, namely 
-I- W1 -P- W2 
where the A, D and 0 are left implicit. 
There are three interesting cases in the axiomatisation of the above cancel 
relation . These occur when two paths join to form a third. 
1. Two paths must end with the same condition, for example: 
- I- y - P- X1 
-J-y-Q- x2 
where x is (x1 and x2) 
In this case both x1 and x2 must be achieved simultaneously for x to be 
achieved . To do this we define the function m(P1 ,P2) called the merge of paths P 1 
and P 2. This is a single path that achieves the goals of both P 1 and P 2. In the 
normal predicate calculus this would be the most general unifier of the two paths. If 
they are solving relatively independent subgoals then intuitively there should be 
some better method of combining the paths than independently finding two paths 
which unify . This problem, of the simultaneous achievement of several goals, was 
one of the main downfalls of both the theorem proving and STRIPS methods. 
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Several methods have been developed to solve this problem of finding a single 
path to solve several subgoals. These include the method of regression 
(Waldinger[77]), and the method of maintaining a plan as a partially ordered set of 
actions (Sacerdoti[75]). Both of these techniques can be used in evaluating the 
function m. Facts of the form (b =? (e -+ a)) can be seen as explicit regression rules 
to find the weakest precondition for a to hold after e occurs. If paths are made into 
partially ordered plans and regressing one goal through an action that has not an 
order relationship with the goal, destroys that goal, then an order relation can be 
built up by making that goal achieved after that action. The problem of finding a 
merge of two partial plans is the problem considered by Sacerdoti, and def-CES can 
be seen as an extension of the work of Sacerdoti into a problem solver with 
alternate ways of proving goals as well as conditional statements. 
The resultant CANCEL from the above two relations would be of the form: 
-m(I,J)-+ y - m(P,Q)-+ x 
2. The c~e where alternate paths are needed to solve a goal, for example: 
- 1-+ X1 - P-+ y 
- J-+ x2 - Q-+ y 
where xis (x1 or x2) 
In this case, when mapped into the predicate calculus, the two paths have to 
unify with, perhaps different instances of the same state variable. In this case the 
resultant CANCEL is of the form: 
- m(I ,J)-+ x - (if x1 then P else Q)-+ y 
This is how if-then-else statements are generated. To ensure that a 
deterministic plan is generated x1 should be a computable fun ction (Manna and 
Waldinger[80]) . If it is not a computable function a nondeterministic program 
results . 
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3. The other case to consider is if one of the branches can be produced by a path 
from anywhere (that is from a fact), and the other alternative produces the desired 
goal, for example: 
-I-+ ?t -P-+ x1 
-J-+ x2 -Q-+ y 
where xis (x1 ===? x2) 
In this case the two initial segments have to be merged forming 
-m(I;P,J)-+ x -Q-+ y 
This is the case where an initial path is created from a non-initial path. So a 
CANCEL relation which did not include such initial paths would not be adequate in 
such cases. 
The complete set of axioms for act-CES can be created by extending the 
def-CES axioms, and using the above three cases to work out the combining of the 
paths. The number of axioms is increased by the fact that there is only a 
contrapositive axiom when the path between the two wffs is SKIP. Some of the 
cases of the axioms can be removed because they violate the restriction on using 
hyperthetical futures reasoning, thus reducing the complexity of the problem solver 
as well as reducing the combinatorial explosion. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7 .1 Overview of Achievements 
This thesis describes the theory of a family of complete expert systems, called 
CES, designed to combine expert systems, theorem provers, and problem solving 
systems such as Nilsson[79] into a unified framework . 
CES is a family of problem solvers with a common semantic base, defined by 
the axioms in Chapter 3. The system described in Chapter 4 and used in Appendix 
D is one implementation of CES. The logic and control components of a CES 
implementation are separated, (see Kowalski[79b], Georgeff[82]) the logic 
component being defined by the axioms, and the control component some searching 
strategy on these axioms. Different implementations are obtained by changing the 
control component. Whilst "CES" is the the family of problem solvers, the term is 
also used to refer to an arbitary member of the family. 
Chapter 7 - Conclusion Page 7-2 
CES does its reasoning in terms of the predicate calculus. The user need not 
convert all knowledge into a more constrained form, such as clause form, or 
operators and reducers (Nilsson[79]). Of course the constrained forms are not 
excluded by CES. The normal subterm multiplication of converting wffs into 
conjunctive normal form is avoided. There is only one minor syntactic constraint on 
the input, and all transformations on the input have an inverse, so the internal and 
external forms are isomorphic. 
Since CES does not destroy the input during processing, explanation of its 
reasoning can be expressed in terms of the input. For example, explanation text 
may be associated with each piece of input, as is done in Emycin (Van Melle[80]) 
(see Appendix D). As the input form is preserved, an explanation may be associated 
with a piece of input, and can be used at the appropriate time when the input is 
used in a deduction. Any information about the input form, for example domain 
specific heuristics , can be found and used at the appropriate time as it is associated 
with thr forms used during processing. 
Any implementation of CES need only do unification at input time, and 
unifying compositions at other times. The set of atomic formulae that unify with a 
particular atomic formula can be found once, eliminating the search for matching 
atoms during the deduction stage. The most general unifiers of pairs of matching 
atomic formulae are computed once and combined by using unifying compositions. 
This is the main advantage that connection graph theorem provers have over other 
deduction methods (Nilsson[80]). 
CES automatically takes care of the problem of renaming variables when 
different instances of facts are used in a solu tion. There is no need to explicitly copy 
wffs to allow for higher order proofs (Sickel[76], Nilsson[79]) . CES solves the 
p~oblem of rewriting variables in a clean way . 
The CES axioms are expressed in a form very close to the predicate calculus. 
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This allows the meaning of the constructs used to be explicit and for the logic 
component of the problem solver to be separated from the control component. The 
axioms defining CES have been proven correct, so that an implementation of CES 
may be proven correct by proving that the control component provides a correct 
search of the space. It is modular, as demonstrated by its restriction to the 
PROVEN relation, and its expansion to incorporate default reasoning and reasoning 
about state changes. 
The completeness proven in Appendix B means that any implementation of 
CES with a semidecidable control component is complete for the first order 
predicate calculus. The implementation described in Chapter 4 is complete. As a 
consequence if the full power of a complete problem solver is required for a 
particular problem then it is available. This does not disallow sacrificing 
completeness for efficiency, but rather enables the power of a complete deduction 
system to be used at the time it is deemed appropriate. If a complete 
implementation announces that there is no solution then it means that there is no 
solution, and more powerful problem solvers do not need to be brought in. 
CES is expanded to include default reasoning and a framework for reasoning 
in domains with state changes. It can be restricted to the PROVEN problem solver 
which is also complete. A simple, although not complete problem solver much like 
that proposed by Nilsson[79] can be produced by removing the assumption list. 
CES provides a unified model for many other seemingly quite disparate 
problem solving systems, as the following shows. 
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7.2 CES in Relation to Other Work 
CES can be seen as way to extend the reasoning power of existing expert 
systems (eg Emycin - van Melle[79]; Prospector - Hart et al[78,79]) to include the 
unrestricted use of variables and functions, and the more liberal use of logical 
connectives. However, missing from a CES model of expert systems is the notion of 
certainty factors . Expert systems were motivated mainly from high performance 
and human engineering issues (Buchanan[81]) . This thesis does not pretend to cover 
all of the issues involved in the design of expert systems. A model for an expert 
system on student enrolment based on the algorithm described in Chapter 4 has 
been demonstrated (see Appendix D). It should be noted that because of the 
differences in control structures, the appropriate domain for a CES expert system 
may be quite different to that for the expert systems using non-standard logic. 
CES can also be seen as an extension of Nilsson[79]'s system by extending its 
language to the full predicate calculus, and making it complete. If desired the 
restrictions of Nilsson's system can be incorporated into CES, producing an 
equivalent system (see section 3.7.1). 
The implementation in chapter 4 shows how a CES implementation can 
utilise the syntactic constraints of Linear resolution {Chang and Lee[73]) (see section 
4.7.1), and connection graph proof procedures (particularly Sickel[76]) (section 
4.7.2) . 
Other input form deduction schemes have included Murray[82] {an extension 
of Manna and Waldinger[80]). This is a "non-clausal analogue lo breadth-first 
binary resolution" (Murray[82] pg.74). They hold a similar relationship to binary 
resolution that CES holds to the searching of a Clause Interconnectivity Graph 
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(Sickel[76]). They suffer efficiency problems similar to those of binary resolution. 
They do not preserve input form during processing so cannot gain any of the 
associated advantages. 
In parallel, but unrelated work Andrews[81] and Bibel[81,82] have developed 
proof techniques based on proving each path in a logical matrix has complementary 
(mated) literals. These systems do not use the full predicate calculus, but use input 
in negation normal form, that is "~" and "=" are expanded out and negations 
are moved in. Using the notation of Andrews[81], matings are equivalent to the 
precomputation of "¢," in rule 1. The and-subtree of Chapter 4 represents a 
systematic and efficient way of representing every vertical path in a logical matrix. 
The use of rule 4 is equivalent to Bibel's circuit lemma and Andrews' merge 
condition. The duplication of quantifiers is a big problem in Andrews[81] which is 
eliminated in CES. The systems are not designed to easily explain their reasoning, 
and the transformation needed to convert internal proof forms to understandable 
external forms is quite large (Andrews[80]). The relative computational efficiencies 
are unclear. 
7.3 Future Work 
As with any new problem solving methodology much work needs to be done 
to produce production scale expert systems. Many of the results of other problem 
solving systems can be adapted to this system, but some features need major 
transformations to fit in to its design philosophy. In this section some of those 
problems are posed with suggested solutions. 
A most important addition to CES would be an effective answer extraction 
system. One version of this was presented in chapter 6 as paths. In the current 
implementation the disjunction of answers is extracted from the resulting 
substitution when the top level goal is produced. This is just a disjunction of 
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possibilities. A more satisfactory form of answer using the "IF-THEN-ELSE" 
construct could be extracted from the solution deduction by finding computable 
conditions within the deduction between the node where a wff is assumed (axiom 
4b) and where it is unassumed ( axiom 4a); splitting the deduction of the wff into 
two deductions, one for the condition holding and one for the condition not holding. 
Lemma B.2 shows how to produce the deduction for the two cases. 
A good explanation scheme would also include a hierarchial description of 
how answei:sare obtained, both during the search and after a solution has been 
found. This could be incorporated into the current implementation by using the 
second explanation scheme described in section 4.7.3.1 and associating with each 
critical operator, information about when to use its corresponding description . 
When the user asks for more detail, a lower level description can be given. The user 
should also be provided with information about why a particular choice was made. 
This involves extracting information from the contradictions, and from the use of 
user-given heuristics. 
One of the uses of formal deduction systems is in automatic programming 
(Manna and Waldinger[80]) . This requires a good answer extraction system, along 
with a lemma formation component. Lemma formation is the termination of infinite 
chains in the deduction by abstracting a loop in the resulting answer. The input 
form deduction system of CES could prove to be very productive in this area as it 
allows for a clean human interface to the internal details of the deduction for either 
the manual generation of lemmas or the introduction of special rules to generate 
specific forms of lemmas. 
It does not seen to be i nfeasable that an automatic programming system 
could be designed to produce an algorithm much like the one in Chapter 4 using 
th_e axioms in Chapter 3. Compiling an appropriate form of the CES axioms using 
Prolog (Warren and Pereira.[771) can be seen as a form of automatic generation of 
an algorithm from the axioms. 
r_ 
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One of the main deficiencies of CES is that it does not incorporate equality. 
Equality could be handled in much the same way as paramodulation {Chang and 
Lee[73]) is used in resolution based systems. Informally it would work like this: if W 
implies a=/3 and Ph], where 0 = mgu(a,-y) then W would imply P[/3]0 (one instance 
of ')' replaced by /3 in P). The difficulty arises in following the design philosophy of 
CES which requires P[/3] to be in terms of the input. 
Practical ways of finding contradictions for default problem solvers, and of 
effectively using the state change formalism, particularly the merging of paths are 
research projects in themselves. 
The broader goal of the CES project is to add domain specific heuristics to 
practical problem solvers. The foundation presented in this thesis was specifically 
designed to allow easy incorporation of such heuristics by preserving input form 
throughout. 
The. current version of CES fulfills the goal of this project. An 
implementation has been built and has been used on a student enrolment example 
(s'ee Appendix D) . To fully prove the utility of CES as a framework for practical 
problem solvers, more implementations with different control components will have 
to be built, and applied to a range of different examples. It is hoped that this will 
be done. 
Appendix A 
Mathematical Preliminaries 
This appendix defines substitutions, unifications and other associated 
concepts, and proves theorems about them for use in the thesis. Many of these 
results and definitions are not new but have not been collected together before. 
They are presented here for completeness. For a different overview see Van 
Vaalen[75]. Many of the definitions (particularly for unifying compositions) come 
from Sickel[76] and Nilsson[80]. 
A.l Substitutions 
Definition: In the language used in this appendix there are two types of 
symbols: variables and constants. 
Definition: An expression is defined as follows: 
A variable is an expression; 
A constant is an expression; 
If o 1 and o 2 are expressions then the ordered pair <01 ,02> is an expression. 
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Definition: A variable v is said to appear in an expression if it is the 
expression, or if it appears in either of the components of the ordered pair of the 
express10n. 
Definition: A substitution 0 is a set of ordered pairs <o-i,vi> , written 
"o)v(, where o-i is an expression; vi is variable, and i~j =} vi~vj· The vi are said 
to be the variables of 0. 
Definition: A substitution 0 is said to be normal if \Ii \lj vi does not appear 
Definition: The application of substitution 0 to expression /3, written /30, is 
defined as follows: 
If /3 is a variable, then if 0-//3 E 0 then f30=a; otherwise /30=/3. 
If /3 is a constant then f30=f3. 
If /3 is of the form </31,/32> then /30=</310,/320>. 
Definition: If 0 and ¢ are substitutions, then the composition of 0 and ¢, 
written 00¢, is the substitution such that for all a, a(0o¢) = (a0)¢ . This is well 
defined as it is just function composition, and so is also associative. 
Lemma A.1: Evaluation of Composition of Substitutions 
If 0 and ¢ are substitutions and 
0'={(ai¢)/vi: a/vi E 0, and ai¢~vi} and 
¢'={ ¢/ui E ¢ such that ui is not a variable of 0} and 
7/J=0' U ¢' 
then 00¢=7/J. 
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Proof: 
Firstly prove that 7/J is a substitution. All of the variables of 7/J are unique, as 
all of the variables of 0' are unique, and all of the variables of ¢ are unique, and we 
are only adding the variables of </> to 7/J if they are different to those of 0'. So 7/J is a 
substitution. 
Let /3 be an expression. To prove /37/J=(/30)¢> by induction on the height of the 
parse tree of /3. 
If /3 is of height 0, then /3 is a constant or a variable. 
If /3 is a constant then /37/J = /3 = /3</> = (/30)¢> . 
If f3 is a variable then we must take two cases into account: 
1. If /3 is a variable of 0, then a/ /3 E 0. 
If a</J-::/,/3 then a¢/ /3 E 7/J so /37/J = a</> = /30</> 
If a</J=/3 then /3 is not a variable of 7/J so /37/J = /3 = a¢> = /30</>. 
2. If /3 is not a variable of 0, then (/30)¢> = /3</> = /37/J. 
If f3 is of height greater than zero, then /3 = </31,/32> 
(/30)¢> = ( </31,/32>0)</> 
= </310,/320></> 
= <(/310)</>,(/320)¢>> 
= </317/J,/32'1/J> 
= </31,/32>'1/J 
Q.E.D. 
-- induction assumption 
Note: the composition of two normal substitutions is not necessarily normal. 
For example {A/v }o{ <f v> /u>} is not normal. 
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Lemma A.2: The composition of two normal substitutions 0 and ¢> is normal 
if none of the variables of 0 appear in terms of ¢>. That is if o:if vi E 0, then 
(V /3j /uj E </>) vi does not appear in /3j. 
Proof: Using the naming of Lemma A.I, none of the variables of</>' appear in 
0' as </> is normal, and </>' is a subset of¢>. 
Suppose none of the variables of 0 appear in terms of </>, then 0' is normal as 0 
is normal, and no variables of 0 are added by applying </>. 
Also one of the variable of 0' appear in </>'. 
So 0' U </>' must be normal. 
Q.E.D. 
A.2 Unifiers of Expressions 
Definition: If o: and /3 are expressions, and 0 is a substitution, then 0 is said 
to unify o: and /3 if o:0={30. 
Definition: If 0 and ¢> are substitutions, then 0 is said to be more general 
that </> if there is a substitution '1/J such that ¢=0o'lj; 
Definition: Two substitutions 0 and </> are equal, if they are both more 
general than each other . This means that for any expression o:, o:0 and o:¢> are the 
same up to renaming of variables. There is a substitution x={ uifvi}, the ui being 
distinct variables, such that </)=0ox. Then x has an inverse x'={ vJui} such that 
0=</>ox'. 
Definition: the Most general unifier (mgu) of two expressions is the most 
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general substitution which unifies the two expressions. 
Theorem A.3: Evaluation of mgu 
a) If a=<a1,a2> and /3=<$1,/32>, and if 0=mgu(a1,{31) exists, and 
¢,=mgu(a20,/320) exists then mgu(a,/3) exists and is 00¢,. 
b) If a is a variable, and a does not appear in /3, then mgu(a,/3)={/3/a}. 
c) If /3 is a variable, and /3 does not appear in a, then mgu(a ,/3)={a/f3}. 
d) If a and /3 are the same constants, then mgu(a,/3)={} . 
e) If a and /3 are the same variable, then mgu(a ,/3)={}. 
f) If none of the above hold , then a and /3 are not unifiable. 
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Moreover , this set of rules implies an algorithm for computing mgus, and if 
this is used , then the mgus created will be in normal form. 
Proof: 
Case 1: a=<a1,a2> , and /3=</31,/32> If mgu(a1,{31) does not exist, then a and 
/3 are not unifiable. Let 0=mgu(a1,/31); Let ¢=mgu(a20,{320) if it exists. 
(i) to show €=0o¢ does indeed unify a and /3. 
a€= <a1,a2>0o¢, 
=<a10¢,,a20¢> 
= </310¢,,{320¢, > as 0 unifies a 1 and {31, and ¢> unifies a20 and 1320. 
=</31,/32> 04> 
=/3€ 
(ii) Suppose a and f3 are unifiable, and that X unifies them. Then x unifies a 1 with 
{31. So there is a substitution 7/J such that x=0:7/J, as 0 is mgu(a1,{31). Also x unifies 
a 2 with {32, so a 2x=/32x; so a20t/J=f320¢, so there exists a substitution p such that 
¢=¢,op; So x=0o¢>op. This means that ¢> exists if a and /3 are unifiable, and €=0o¢, 
is the most general unifiers of a and {3. 
(iii) If 0 and ¢, are normal substitutions, then € must be normal as no variables of 0 
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appear in 0:20 or /320, so cannot appear in <p. 
Case 2: If one of a: and /3 is not a pair: 
a) If one is a variable, assume without loss of generality that a: is a variable. 
(i) If /3 is the same variable as a:, then o:{}=/3{} , and as {} is the most general 
substitution , mgu(o: ,/3)={}. 
(ii) If a: appears in /3, and is not equal, then a: and /3 are not unifiable, as any 
substitution on a: will also be done within /3, so /3 will always be bigger (in some 
sense) than a:. 
(iii) The other case to consider is if a: does not appear in /3. let €={/3/o:} , then 
o:€=/3= /3€, so € unifies a: and /3 . Suppose 7/J also unifies a: and /3, then o:'t/J= /37/J. 
€0¢ = {/37/J/o:}+('t/J-{o:7/J/o:}) 
= { o:7/J/ a: }+(r-{ o:7/J/ a:}) 
= '1/J 
so ~ is the mgu , and is normal by its definition. 
-- Lemma A.I 
b) If none are variables, then one of them is a constant. Suppose a: is a constant. If 
they are unifiable then there is a substitution 7/J such that o:'t/J= /37/J. o: '1/J=o:, so /37/J 
must be a constant, and as /3 is not a variable, it cannot be a pair so it must be a 
constant , then /37/J= /3. For a: and /3 to be unifiable o:=/3, in which case 
mgu(o: ,/3)={}. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma A.4 Suppose 0={"')'/vi,i=l..n} is a substitution in normal form. Let 
I'O=nil, and I'i=<'i'i ,ri-l>; Let Vo=nil, and Vi=<vi,Vi-i>, where nil is a 
constant, then 0=mgu(I'n ,V n) . 
Proof: 
a)_ 0 unifies I'n with V n· I'0 0=I'0 as none of the 'i'i contain any of the vi as 0 was 
normal. To prove Vi0=I'j, do this by induction on i. 
VO0 = nil0 =nil= I'O. 
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Vi0 = <vi,Vi-l >0 
= <vi0,Vi-l 0> 
= < 'Yi ,ri-1 > 
= ri 
so by induction V n0=I'n0 
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-- induction 
b) to show 0 is the most general unifier. Suppose </> also unifies I'n with V n· Then 
for all i 'Yi</>=vi</>- So for all expressions L, L0ef>=L</>, as 0 only changes the vi to 'Yi, 
which gives the same results when </> is applied. So 0 is more general than ¢> . 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem A.5 If rngu(a,,B)=hifvi i=l..n}=s, and I'i and Vi are defined as 
in Lemma A.4, then mgu(a</> ,,B</>)=mgu(I'n.</>,V n.</>). 
Proof: Let 7/J=mgu(a</>,,B</>). To show 7/J=mgu(I'n</>,Vn.ef>). 
a</>7/J=,8</>7/J as 7/J=mgu(a</>,,B</>) 
that is ef>o?jJ unifies a u.nd ,8. As 0 is the most general unifier of a and ,8, there exists 
substitution E such that ef>o?jJ=0oE 
7/J unifies I'n</> with V n<I> as 
I'n</>7/J = rnoe 
=Vn0E 
=Vn</>7/J 
-- as ef>o?jJ=0oE 
-- by Lemma A.4 
Suppose x also unifies I'n</> with V n<I> - Then </>ox unifies a and ,B by lemma 4, 
that is aef>x=,B</>x, so as 7/J is the mgu(a</>,,B</>) , 7/J is more general than x is, so 
7/J=mgu(I'n</>,V n<I> ). 
Q.E.D. 
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A.3 Unifying Compositions 
Definition: If</> and 0 are normal substitutions, then the unifying 
composition of </> and 0, written uc( </>,0), is the most general substitution ~ 
satisfying: 
</Jo~ = ~o</> = ~ = 0o~ = ~o0 
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Definition: If the unifying composition of </> and 0 exists, then </> and 0 are 
said to be consistent substitutions. 
Theorem A.6: Unifying composition is commutative, associative and 
nilpotent. 
Proof: 
a)Commutativity: uc(0,</>) = uc(¢,0) , this follows directly from the symmetry of the 
definition. 
b )Nilpotency: that is 0=uc( 0,0) 
0o0=0 as composition of normal substitutions is nilpotent, suppose that </> also has 
the property ¢>o0=0o¢>=¢. Then by the definition of "more general", 0 is more 
general than </>. 
c) associativity: To prove uc(¢, uc(0,¢)) = uc( uc(¢> ,0) , ¢) 
Let ~=uc( 0, '1/J) 
Let x=uc(</)J) 
Let >-=uc( ¢>,0) 
Let µ=uc(>. ,¢) 
To prove x=µ 
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(i) X is the most general substitution such that 
¢,ox = XO¢ = X = f.ox = xof. 
to show t has this property: 
(1) ¢,oµ = ¢,o'>.oµ 
='>-oµ 
=µ 
(2) µ0¢, = µo'>.0¢, = µo'>. = µ 
(3) Also 0oµ = µo0 = µ 
It is known µ = 'I/Joµ = µo'ljJ 
So by definition of uc f. is more general than µ. 
so µ=f.op for some p 
so f.oµ = f.of.op = f.op = µ 
(4) To show µof.=µ 
It is known that µof. is an instance ofµ 
/'.. -
-- as µ='>.oµ 
-- as '>-=¢,o'>. 
-- as µ='>.oµ 
-- symmetry of above 
-- by def n of µ 
It remains to be proven that µ is an instance of µof. 
that is for some p, µof.op=µ 
Let p=µ 
Then µof.oµ = µoµ 
=µ 
so x is a more general substitution than µ 
(ii) µ = uc( '1/J, uc( 0,¢, )) 
x= uc( uc( '1/J ,0) , ¢,)) 
So by (i) µ is more general substitution that x 
Soµ=x 
Q.E.D. 
-- by (a)(i)(3) 
-- by part (b) 
-- by (a) 
-- by (a) 
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Theorem A.7 If ¢,={,Jvi, i=l..n} and 0={6Jwi, i=l..m} are in normal 
form then if I'o=nil; I'i= < "Yj,I'i-1 >; V o=nil; Vi=< vi,vi-1 >; .1o=nil; 
Lli=<6i,.1i-l>; Wo=nil; Wi=<wi,Wi-1>; 
then uc( ¢, ,0)=mgu( <I'n ,Llm > , <V n,W m >) 
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Proof: Let x=mgu(<I'n,Llm>,<Vn,Wm>). 
Part 1: to show ¢ox = xo¢ = X = xo0 = 0ox. 
a) To show a¢x = ax for any expression a. Prove this by induction on the height 
of a. 
If a=<a1,a 2>, then 
a¢x = < al ,a2 > <PX 
= <a1¢x,a2¢x> 
= <a1x,a2x> 
= ax 
If a is a constant then a¢x=a=ax 
-- inductive assumption 
If a is a variable of ¢, say vi then vi¢X = 'YiX = viX 
-- as x unifies vi with 'Yi 
If a is a variable not of¢, then a¢=a so a¢x = ax . 
b) To show xo</J=x. By Theorem A.3 and Lemma A.4 x = ¢omgu(Llm¢,Wm¢). 
For all expressions a, a¢ does not contain any variables of¢, as ¢ is in normal 
form. Also mgu(Llm¢,Wm¢) does not contain any references to variables of¢. So¢ 
has no effect on X· that is 
xo¢ = ¢omgu(Llm¢,Wm¢)o¢, 
= ¢omgu(Llm¢,Wm¢>) 
=x 
So by symmetry of the definition x satisfies ¢,ox = xo¢> = x = xo0 = 0ox 
Part 2: to show that x is the most general substitution that satisfies the 
equation. 
Assume that 'I/; also satisfies ¢,01/;='l/;0¢='1/;=00'1/J='l/;00. 
So vi 'I/J = vi¢1P = 'Yi1P -- as vi¢ = 'Yi· 
So 1/J unifies 'Yi and vi for all i. 
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So 'I/; unifies I'n and Vn. 
Similarly 'I/; unifies Llm and Wm· 
So 'I/; unifies <I'n,Llm> with <Vn,Wm>· 
So x is more general than 'I/; by the definition of x. 
Q.E.D. 
Part 1: 0=01 oO, so for all expressions ,, 10=1010¢> for some ¢>. 
a 1 0=a1o10¢> = 131 o1 O</J = 1310 
so 0 unifies a 1 with /31. 
Similarly O unifies a 2 with /32-
So O unifies <a1,a 2> with </31 ,/32 >-
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Part 2: Suppose x unifies <a1,a2> with </31,/32>- So X unifies a 1 with /31, 
so x=01 ox 1 for some x 1, as 01 is mgu(a1,/31). As x unifies a 2 and /32, x=02ox2 
for some x 2. Let 01 ={,Jvi i=l..n}; 02={ c5Jwi i=l..m}. Define I'i, Vi, Lli and Wi 
as in theorem 7. By Theorem A.7 O=mgu( <I'n,Llm>,<Vn,Wm> ). 
<Vn,Wm>X = <Vnx,Wmx> 
= <Vn01x1,Wm82x2> 
= <I'n81X1,Llm82x2> 
= <I'nx,L1mx> 
= <I'n,Llm>X 
Sox unifies <I'n ,L1m> with <Vn,Wm> , so O is more general than p. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma A.9: If x is a ground instance of O and ¢, then it is an instance of 
uc( O,</J ). 
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Proof: 
x o</J = x as all of the variables of x are removed by applying x. 
If x is an instance of 0 then x=0otf; for some t/J; 
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so 0ox = 0o0ot/J = 0otf; = X .. 
-- as 0o0 = 0 as 0 is normal. 
Similarly xo</J = x = ¢>ox, so x is an instance of uc( 0,</>) by definition of uc . 
Q.E.D. 
A.4 Using these Results 
Whereas this appendix treats all objects as ordered pairs, the rest of the thesis 
uses objects of the form p(x1,x2 ,··,xn) where p is a predicate symbol or a function 
symbol. The results for pairs can be directly applied to that form by considering a 
non-empty list as an ordered pair <Jirst_element_of_list, rest_of_list> and an 
empty list as the unique atom "NIL". 
The form f(x1, x2, .. . , xn) is the pair <f,L> where Lis the paired form of the 
list (x1, x2, .. . , xn)- For example the form P(a,b,c) is represented as 
<P,<a,<b,<c,NIL> > > >-
With this isomorphism all of the results of this chapter are applicable to the 
forms used in the rest of the thesis. 
/_ -
Appendix B 
Deletion of Identical Descendent Subgoals 
In this appendix it is proved for the propositional case of the backward 
chaining CES that identical subgoals that are descendents of a node may be 
removed , with node used as in chapter 4. That is if there is a solution with that 
subnode in the solution tree, then there will be a solution without that subnode in 
the solution tree. As this is a propositional rule it is sufficient to prove this for the 
propositional calculus, and the result extends to the predicate calculus. This result 
has recently been described in Loveland and Reddy[81]), 
where they also prove that the result holds in systems with equality. 
The notation used will be for a projection of the propositional CANCEL, 
namely 
PROVEN( S, A) 
is defined to be v'S1 CANCEL( S1 , S, A). 
Lemma B.1: If PROVEN( <s,w>, { <s2,w2>} U A) 
--Formula 1 
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can be deduced, then this deduction must have used rule 4b in the following form: 
--Formula 2 
Proof: This is proven by induction on the size of the minimal deduction that 
deduces formula 1. 
If it is of length 1 then this must have been rule 4b, with A={}, s=s2, and 
w=w2. So the lemma is proven in this case. 
Assume that dedn is of length n ( n > 1 ), and the lemma holds for all 
deductions of length less than n. Look at the last step of the deduction. If <s2,w2> 
is in the assumption list in the consequence, then it is in the assumption list of one 
of the PROVEN in the antecedent. So by the inductive assumption , formula 2 must 
be in the deduction. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma B.2: Using only rules 1 b, 2, 3, 4, Sb restricted to PROVEN relation. 
If 
PROVE ( <s,w>, { <s4,w4>} U A) 
can be deduced then 
--Formula 3 
--Formula 4 
can be deduced, in a deduction with no more applications of rules, apart from rule 
4b. 
Justification: This is justified as 
PROVEN( <s,w>, { <s4,w4>} U A) 
means f- ( { <s4,w4>} U A)*=} <s,w>* 
so f- A' and <s4,w4>* =} <s,w>* 
so f- A' and <'"'-'s,w>* =} <'"'-'s4,w4>* 
so f- ( { <'"'-'s,w>} U A)*=} <'"'-'s4,w4>* 
ie PROVEN( <,..__,s4,w4>, { <'"'-'s,w>} U A) 
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Proof: This is proved by induction on the minimal length of the deduction 
(i.e. number of applications of the axioms). 
If there was only one rule it must have been rule 4a, as it is the only rule that 
could put <s4,w4 > in the assumption list. In this case A={} and w=w4, so that 
the lemma holds in this case. Both of these deductions are of length 1. 
Assume that formula 3 is produced in deduction of length n, (n>I), and that 
the lemma holds for all deductions of length less than n. 
Consider the last step in that deduction. It must have used one of rules I b, 2, 
3 or 4a. Rules 4b or Sa only produce deductions of one step, and so contradicting 
the length of the deduction being greater than 1. Consider each of these possibilities 
as a different case. 
Case 1: In the last step of the deduction one of rules 2a, 2c, 3a or 3b was 
used . Eacp of these rules is of the form: 
If PROVEN(<s',x'>, A) 
then PROVE ( <s,x> , A) 
wheres' is a function of s, and x and x' have a well defined parent - offspring 
relationship. Ea::: Li of these have an inverse, namely rule 2a with 2c and 3a with 3b. 
Only the signs are reversed . 
If PROVEN( <s,w>, { <s4,w4>} U A) can be deduced in n steps, then 
PROVEN( <s',w'>, { <s4,w4>} U A) can be deduced in n-1 steps. 
So by the inductive assumption 
PROVEN( <,_.__.s4,w4>, { <,_.__.s',w'>} U A) can be deduced. By lemma B.l the 
deduction uses rule 4b in the form: 
PROVEN( < ,_,__,s',w ' >, { < ,_,__,s ',w' > }) 
--call this formula 5 
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Suppose that instead of using formula 5, 
PROVEN( <,..,__,s',w'>, { <"-'s,w>}) 
is used. This could have been deduced from 
PROVEN(< "-'S, w >' { < "-'S, w >}) 
--formula 6 
--formula 7 
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using axiom 4b and the inverse to the axiom chosen above. The new proof is 
obtained by using formulas 6 and 7 instead of formula 5, and replacing each 
occurence of < "-'S' ,w' > in assumption lists by < "-'S,w>. This is a legal deduction , 
and follows the lemma. 
Each of the other cases is proven in much the same way: 
Case 2: In the last step of the proof rule 2b or rule 2d were used. 
Rules 2b and 2d are of the form: 
PROVE {<s1,y1>,A1) 
and PROVEN( <s2,Y2 >, A2) 
=} PROVEN( < s3,Y3 > , A1 U A2) 
the s1,s2,s3 are related as triples, and the y1,y2,y3 are related in a parent/offspring 
relationship . 
Suppose PROVEN( <s3,w3 >, { <s4,w4>} U A) can be deduced inn steps. 
Then 
PROVEN( <s1,w1 >, A 1) and 
PROVEN(<s2,w2> , A2) where A1 U A2={ <s4,w4 >} U A can be deduced in less 
than n steps. Assume, without loss of generality, that { <s4,w 4 >} E A1. 
So by the induction principle define A5=A1-{ <s4 ,w4 > }, then 
PROVEN(< "-'s4,w4 >, A5 U { <,..,__,s1,w1> }) --Formula 8 
can be deduced. By lemma B.l rule 4b must have been used in this deduction to 
deduce 
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PROVEN( <'"'-'s1,w1> , { <'"'-'s1 ,w1> }) 
In this deduction replace formula 9 by 
PROVEN( <'"'-'s3,w3> , { <'"'-'s3,w3>}) 
together with the deduction for 
--Formula g 
--Formula 10 
--Formula 11 
gives PROVEN( <'"'-'s1 ,w1>, A2 U { <'"'-'s3,w3> }) 
--Formula 12 
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The new deduction will be the deduction of 10, with 11 giving 12. The proof 
then proceeds in the same way that formula 9 was deduced from 8, but replacing 
<'"'-'s1,w1> in all assumption lists in the proof with < '"'-'s3,w3 > . This proof 
produces: 
There are now two cases to look :tt: 
1. If <s4,w4 > ~ A2 then A2 U A5=A, and the proof is complete. 
2. If <s4,w4> E A2 then rule 4a can be used to produce 
PROVEN( <'"'-'s4,w4> , AU { < '"'-'s3,w3 > }), and the proof is completed. In both of 
these cases the number of applications of rules, apart from rule 4a, is not increased. 
Case 3: In the last step of the proof rule lb was used. 
PROVEN(<s,w>, AU { < s4,w4> }) is produced inn steps with the last step of 
the proof being rule 1 b, so for some atom x, x and w are different instances of the 
same atom, and 
PROVEN(< s,x >, A U { < s4, w 4 >}) can be produced in n-1 steps. By the 
inductive assumption 
--Formula 13 
can be deduced in no more steps. By lemma 1 this deduction uses rule 4b to deduce 
PROVEN(< '"'-'S,X >' { < '"'-'S,X >}) 
--Formula 14 
If instead of formula 14 in the proof the following two steps were in the proof: Use 
rule 4b to deduce 
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PROVEN( <"-'s,w>, { <"-'s,w>}) 
--Formula 15 
and with formula 11 use rule 1 b to prove: 
PROVEN(<"-'s,x> , {<"-'s,w>}) 
--Formula 16 
The new proof continues as does the last, except formulas 15 and 16 are used 
everywhere instead of formula 14, and < "-'s,x> is replaces in assumption lists 
everywhere by <"-'s,w>. Then 
PROVEN(<"-'s4,w4>, AU { <"-'s,w> }) is deduced without increasing the proof 
length, which proves the lemma for this case. 
Case 4: The only other case to consider is if the last rule in the deduction 
was an application of rule 4a. Suppose 
PROVEN( <s,w>, AU { <s4,w4>}) was deduced inn steps, then 
PROVEN( <s,w> , AU { < "-'S,w>} U { <s4,w4>}) can be deduced in n-1 steps, 
so by the inductive hypothesis 
PROVEN( <,..__,s4,w4> , AU { < "-'s,w>} U { <"-'s,w> }) which is 
PROVEN(< "-'s4,w 4> , AU { < "-'s,w>}) can be deduced without increasing the 
proof length. Thus the lemma holds for case 4. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem B.3: If A=PROVEN( <s,w> , AU { < "-'s,w> }) is set up as a 
subgoal in ,'.1, backward chaining proof, then it may be removed without affecting 
completeness. Moreover, removing it will not remove the shortest proof. (Shortest in 
the number of applications of axioms other than 4b .) 
Proof: Assume that there is a solution using this as a subgoal. To show there 
is a solution without using A as a subgoal. 
In the solution tree, suppose an instance of node A, namely 
PROVEN( <s,w>, B) can be deduced, where B CA U { <"-'s,w> }. Call this 
deci ~;c tion (i) . 
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Let I' be the ancestor of A of the form PROVEN( <s,w>, C). This must 
exist, as it is the only way <'""-'s,w> could appear in the assumption list for A. 
Note: CC A. 
There are two cases to consider: 
Case 1: BC C: 
In this case deduction (i) could have been used to deduce I', instead of A, and the 
whole proof would have proceeded as before from there, and the proof is shorter. 
Case 2: B is not a subset of C: 
Let B'=B-C. Each element of B' represents an ancestor of A and a descendent of I'. 
Let <s2,y > in B' represent the lowest ancestor of A, call this Ll. 
Then PROVEN( < '""-'s2,y>, D) can be deduced , where BCD. 
Let E=B-{ <s2,y> }. 
So PROVEN( <s,w>, EU { <s2,y>}) can be deduced with deduction (i) . 
So by lemma 2, PROVEN(< ,..__,s2,y >, E U { < '""-'S ,w >}) can be deduced. 
This is an. alternative proof of Ll , as E U < '""-'S, w > E D. This proof is shorter than 
the original proof, as it misses out the steps from A to Ll. All other steps remain 
legal, except that < '""""'s,w> is in the assumption list until I', and the rule 4b is 
applied. 
There is now a shorter proof of the theorem that does not use node A. This 
algori~h m can be applied successively to each identical descendent subgoal, and this 
will not loop, as the proof length is finite , and reduces each time through the proof. 
Q.E.D. 
Appendix C 
Completeness of the Problem Solver 
In this appendix the completeness of the axioms of CES is proven. In fact a 
subset of the system will be shown to be complete. This is the same subset as is 
used for the implementation of chapter 4 (for the predicate calculus) , and in 
Appendix B (propositional calculus). 
C.l The Propositional Case 
Define the projection PROVEN-1 of the propositional CANCEL by: 
PROVEN-1( S, A) means 
VS1 CANCEL(S1, S, A). 
The only axioms used are axioms lb, 2, 3, 4, and 5a, restricted to the 
relations having corresponding direction (see section 2.7). The completeness of this 
restriction of the CANCEL relation is proven in this appendix. 
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Let succ be the name of implicit {odd) input wff, that is an instance of the 
atom success, which is the top level goal of the system. 
Let S be the facts, append the atom "truth" to S as a fact. Let "r' be the 
instance of truth that is the fact. Assume that S is satisfiable and that S f- success. 
In the following lemmas, for the case of two atoms in S, namely "success" 
and "truth" . Consider the interpretation: 
1 = { ,...__,success, truth} which is the interpretation in which success is false and 
truth is true. 
Lemma C.1: If xis an input wff that contains instances of the atoms 
"success" and "truth" only, ands is a sign then 
If <s,x >* is true in lthen PROVEN-1{ < s,x >, A) can be deduced , 
where A is {} or { <n ,succ> }, and the direction of < s,x > is up. 
Proof: This is proven by induction on the height of the parse tree of x: 
If x is of height 0, then it is an instance of the atom "success", or "truth". 
Consider the case when x is "success": It is false in 1, so s= "n". The following 
deduction can be carried out: 
PROVEN-1{ <n,succ>, { <n,succ>}) 
PROVEN-1{ <n,x >, { <n,succ>}) 
--axiom 4b 
--axiom lb 
Consider the case of x being an instance of the atom "truth". An instance T of 
"truth" is a fact, so is true in l. As it is a fact axiom Sa gives 
PROVEN-l{<p,r>, {}). 
So PROVEN-l{<p ,x >, {}) --axiom lb 
This proves the lemma for the case of height 0. 
Suppose x is of height h, and that the lemma holds for all wffs of height less 
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than h. Either x is of the form (x1 op x2) or of the form (not z) . 
Suppose xis of form (not z). If <s,x>* is true in l, then <s,not z>* is true 
in l, so <"-'s,z>* is true in l. z is of height h-1 so by the inductive assumption 
PROVEN-1( <"-'s,z ,>, A) can be deduced. So using axiom 3a 
PROVEN-1( <s,x> , A) can be deduced . 
If x is of the form (x1 op x2), then x1 and x2 are of heights less than h, and so 
lemma C.l holds for them, by the induction assumption. Assume <s,x> * is true in 
l. There are two cases to consider s=op0, and S="-'OPo· 
If s=op0, then <s,x>* = ( <op1,x1>* V <op2,x2>*) is true in l, 
so < opi,xi > * is true in 1 for some i, xi being of height < h. 
By the inductive assumption PROVEN-1( <opi ,xi> , A) can be deduced. 
using axiom 2a PROVEN-l(<op0,x>, A) can be deduced. 
that is PROVEN-1( < s,x> , A) can be deduced . 
If s="-'OPo then <"-'s,x>* = (<op1,x1>* V <op2,x2> *) is false in l, 
so < opi,xi > * is false in 1 for all i. 
By the inductive assumption PROVEN-1( < ""'-'OPi ,xi > , Ai) can be deduced for each 
i, using axiom 2b PROVEN-1( < ""'-'op0,x>, A1 U A2) can be deduced , that is 
PROVEN-1( <s,x> A1 U A2) can be deduced . 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma C.2: If <s,x>* is false in l, and PROVEN-1( <s,x> , A) is 
deducible; where A is {} or { <n,succ> }, and <s,x> has direction "down", 
then PROVEN-l(<p,succ>, {}) is deducible. 
Proof: This is proven by induction on the height of x. 
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Height 0: 
If x is an atom, then it must be "success", or "truth". 
Consider the case of x being the atom "success". Then x is false in 1, so s=p. 
So PROVEN-I( <p,x>, A) is deducible. Using axiom lb, PROVEN-I( <p,succ> , 
A) is deducible. If A={}, then the proof is complete; if A={ <n,succ>} then use 
axiom 4a to deduce PROVEN-I( <p,succ>, {} ). 
Consider the case of x being the atom "truth". In this case <n,x>* is false in 
1. Suppose PROVEN-I( <n,x> , A) is deducible, where A is{} or { <n ,succ> }. If 
A={}, then it bas proven that <n,truth>* is true, which contradicts the fact that 
S is satisfiable. So A={ <n,succ> }. By Lemma B.2 , 
PROVEN-I( <p,succ>, { <p,x>}) is deducible. By lemma B.l this deduction used 
axiom 4b in the form PROVEN-I( <p,x > , { <p,x>} ). Replace each occurence of 
this instance of axiom 4b by axiom 5a in the form PROVEN-I( <p ,r> , {}) followed 
by a application of axiom lb giving PROVEN-I( <p,x>, {}),and remove <p ,x> 
from all assumption lists in the deduction. This is then a legal deduction of 
PROVEN-I( <p,succ>, {}). 
Height > 0: 
Suppose xis of height h>0, and assume that the lemma bolds for all wffs of 
height less than h. Either x is of the form (not z) or of the form (x 1 op x2)-
Case 1: xis of the form (not z). <s,x>* is false in 1, so <,...__,s ,z>* is false in 
1. PROVEN-I( <s,x>, A) is deducible, so using axiom 3b 
PROVEN-I( <,...__,s,z>, A) is deducible. By the induction assumption 
PROVEN-I( <p,succ>, {}) is deducible. 
Case 2: x is if the form (x 1 op x2). There are two cases to consider in this 
case: opo=s and opo=..--..,s. 
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Case 2a: op0=s. <s,x>* is false in J; so (<op1,x1> * V <op2,x2>*) is 
false in J; so <opi ,xi>* is false in lfor each i; so <,...__,op1,x1>* is true in 1, so by 
lemma C.l PROVEN-l(<,...__,op1,x1>, A1) can be deduced. PROVEN-l(<s,x>, A) 
is deducible, so using axiom 2d PROVEN-I( <op2,x2> , AU A1) is deducible. x2 is 
of height< h so by the induction assumption PROVEN-l(<p,succ>, {}) is 
deducible. 
Case 2b: op0=,...__,s. <s,x>* is false in 1, 
so <,...__,s,x> = (<op1,x1>* V <op2,x2>*) is true in 1, so <"-'OPi,xi> is false in 
lfor some i. PROVEN-l(<"-'op0,x > , A) is deducible, so by using axiom 2c, 
PROVEN-1(<"-'0Pi,xi>, A) is deducible. xi is of height< h so by the induc tive 
assumption PROVEN-I( <p ,succ>, {}) is deducible. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma C.3: If there is a deduction of PROVEN-I( <p,succ> , {}) 
containing 
PROVEN-I( <n,t>, A) --Formula 1 
where tis an instance of the atom "truth", then there is a (not longer) deduction 
not containing formula 1. 
Proof: Note that A is not the empty set, otherwise <n,truth>* would be 
provable, and so S would be inconsistent. 
Suppose <s,x > is the first element of A to be removed using axiom 4a, then 
PROVEN-I( <""'s,x>, B) --Formula 2 
is deduced form CANCEL( <""'s,x>, { <s,x >} U B) where AC { <s,x>} U B. 
By lemma B.2, and formula 1, 
PROVEN-I( <"-'s,x>, { <p ,t>} U A') --Formula 3 
can be deduced where A'=A-{ <s,x> }. By Lemma B.l this deduction uses axiom 
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4a in the form: 
PROVEN-I( <p,t>, { <p,t> }) --Formula 4 
If formula 4 is replaced by the deduction: 
PROVEN-I( <p,r>, {}) where Tis the name of the instance of the atom "truth" 
that was given as a fact, this is by axiom 5a, 
PROVEN-I( <p,t>, {}) --by axiom 1 b. 
Using the deduction of formula 3 formed by thus removing <p,t> from all 
assumption lists, PROVEN-I( <'"'"'s,x>, A') can be deduced. As A' is a subset of B, 
this deduction can be used instead of the deduction for formula 2. As the steps from 
formula 1 to formula 2 are removed, and there is at least one of these, and only one 
new step is added , the length of the proof is not increased. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma C.4: If S is a set of facts, with T the name of the instance of the 
atom truth that is a fact , such that S is satisfiable, and S I- success, then 
PROVE -1( <p,succ>, {}) can be deduced. 
moreover .in the deduction the only instance of atom "success" appearing in an 
instan c:- e of axiom 4 is succ, and axiom 1 b is only used for instances of the atom 
"success" when one is succ. 
Proof: This is proven by induction on the number of atoms in S. 
Case 1: S has only 2 atoms. These are "success" and "truth" . There is some 
fact win S such that <p ,w>* is false in 1, otherwise (S /\ not success) is satisfied 
by 1, which cannot happen. As w is a fact PROVE -1( <p,w>, {}) is deducible , so 
by lemma C.2 PROVEN-I( <p,succ>, {}) is deducible. 
Case 2: S has q> 2 atoms, and assume that the theorem holds for all sets of 
facts with atom sets less than q. 
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S is satisfiable, so these is some interpretation I which satisfies S. Note that 
success is true in I, and truth is true in I. Choose some atom a , different to 
success and truth in S. a is either true or false in J. 
Case 2a: a is true in I. Form S1 by replacing each occurence of a in S with 
success. I satisfies S1, and s1 ~ success. So by our inductive assumption 
PROVEN-l(<p,succ>, {}) can be deduced using deduction D1. 
Construct D2 from deduction D1 by putting back all of the a's into the input 
wffs from where they came from. There are two cases to consider, namely a 
occuring in D2, and a not occuring in D2. 
Case 2ai: a does not appear in D2. In this case D2 in s1 is a legal deduction 
in S, so the proof is complete. 
Case 2aii: a does appear in D2. a was not used in axiom 4, so the only place 
that changing success to a could have made a difference is in axiom 1 b. 
If PROVEN-I( <n,succ>, A) was used to deduce PROVE -1( <n,w> , A), 
for some instance w of the atom a, then replace this deduction with 
PROVEN-I( <n,w0 >, { <n,w0 > }), using axiom 4b, for some instance w0 of the 
atom a. Axiom lb is then used to deduce PROVEN-I( <n,w> , { <n,w 0>} ). In this 
case the only thing that may happen is <n ,w0 > is added to some assumption lists 
in the resulting deduction. 
If PROVE -1( <p,w>, A) was used to deduce PROVEN-I( <p,succ> , A) 
then A could only be a subset of { <n ,w0 >, <n,succ> }, so instead 
PROVEN-I( <p,w 0>, {}) or PROVEN-I( <p,w 0>, { <n,succ>}) could be 
deduced using axiom 4a if necessary, and axiom lb. So by lemma B.2 
PROVEN-I( <p,w0 >, { <n,succ> }) is deducible, unless PROVEN-I( <p,w0 >, {}) 
is deducible, call this deduction D3. 
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The proof now proceeds by proving that deducing PROVEN-I( <p,w 0 > , A) 
can be used to deduce PROVEN-I( <p,succ>, {} ). 
Form S2 from S by substituting "truth" for "a" wherever it occurs. I satisfies 
s2, and s2 ~success . So by the inductive assumption PROVEN-l(<p,succ> , {}) 
can be deduced in s2 with deduction D 4. Create D5 from deduction D 4 by putting 
all occurences of "a" back into S2. 
The aim now is to construct a deduction of PROVEN-I( <p ,succ>, {}) from 
By lemma C.3, it can be ensured that <s,t > never appears in D4 for any 
instance t of the atom "truth". This means that the only place where changing a 
"truth" to an "a" could have made a difference is in axiom 1 b. There are two 
instances of this axiom that need to be considered. 
The first is PROVEN-I( <p ,w 0>, A) is used to deduce 
PROVEN-I( <p,wt > , A), where w O is an instance of "a", and wt is an instance of 
atom "truth". In this case replace that deduction of the latter relation by the two 
steps: 
PROVEN-l(<p,r> , {}) 
PROVEN-I( <p ,wt > , {}) 
--axiom Sa 
--axiom lb 
The new deduction then proceeds as the first , but not needing the axioms 4b that 
were needed to remove the elements of A. 
The second case is if PROVEN-I( <p,wt>, A) was used to deduce 
PROVEN-I( <p,w0 >, A) . In this case replace the latter by 
PROVEN-I( <p,w 0 >, { <n,succ>} ), which can be deduced using ded uction D3. 
This may add <n,succ> to assumption lists, so PROVE -1( <p ,succ>, 
{ <n ,succ>}) can be deduced, so using axiom 4b PROVE -1( <p ,succ> , {}) can 
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be deduced. 
Case 2b: If a is false in I then the proof proceeds exactly as in case 2a, 
except (not a) is substututed for success and truth. 
Q.E.D. 
Corrolary C.5: Completeness for the Ground Case 
If S is a set of facts, such that S is satisfiable, and S f- success, then 
PROVEN-l(<p,succ>, {}) can be deduced. 
Proof: Add a unique element "truth" to S as a fact. By lemma 4, 
PROVEN-I( <p ,succ>, {}) can be deduced. "truth" need never appear in this 
deduction as there is only one legal step that could use this wff, namely 5a, and this 
could not be used in any other deduction, so it may be removed from the deduction 
without affecting the proof. 
Q.E.D. 
C.2 Completeness for the Predicate Calculus CANCEL 
The proof for the predicate calculus relies on Herbrand's Theorem (Theorem 
4.4, Chang and Lee[73]), which states that if there is a solution for the predicate 
calculus, then there is a solution using ground instances of the wffs. The 
completeness proof for the predicate calculus case is constructed from the 
propositional case proof using ground instances. 
Define the predicate PROVEN-2 to be a projection of the predicate calculus 
CANCEL: 
PROVEN-2(W, A, 0) is 
v'W1 CANCEL( W1, W, A, 0) 
The only applicable axioms being lb, 2, 3, 4 and 5a. 
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Lemma C.6: If S is the set of facts and there are a set of ground instances 
{S¢>} of S such that 
PROVEN-I( <s,w¢>>, A1) caii be deduced in the ground case 
A1 ={ <sk,wk¢>k>} 
PROVEN-2( <s,w,i>, A2, 0) can be deduced in the predicate calculus case, where 
A2={ <sk,wk,ik>} 
. . 
where 0, in normal form, may be partitioned into e1 and 0*i, where 01 is the 
substitution of variables of index i in 0, and 0*i is the subset of 0 of variables not of 
index i, and ¢>!i (¢> with all vars having index i) is a ground instance of 01. 
Proof of Lemma: The lemma is proven on the length of the deduction of 
the ground case. 
Case 1: Ground case deduction is of length l. There are two possible 
deductions of length 1: 
If the deduction of the ground case was one instance of axiom 4b, then 
PROVEN-I( <s,w¢>>, { <s,w¢>>}) was deduced, so then 
PROVEN-2( <s,x ,i>, { <s,w ,i3> }, 1./J) can be deduced where 1.j;!i={} and 
1./J=?.jJ*i={ v!i/v!i3: v is a var in w} then <Pi is an instance of 1.j;!i, and the lemma 
holds in this case. 
If the deduction was an instance of axiom Sa, then w¢> is a fact, so w is a fact , 
so if 
PROVEN-I( <s,w¢>>, A1) was deduced by axiom Sa then 
PROVEN-2( <s,w,i>, A2, {}) can be deduced by axiom Sa and the lemma in this 
case holds. 
Case 2: Assume that the lemma holds for all deductions of length less than k 
(k> 1), and that the ground case proof has a minimal proof length of k. Consider 
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the last step of the ground case proof: 
Case 2a: The last step of the ground case proof was axiom 2a, 2c, or axiom 
3. These are of the form: 
PROVEN-I( <s1,x¢ > , A)=? PROVEN-I( <s2,z¢>, A) for ground case 
PROVEN-2( <s1,x,i>, B, 0) =? PROVEN-2( <s2,z,i>, B, 0) for predicate case 
Then by the inductive assumption the left hand PROVEN-2 can be deduced with 0 
. . 
can be partitioned into e1 and 0*i with ¢, an instance of e1, and so the lemma is 
proven in this case. 
Case 2b: The last step in the ground case proof was axiom 2b or 2d. These 
two axioms are of the form: 
PROVE -1( <s1,x1 ¢ > , A1) and PROVE -1( <s2,x2¢> , A2) 
=? PROVEN-I( <s3,x3¢>, A1 U A2) 
PROVEN-2( <s1,x1,i> , B1, 01) and PROVEN-2( <s2,x2,i> , B2, 02) 
=? PROVEN-2( <s3,x3,i>, A1 U A2, 0) where 0=uc(01,02) -
If Backward chaining (section 3.5) was used, then it can be ensured that the 
indexes, apart from i, in 01 and 02 are disjoint. So for completeness it may be 
assumed that they are disjoint. 
. . . 
Let 03 = uc(0/,0/) = 03
1 U 03*i 
Let 0*i = 03*i U the substitution form ed by applying 03 to the terms of 01 *i and 
02 *i. This works because all the indexed variables are unique, as all of the 
substitutions are normal. 
. . 
l l Let 0 = 03 . 
then 0 = uc( 01,02) = 0
1 U 0*i. The proof of this is straight forward and is left to 
the reader. 
By lemma A.9 ¢, is an instance of 01• 
Case 2c: The last step in the ground case proof was an instance of axiom 1 b. 
This step is of the form : 
Appendix C - Completeness of the Problem Solver 
PROVEN-I( <s,x1/J>, A)~ PROVEN-I( <s,z</>>, A) where x1/J = z</> 
The corresponding predicate calculus axiom is 
PROVEN-2( <s,x,j>, B, µ) ~ PROVEN-2( <s,z,m>, B, 0) 
x and z are unifiable (after variables are separated) as x1/J = z</> 
Let € = mgu(z!m,x!l)(0-m,1-j) be the mgu of x!j and z!m. 
Then 0 = uc( €,µ) by axiom 1 b for predicate calculus. 
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By the inductive assumption µ = µj U µ*j where 1/J!j is a ground instance of µj . 
By axiom lb , µ*j contains no vars of index m. 
Let X = 1/J!j U </>!m U µ*j 
We will show that x is an instance of 0. 
x is a ground substitution for variables of index j and m so 
X0 € = X 
xoµ = x as all variables of x are either of index j or are removed by µ*j. 
x unifies x!j and z!m as 
x!jx = x!j(1/J!j U ¢>!m U µ*j) 
= x!j1/J!j 
= z!.m</>!m 
= z!mx 
so x = €0).. for some ).. 
so umjoX = f€o>-. 
= umjo).. 
=x 
-- as ¢>!m and µ*j have no effect on x!j 
-- as z</> = x1/J 
-- as 1/J!j and µ*f have no effect on z!m 
¢>!m cannot effect µ as µ has no variables of index m. 
µ*j cannot effectµ asµ is normal and µ*j C µ 
so µox = µjo 1/J!j u </>!m u µ*j 
by the inductive assumption 1/;!j is an instance of µj 
so /ljo1/J!j = 1/J!j 
so µox= X 
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so we have proven that: 
µox = xoµ = X = ~ox = xo~ 
so x is an unstance of 0 
ie (1/J!j U ¢!m U µ*j) is an instance of 0 
so ¢!m is an instance of Om. 
this proves the case of the last step being axiom I b 
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Case 2d: The last step of the ground case proof was an instance of axiom 4a. 
This means that the axiom was of the form: 
PROVEN-I( <s,w¢>, AU { <,...__,s ,w¢> }) =? PROVEN-I( <s,w¢>, A) 
and the corresponding predicate calculus axiom is 
PROVEN-I( <s,w,i>, BU { <,...__,s ,i,w> }, 0) =? PROVEN-I( <s,w,i>, B, 0) 
By the inductive assumption ¢ must be an instance of e1, and so the proof for this 
case is complete. 
Q.E.D. 
Th~orem C. 7: Completeness for Predicate Calculus CANCEL. 
If S is a set of facts in the predicate calculus, such that S is satisfiable, and 
S f- success then 
PROVEN-2( <p,succ,I>, {}, ?O) can be deduced. 
Proof: By Herbrand's Theorem (Theorem 4.4 Chang and Lee[73]) 
S f- success iff there are ground instances {S¢} of S such that 
{S¢} f- success . By Corrolary 5 
PROVEN-I(p,succ,{}) can be deduced. 
So by Lemma 6 
PROVEN-2( <s,w,I>, {}, 0) can be deduced. 
Q.E.D. 
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An Implementation 
An expert system based on the algorithm given in Chapter 4 has been 
implemented in Rutgers-UC! Lisp on the Dec-10 at the Australian ational 
University. 
Its particular domain is in advising students on enrolment in the University. It 
knows about students; plans for a degree; majors and minors in departments; 
courses; and prerequisites for courses etc. It is still very much a prototype system 
and has not had any "real" users on it. 
D.l Using the System 
Input to the system is via facts which are input enclosed in parenthases. 
There are also a number of commands which are entered by typing their name. All 
input in this appendix is preceeded by the prompt ">". 
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The output of the system is either in internal (predicate calculus) form or is in 
a pseudo-english form. The english is generated by associating an english form with 
predicates, functions and variables. Within predicates the english for the arguments 
n is substituted for ~n in the english for the predicate symbol. English definitions 
are given by the "english" command. For example the three place predicate "enr" 
has english form defined by: 
> english enr ~1 is enrolled to be a ~2 student in ~3 
Variables are defined in the same way, but when used, the second and subsequent 
occurences have the word "that" substituted for "any" . For example consider the 
following definitions: 
> english st any student 
> english dep any department 
> english y3 third year 
Given these definitions the input: 
> enr(?st.y3.?dep) 
has english form: 
any student is enrolled to be a third year student in any department 
So with the following english definitions 
> english minor ~1 has enrolled in a minor in ~2 
> english major ~1 has enrolled in a major in ~2 
The input: 
> ( enr(?st.y3,?dep) and minor(?st.?dep) =} major(?st,?dep) ) 
has the english output: 
> PRINT 217 
217 : (If any student is enrolled to be a third year student in 
any department AND that student has enrolled in a 
minor in that department THEN that student has 
enrolled in a major in that department) 
217 being the internal reference for the fact. 
The english form provides a quite readable, although sometimes contorted 
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explanation for a fact. One problem is that operator precedence is not built in, so 
that either many brackets have to be put in, or the sentence is left ambiguous. The 
latter has been chosen in this case as any ambiguities can be cleared up by 
examining the internal (that is predicate calculus) form of the wff. There are two 
commands for printing wffs: 
> PRINT <list of wffs> 
prints the english form of the wffs. If the list is empty all facts are printed. 
> EXAMINE <list of wffs> 
as for PRINT but the internal forms are printed. 
The syntactic explanation sr hcme described in section 4.6.3.1. is the one used 
in this example. Thus only when axiom lb is used or when axiom 4b is used is an 
explanation generated. Thus each statement of the explanation consists of one fact . 
D.2 Mathematical Style Explanation 
The-first explanation scheme considered here is the use of a mathematical 
style proof. In this each statement is numbered, and is derivable from a fact and/or 
a default and a (perhaps empty) set of previous statements. This explanation is 
generated directly from the and-subtree which represents the solution as defined in 
Chapter 4. 
Consider the following subproblem, of proving that Deirdre Meaner is 
enrolled in a minor in some subject. The following is the input to the system. ( ote 
that a comma ar the end of a line is used to continue text.) 
> english minor ~1 has enrolled in a minor in ~2 
> english enr ~1 is enrolled to be a ~2 student in ~3 
> english yl first year 
> . english y2 second year 
> english y3 third year 
> english st any student 
> english dep any department 
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> ( enr(?st y1 ?dep) and enr(?st y2 ?dep) 
~ minor(?st ?dep) ) 
> english plane ~1 ~2 ~3 
> english done has already done 
> english doing is currently doing 
> english willdo is enrolled to do 
> english wants ~1 wants to do ~2 
> english course ~1 is a ~2 course in ~3 
> english status will have done 
> english crs any course 
> english level any year 
> ( planc(?st ?status ?crs) and course(?crs ?level ?dep) 
~ enr(?st ?level ?dep) ) 
> english pre-req ~1 will have the prerequisites to do ~2 
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> (wants(?st ?crs) and pre-req(?st ?crs) ~ planc(?st willdo ?crs) ) 
> english STA01 An Introduction to Statistics (ST A01) 
> english STB01 Introduction to Probability Theory and Statistical. 
Inference (ST B01) 
> english STB02 Introduction to Econometrics (ST B02) 
> ( planc(?st ?status STA01) ~ pre-req(?st STB01) ) 
> ( plan~(?st ?status STA01) =} pre-req(?st STB02) ) 
> english stats The Department of Statistics 
> ( course(STA01 y1 stats) ) 
> ( course(STB01 y2 stats) ) 
> ( course(STB02 y2 stats) ) 
> english DM Deirdre Meaner 
> ( planc(DM done STA01) ) 
> ( wants(DM STB01) or wants(DM STB02) ) 
> ( minor(DM,?dep) ~success) 
The internal form of the facts can then be examined , and printed with their 
internal reference number. The command EXPLAIN is used to output a 
mathematical style proof of the problem. The following is an actual trace of a 
subproblem: 
Appendix D - An Implementation 
> EXAMINE 
217 ((MINOR DM ?DEP) =} (SUCCESS)) 
196 ((WANTS DM STB01) OR (WANTS DM STB02)) 
175 (PLANC DM DONE STA01) 
168 (COURSE STB02 Y2 STATS) 
161 (COURSE STB01 Y2 STATS) 
154 (COURSE STA01 Y1 STATS) 
147 ((PLANC ?ST 7 STATUS STA01) =} (PRE-REQ ?ST STB02)) 
126 ((PLANC ?ST ?STATuS STA01) =} (PRE-REQ ?ST STB01)) 
105 (((WANTS ?ST ?CRS) AND (PRE-REQ ?ST ?CRS)) =} (PLANC ?ST 
WILLDO ?CRS)) 
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70 (((PLANC ?ST ?STATUS ?CRS) AND (COURSE ?CRS ?LEVEL ?DEP)) =} 
(ENR ?ST ?LEVEL ?DEP)) 
35 (((ENR ?ST Y1 ?DEP) AND (ENR ?ST Y2 ?DEP)) =} (MINOR ?ST ?DEP)) 
> PRINT 
217 (If Deirdre Aeaner has enrolled in a minor in any department 
THEN The goal is proven l) 
196 (either Deirdre Meaner wants t o do Introduction to 
Probability Theory and Statistical Inference 
(ST B01) or Deirdre Meaner wants to do Introduction 
to Econometrics (ST B02)) 
175 (Deirdre Meaner has already done An Introduction to 
Statistics (ST A01)) 
168 (Introduction to Econometrics (ST B02) is a second year 
course in The Department of Statistics) 
161 (Introduction to Probability Theory and Stati stical 
Inference (ST B01) is a second year course in The 
Department of Statist i cs) 
154 (An Introduction to Statistics (ST A01) is a first year 
course in The Department of Statistics) 
147 (If any student will have done An Introduction to Statistics 
(ST A01) TH2N that student will have the 
prerequisites to do Introduction to Econometrics 
(ST B02)) 
126 (If any student will have done An Introduction to Statistics 
(ST A01) THEN that student will have the 
prerequisites to do Introduction to Probability 
Theory and Stat i stical Inference (ST B01)) 
105 : (If any student wants to do any course AND that student will 
have the prerequi sites to do that course THEN that 
student is enrolled to do that course) 
70 (If any student will have done any course AND that course is 
a any year course in any department THEN that student 
is enrolled to be a that year student i n that 
department) 
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35 : (If any student is enrolled to be a first year student in any 
department AND that student is enrJl led to be a 
second year student in that department THEN that 
student has enrolled in a minor in that department) 
> EXPLAIN 
1 : By fact 175 (Deirdre Meaner has already done An Introduction to 
Statistics (ST A01)) 
2 : By fact 154 (An Introduction to Statistics (ST A01) is a first 
year course in The Department of Statistics) 
3 : By fact 70 and steps (1 2) (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to be a 
first year student in The Department of Statistics) 
4 : assume (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to be a second year student 
in The Department of Statistics) is not true 
5 : By fact 161 (Introduction to Probability Theory and Statistical 
Inference (ST B01) is a second year course in The 
Department of Statistics) 
6 : By fact 70 and steps (4 5) (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to do 
Introduction to Probability Theory and Statistical 
Inference (ST B01)) is not true 
7 : By fact 175 (Deirdre Meaner has already done An Introduction to 
Statistics (ST A01)) 
8 : By fact 126 and steps (7) (Deirdre Meaner will have the 
prerequisites to do Introduction to Probability 
Theory and Statistical Inference (ST B01)) 
9 : By fact 105 and steps (6 8) (Deirdre Meaner wants to do 
Introduction to Probability Theory and Statistical 
Inference (ST B01)) is not true 
10 : By fact 196 and steps (9) (Deirdre Meaner wants to do 
Introduction to Econometrics (ST B02)) 
11 : By fact 175 (Deirdre Meaner has already done An Introduction to 
Statistics (ST A01)) 
12 : By fact 147 and steps (11) (Deirdre Meaner will have the 
prerequisites to do Introduction to Econometrics 
(ST B02)) 
13 : By fact 105 and steps (10 12) (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to do 
Introduction to Econometrics (ST B02)) 
14 : By fact 168 (Introduction to Econometrics (ST B02) is a second 
year course in The Department of Statistics) 
15 : By fact 70 and steps (13 14) (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to be 
a second year student in The Department of Statistics) 
16 : By fact 35 and steps (3 15) (Deirdre Meaner has enrolled in a 
minor in The Department of Statistics) 
17 : By fact 217 and steps (16) (The goal is proven 1) 
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D.3 Expert System Style Explanations 
Current expert systems have an on-line explanation system, where the user 
can walk through the and-tree representing a (partial) solution finding the reasons 
for the results produced. This implementation provides such a facility also. 
Following the conventions of Emycin (van Melle[79,8O]), there are two commands, 
namely "WHY" and "HOW". 
"WHY" is used to explain why a particular node in the tree is there. Thus it 
gives a node higher up in the tree that can justify the lower nodes existance. The 
node used in this implementation is the node representing the lowest instance of 
axiom lb used . 
"HOW" is used to explain how a particular node in the tree is proven. It gives 
the fact together with a list of atomic formulae which were used to derive the wff. 
Alternatively a wff that is assumed may also be given. 
The problem solver maintains a focus of the interrogation. This is moved up 
with a WHY command to the higher level wff, and down with a HOW n command , to 
the nth fact of a previous HOW command. This is most useful in a structured 
explanation of the solution. There are also commands to save the current focus and 
to restore it at a later date so that many branches can be explored. The following 
example shows the path down just one path . 
> HOW 
To prove (The goal is proven!) 
use fact 707 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner can enrol in the degree course) 
> PRINT 707 
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707 : (If Deirdre Meaner can enrol in the degree course THEN 
The goal is provenl) 
> EXAMINE 707 
707 : ((CAN- ENROL DM) ~ (SUCCESS)) 
> HOW 1 
To prove (Deirdre Meaner can enrol in the degree course) 
use fact 49 
Page D-8 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner has fulfilled the entry requirements) 
2 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner has a legal plan for a degree) 
3 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner has fulfilled the administrative 
requirements) 
> PRINT 49 
49 : (If any student has fulfilled the entry requirements AND that 
student has a legal plan for a degree AND that 
student has fulfilled the administrati ve requirements 
THEN that student can enrol in the degree course) 
> EXAMINE 49 
49 : (((ENTRY ?ST) AND ((PLAN ?ST) AND (ADMIN ?ST))) ~ (CAN-ENROL 
?ST)) 
> HOW 2 
To prove_ (Deirdre Meaner has a legal plan for a degree) 
use fact 147 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner has enrolled in a maj or in The 
Department of Computer Science) 
2 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner has enrolled in a minor in The 
Department of Statistics) 
3 : and prove (The Department of Computer Science is a different 
department to The Department of Statist i cs) 
4 : and prove (De i rdre Meaner has the requisite number of subjects) 
> PRINT 147 
147 : (If any student has enrolled in a major in any department 
AND that student has enrolled in a minor in any other 
department AND that department is a different 
department to that other department AND that student 
has the requ i site number of subjects THEN that 
student has a legal plan for a degree) 
> EXAMINE 14 7 
147 : (((MAJOR ?ST ?DEP) AND ((MINOR ?ST ?DEP2) AND ((DIFF-DEP ?DEP 
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?DEP2) AND (NUM-SUB ?ST)))) =} (PLAN ?ST)) 
> HOW 1 
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To prove (Deirdre Meaner has enrolled in a major in The Department 
of Computer Science) 
use fact 217 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to be a third year 
in The Department of Computer Science) 
2 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner has enrolled in a minor in The 
Department of Computer Science) 
> PRINT 217 
student 
217 : (If any student is enrolled to be a third year student in 
any department AND that student has enrolled in a 
minor in that department THEN that student has 
enrolled in a major in that department) 
> HOW 2 
To prove (Deirdre Meaner has enrolled in a minor in The Department 
of Computer Science) 
use fact 182 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to be a first year student 
in The Department of Computer Science) 
2 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to be a second year 
student in The Department of Computer Science) 
> PRINT -182 
182 : (If any student is enrolled to be a first year student in 
any department AND that student is enrolled to be a 
second year student in that department THEN that 
student has enrolled in a minor in that department) 
> HOW 2 
To prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to be a second year student in 
The Department of Computer Science) 
use fact 252 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to do The Design and 
Analysis of Algorithms (CS B11)) 
2 : and prove (The Design and Analysis of Algorithms (CS B11) is a 
second year course in The Department of Computer 
Science) 
>·PRINT 252 
252 : (If any student will have done any course AND that course is 
a any year course in any department THEN that student 
is enrolled to be a that year student in that 
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department) 
> HOW 1 
To prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to do The Design and Analysis 
of Algorithms (CS B11)) 
use fact 287 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner wants to do The Design and Analysis of 
Algorithms (CS B11)) 
2 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner will have the prerequi sites to do The 
Design and Analysis of Algorithms (CS B11)) 
> PRINT 287 
287 : (If any student wants to do any course AND that student will 
have the prerequisites to do that course THEN that 
student is enrolled to do that course) 
> HOW 2 
To prove (De i rdre Meaner will have the prerequisites to do The 
Design and Analysis of Algorithms (CS B11)) 
use fact 378 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner is currently doing Introduction to 
Computer Science (CS AOl)) 
2 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to do Techni ques of 
Calculus (PM AO1)) 
3 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner has already done An Introduction to 
Statistics (ST A01)) 
> PRINT 378 
378 : (If any student will have done Introduction to Computer 
Science (CS AO1) AND either that student will have 
done Techniques of Calculus (PM AO1) or either that 
student will have done Techniques of Finite 
Mathematics (PM AO2) or that student will have done 
Calculus and Linear Algebra 1 (PM AO3) AND either 
that student will have done An Introduction to 
Statistics (ST AOl) or that student will have done 
Methods of Applied Mathematics (AM A21) THEN that 
student will have the prerequisites to. do The Design 
and Analysis of Algorithms (CS B11)) 
> EXAMINE 378 
378 (((PLANC ?ST ?STATUS1 CSAOl) AND (((PLANC ?ST ?STATUS2 PMAO1) 
OR ((PLANC ?ST ?STATUS3 PMAO2) OR (PLANC ?ST ?STATIJS4 
PMAO3))) AND ((PLANC ?ST ?STATIJSS STAO1) OR 
(PLANC ?ST ?STATUS6 AMA21)))) ::::} (PRE- REQ ?ST CSB11)) 
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> HOW 2 
To prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to d0. ~~:hniques of Calculus 
(PM AO1)) 
use fact 287 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner wants to do Techniques of Calculus 
(PM AO1)) 
2 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner will have the prerequisites to do 
Techniques of Calculus (PM AO1)) 
> PRINT 287 
287 : (If any student wants to do any course AND that student will 
have the prerequisites to do that course THEN that 
student is enrolled to do that course) 
> HOW 1 
To prove (Deirdre Meaner wants to do Techniques of Calculus 
(PM A01)) 
use fact 623 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner wants to do Techniques of Finite 
Mathematics (PM AO2)) is not true 
> PRINT 623 
623 : (either Deirdre Meaner wants to do Techniques of Calculus 
(PM AO1) or Deirdre Meaner wants to do Techniques of 
Finite Mathematics (PM AO2)) 
> HOW 1 · 
To prove (Deirdre Meaner wants to do Techniques of Finite 
Mathematics (PM AO2)) is not true 
use fact 287 
1 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to do Techniques of Finite 
Mathematics (PM AO2)) is not true 
2 : and prove (Deirdre Meaner will have the prerequisites to do 
Techniques of Finite Mathematics (PM AO2)) 
> PRINT 287 
287 : (If any student wants to do any course AND that student will 
have the prerequisites to do that course THEN that 
student is enrolled to do that course) 
> HOW 1 
To prove (Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to do Techniques of Finite 
Mathematics (PM AO2)) is not true 
assume (either that student will have done Techniques of 
Calculus (PM AO1) or either that student will have 
done Techni ques of Finite Mathematics (PM AO2) or 
that student will have done Calculus and Linear 
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Algebra 1 (PM A03)) is not true 
> WHY 
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(Deirdre Meaner is enrolled to do Techniques of Finite Mathematics 
(PM A02)) is not true 
is used to prove (Deirdre· Meaner wants to do Techniques of Finite 
Mathematics (PM A02)) is not true 
> WHY 
(Deirdre Meaner wants to do Techniques of Finite Mathematics 
(PM A02)) is not true 
is used to prove (Deirdre Meaner wants to do Techniques of Calculus 
(PM A0l)) 
This sort of interactive interrogation can be used during the proving 
phase as well as when explaning a solution found. The WHY and the HOW commands 
are based on the corresponding commands in Emycin. This example is intended to 
show that the explanation used in current Expert Systems can be incorporated into 
a predicate calculus input form problem solver, and is not a property of the way 
expert systems work. 
This example shows also that different types of expert systems to the Mycin, 
Prospecto·r style of backchaining with certainty factors are suitable for certain 
problems. The examples in this appendix can neither be used in a Emycin type 
expert system not in a Prolog system as disjunctive facts are allowed and used. 
Future enhancements of the above system are proposed by including the 
following ideas: 
Different explanations can be generated by associating english text with certain 
operators in the input form of the wff. When these operators are then used in the 
solution tree the associated english explanation is generated. 
Instead of using the "assume" within explanations, the algorithm implicit in Lemma 
B.2 can be used to build a new proof of the goal. This would then for the aboYe 
algorithm produce the reasoning: 
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(If Deirdre Meaner wants to do Techniques of Finite Mathematics (PM 
A02) THEN Deirdre Meaner will have the prerequisites 
to do The Design and Analysis of Algorithms (CS B11)) 
(If Deirdre Meaner wants .to do Techniques of Calculus (PM A01) THEN 
Deirdre Meaner will have the prerequisites to do The 
Design and Analysis of Algorithms (CS B11)) 
so by fact 623 
(Deirdre Meaner will have the prerequisites to do The Design and 
Analysis of Algorithms (CS B11)) 
If this form of explanation is used then the user will not have to consider why 
an assumption is able to be assumed when the answer is produced. 
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Lists of Axioms 
E.1 Axioms for CANCEL in the Propositional Calculus 
1. CANCEL on atoms. 
If x and y are different instances of the same atom then 
a) Equality CANCEL Axiom 
CANCEL{ <p,x>, <p,y>, A) 
b) Equality Substiution Axiom 
If CANCEL( S, <s,x >, A) 
then CANCEL(S, <s,y>, A) 
2. CANCEL for Binary Logical Connective 
If x is of the form (x1 op x2) and if op has triple <opo, op1, op2> then 
2a) Upward Disjunction Axiom 
For i E {1,2} If CANCEL( S, <opi,xi>, A) then CANCEL(S, <opo ,x > , A) 
2b) Upward Conjunction Axiom 
If CANCEL( S, <,.__,op1,x1>, A1) and CANCEL( S, <"--'0P2,x2>, A2) then 
CANCEL(S, <"--'OPo ,x>, A1UA2) 
2c) Downward Conjunction Axiom 
For i E {1,2} If CANCEL(S, <"--'op0,x>, A) then CANCEL( S, < ,.__,opi ,xi> , A) 
2d) Implication Axiom 
If {i,j} = {1,2} and CANCEL(S, <op0,x>, A) and CANCEL( S, < "--'oPi,xi> , Ai) 
th.en CANCEL(S, <opj,xj>, AU Ai) 
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2e) CANCEL on equivalences 
If xis of the form (x1 = x2) and {u, v, w} = {x, x1, x2} and 
If CANCEL( S, <s1,u>, A1) and CANCEL(S, <s2,v>, A2) 
then CANCEL( S, <s,w>, A1 U A2) 
where IF (S1=s2) THEN s="p" ELSE s="n" 
3. CANCEL on negations 
If x is of the form ( not z) then 
3a) Upward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL{ S, <s,z>, A) then CANCEL(S, <'"'-'s,x> , A) 
3b) Downward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL(S, <s,x>, A) then CANCEL(S, <'"'-'s,z>, A) 
4. Manipulation of Assumption Set 
4a) The Unassuming Axiom 
If CANCEL(S, <'"'-'s,y>, AU { <s,y> }) then CANCEL(S, <'"'-'s,y >, A) 
4b) The Assuming Axiom 
CANCEL(S1, S2 , AU {S2}) 
5. CANCEL for Facts 
If f is a fact then 
Sa) Fact Axiom 
CANCEL(S, <p,f>, A) 
Sb) Contradiction Axiom 
If CANCEL( <s,y>, <n,f>, A) then CANCEL(S, <'"'-'s,y > , A) 
6. Contrapositive axiom 
CANCEL(<s1,x>, <s2 ,Y > , A)= CANCEL(<'"'-'s2,Y>, <'"'-'s1 ,x > , A) 
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E.2 Axiomatisation of Predicate Calculus CANCEL 
1. CANCEL on atoms 
If x and y are unifiable input atomic formulae with ¢>=mgu(x!O,y!l) then 
la) Equality CANCEL Axiom 
CANCEL( <p,x,i> , <p,y,j>, A, ¢>!(O-i,l-j)) 
lb) Equality Substitution Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <s,x,m>, A,¢) then CANCEL(W, <s,y,j> , A, 0) 
where j~m, j does not appear in A, W or¢; 0=uc(¢,¢>!(O->m,l->j)) 
2. CANCEL for Binary Logical Connectives 
If x is of the form ( x 1 op x2) then 
2a) Upward Disjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2} , If CANCEL(W, <opj ,xj ,i>, A, 0) 
then CANCEL( W, <opO,x,i> , A, 0) 
2b) Upward Conjunction Axiom 
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If CANCEL(W, < '"'-'OP1 ,x1,i > , A1, 01) and CANCEL(W, < ,.__,op2,x2,i > , A2, 02) 
then CANCEL(W, <,.__,opO,x,i> , A1 U A2, uc(01,02)) 
2c) Downward Conjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If CANCEL(W, < ,.__,opO,x,i>, A, 0) 
then CANCEL(W, <'"'-'OPj ,xj ,i> , A, 0) 
2d) Implication Axiom ·· 
For {j,k} = {1 ,2}, If CANCEL( W, <opO,x,i> , A, 0) 
and CANCEL(W, <'"'-'OPj ,xj'.i> , Aj, 0j) 
then CANCEL(W, < opk,xk,1> , AU Aj , uc(0,0j)) 
2e) Equivalence Axiom 
If x is of the form (x1 = x2) and { u, v, w} = {x, x1, x2} and 
CANCEL(W, <s1,u,i> , A1, 01) and CANCEL(W, <s2,v,i> , A2, 02) 
then CANCEL(W, <s,w,i> , A1 U A2, uc(01 ,02)) 
where IF (s1 =s2) THEN s= "p" ELSE s="n" 
3. CANCEL on negations 
If x is of the form (not z) then 
3a) Upward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, < s,z,i > , A, 0) then CANCEL( W, < '"'-'s,x, i> , A, 0) 
3b) Downward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, < s,x, i> , A, 0) then CANCEL( W, < '"'-'s,z,i > , A, 0) 
4. Manipulation of Assumption list 
4a) The Unassuming Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, < '"'-'s,x, i> , AU { < s,x, i> }, 0) then CANCEL(W, < '"'-'s,x,i > , A, 0) 
4b) The Assuming Axiom 
CANCEL( W, < s,x,j> , AU { <s,x,i> }, 1/J) where 1/J={v!j/v!i: vis variable in x} 
5. CANCEL for Facts 
If f is a fact then 
5a) Fact Axiom 
CANCEL(W, <p,f,i> , A,{}) 
5b) Contradiction Axiom 
If CANCEL( < s,x, i> , <n,f,j> , A, 0) then CANCEL(W, < ,.__,s,x,i > , A, 0) 
6. Contrapositive Axiom 
CANCEL(<sl,x, i> , <s2,y,j> , A, 0) = CANCEL(<'"'-'s2 ,y,j> , < ,.__,s l ,x,i > , A, 0) 
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E.3 Forward Axioms for Predicate Calculus CANCEL 
1. CANCEL on atoms 
If x and y are unifiable input atomic formulae with ¢=mgu(x!O,y!l) then 
la) Equality CANCEL Axiom 
CANCEL( <p,x,O> , <p ,y,1> , {}, ¢) 
lb) Equality Substitution Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <s,x,1 > , A, 1/J) then CANCEL(W, < s,y,1> , A!l--+m, 0) 
where m is a unique index, and 0=uc( 1/J!l--+m,¢!O-+m)) 
2. CANCEL for Binary Logical Connectives 
If x is of the form (x1 op x2) then 
2a) Upward Disjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If CANCEL(W, <opj ,xj,1>, A, 0) 
then CANCEL( W, <opO,x,1> , A, 0) 
2b) Upward Conjunction Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, < ,...._,op1,x1,1 > , A1, 01) and CANCEL( W, < ,...._,op2 ,x2,l > , A2 , 02) 
then CANCEL( W, < ,...._,opO,x,1 > , A1 U A2, uc(01,02)) 
2c) Downward Conjunction Axiom 
For j E {1 ,2}, If CANCEL( W, < ,..__,opo,x,l > , A, 0) 
then CANCEL( W, < '""'-'oPj ,xj ,1>, A, 0) 
2d) Implication Axiom 
For {j,k} = {1,2}, if CANCEL( W, <opO,x,1>, A, 0) 
and CANCEL(W, < '""'-'OPj ,xj ,1>, Aj, 0j) 
then CANCEL( W, <opk ,xk,1> , AU Aj , uc(0,0j)) 
2e) Equivalence Axiom 
If x is of the form (x1 = x2) and { u, v, w} = {x, x1, x2} and 
If CANCEL(W, <s1,u,1> , A1, 01) and CANCEL( W, <s2,v, l> , A2, 02) 
then CANCEL( W, <s,w, 1 > , A1 U A2, uc(01 ,02)) 
where IF (s1 =s2) THEN s= "p" ELSE s= "n" 
3. CANCEL on negations 
If x is of the form ( not z) then 
3a) Upward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, <s,z,1>, A, 0) then CANCEL( W, < ,..__,s,x,1> , A, 0) 
3b) Downward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, <s,x,1>, A, 0) then CANCEL(W, < '""'-'s,z,1> , A, 0) 
4. Manipulation of Assumption list 
4~) The Unassuming Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, <'""'-'s,x,1>, AU { <s,x,j> }, 1/J) 
then CANCEL( W, <,..__,s ,x,1> , A, 0) 
where 0 = uc(1/J, {v!j/v!l: vis a variable in x}) 
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4b) The Assuming Axiom 
CANCEL(W, <s,x, l>, { <s,x, l> }, {}) 
5. CANCEL for Facts 
If f is a fact then 
Sa) Fact Axiom 
CANCEL(W, <p,f,l> , {}, {}) 
Sb) Contradiction Axiom 
If CANCEL( <s,x ,i> , <n,f,l> , A, 0) 
then CANCEL( W, <""'s,x,i > , A!(0--+1,1--+m), 0!(0--+1 ,1--+m)) 
where m is a unique index 
6 . Contrapositive Axiom 
CANCEL( <sl ,x,O> , < s2,y, l> , A, 0) 
= CANCEL( < "-'s2,y,O> , < ""'sl ,x,l> , A!(0--+1,1--+0) , 0!(0--+1 ,1--+0)) 
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E.4 Axiomatisation of Predicate Calculus PROVEN 
1. PROVEN on atoms 
If x and y are unifiable input atomic formulae with ¢=mgu(x!O,y!l) then 
lb) Equality Substitution Axiom 
If PROVEN( < s,x,m> , A, 1/J) then PROVEN( < s,y ,j> , A, 0) 
where j~m, j does not appear in A, W or 1/J; 0=uc(1/J, ¢!(0--+m, l--+j)) 
2. PROVEN for Binary Logical Connectives 
If x is of the form (x1 op x2) then 
2a) Upward Disjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If PROVEN( <opi,xj ,i>, A, 0) then PROVEN( < op0,x, i> , A, 0) 
2b) Upward Conjunction Axiom 
If PROVEN(< ""'op1,x1,i> , A1, 01) and PROVEN(< "-'OP2,x2,i>, A2, 02) 
then PROVEN(<""'op0,x,i>, A1 U A2 , uc(01,02)) 
2c) Downward Conjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If PROVEN( < "-'op0,x,i> , A, 0) 
then PROVEN( < "-'OPj ,xj ,i> , A, 0) 
2d) Implication Axiom 
For {j ,k} = {1,2}, if PROVEN( < op0,x,i>, A, 0) and 
PROVEN( <""'oPj,xj,i>, Aj, 0j) then PROVE ( < opk ,xk ,i> , AU Aj , uc(0,0j)) 
3. PROVEN on negations 
If x is of the form ( not z) then 
3a) Upward Negation Axiom 
If PROVEN( <s,z,i>, A, 0) then PROVEN( < ""'s,x,i> , A, 0) 
3b) Downward Negation Axiom 
If PROVEN( <s,x,i>, A, 0) then PROVE ( <""'s ,z,i> , A, 0) 
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4. Manipulation of Assumption list 
4a) The Unassuming Axiom 
Page E-6 
If PROVEN( <"-'s,x, i> , AU { <s,x,i> }, 0) then PROVEN( <"-'s,x,i>, A, 0) 
4b) The Assuming Axiom 
PROVEN( < s,x,j> , AU { <s,x,i> }, 1/J) where 1/J={v!j/v!i: vis variable in x} 
5. PROVEN for Facts 
If f is a fact then 
5a) Fact Axiom 
PROVEN( <p,f,i>, A, {}) 
E.5 Axiomatisation of Def a ult Logic CANCEL 
1. CANCEL on atoms 
If x and y are unifiable input atomic formulae with ¢=mgu(x!O,y!l) then 
la) Equality CANCEL Axiom 
CANCEL( <p,x,i> , <p ,y,j> , A, D, ¢!(0-. i,l-.j)) 
1 b) Equality Substitution Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, <s,x,m> , A, D, 1/J) then CANCEL( W, < s,y,j>, A, D, 0) 
where j=rfm, j does not appear in A , D, W or 1/J; 0=uc(1P,¢!(O-.m,l-.j)) 
2. CANCEL for Binary Logical Connectives 
If x is of the form (x1 op x2) then 
2a) Upward Disjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If CANCEL( W, <opj ,xj,i> , A, D, 0) 
then C_ANCEL( W, <op0,x,i> , A, D, 0) 
2b) Upward Conjunction Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, < ,..___,op 1,x1,i>, A1, D1 , 01) 
and CANCEL( W, <,..___,op2 ,x2, i>, A2, D2, 02) 
then CANCEL(W, <,..___,op 0,x ,i>, A1 U A2, D1 U D2, uc(01 ,02)) 
2c) Downward Conjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If CANCEL( W, <,..___,op0,x,i> , A, D, 0) 
then CANCEL(W, < "-'OPj ,xj ,i>, A, D, 0) 
2d) Implication Axiom 
For {j,k} = {1,2}, if CANCEL(W, <op0,x,i>, A, D, 0) 
and CANCEL(W, <"-'OPj,xj '.i> , Aj, Dj , 0j) 
then CANCEL(W, <opk ,xk,1>, AU Aj, DU Dj, uc(0,0j)) 
2e) Equivalence Axiom 
If x is of the form (x1 _ x2) and { u, v, w} = {x, x1, x2} 
and CANCEL( W, <s1,u,i>, A1, D1, 01) 
and CANCEL(W, <s2,v ,i>, A2, D2, 02) 
then CANCEL(W, <s,w,i>, A1 U A2 , D1 U D2 , uc(01 ,02)) 
· where IF (s1=s2) THEN s="p" ELSE s="n" 
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3. CANCEL on negations 
If x is of the form (not z) then 
3a} Upward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <s,z,i>, A, D, 0) then CANCEL(W, <,..._,s,x,i>, A, D, 0) 
3b) Downward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <s,x,i>, A, D, 0) then CANCEL(W, <,..._,s,z,i>, A, D, 0) 
4. Manipulation of Assumption list 
4a) The Unassuming Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <,..._,s,x,i>, AU { <s,x,i> }, D, 0) 
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then CANCEL(W, <,..._,s,x,i>, A, D, 0) 
4b} The Assuming Axiom 
CANCEL(W, <s,x,j>, AU { <s,x,i> }, D, 1/J) where 1/J={v!j/v!i: vis variable in x} 
5. CANCEL for Facts 
If f is a fact then 
Sa} Fact Axiom 
CANCEL(W, <p,f,i>, A, D, {}) 
Sb) Contradiction Axiom 
If CANCEL( <s,x,i> , <n,f,j>, A, D, 0) then CANCEL(W, <,..._,s,x,i>, A, D, 0) 
6. Contrapositive Axiom 
CANCEL( <sl,x,i>, <s2,y,j>, A, D, 0) 
= CANCEL( <,..._,s2,y,j> , <,..._,sl,x,i>, A, D, 0) 
7. CANCEL for Defaults 
7a} Default Axiom 
If b=<w,f> E .1, then CANCEL(W, <p ,w,i>, A, DU { <8,j_> }, ¢,) 
where </>={ v!i/v!j: v E f} 
7b) Default Elimination Axiom 
IF b=<w,f> E .1 , then If CANCEL(W1, <n,w,i>, A, D, 0) 
then CANCEL(W1, W2, A, D U { <8,i> }, 0) 
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E .2 Axio1nati ation of Predicate Calculus CANCEL 
1. CANCEL on atoms 
If x and y arc uni fiab le inp ut atomic fo rmulae with ¢=mgu( x!0 ,y !l) then 
la) Equality CANCEL Axiom 
CANCEL(< p,x, i > , < p,y,j >, A, ¢ !(0- i,l -+j)) 
lb) Equality Substitution Axiom 
If CANCEL( W, < s, x,m> , A, t/; ) then CANCEL(W, < s,y,j > , A, 0) 
wh ere j~ m, j does not appear in A, W or t/J; 0=uc(tf;,¢ !(0-m,l ...... j)) 
2. CANCEL for Binary Logical Connectives 
If x is of th0 fo rm (x 1 op x2) then 
2a) . Upward Disjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If CANCEL(W, < opj ,xj ,i> , A, 0) 
then CANCEL( W, < op0,x, i> , A, 0) 
2b) Upward Conjunction Axiom 
A 
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If CANCEL(W, < ,.....,op1,x1,i>, A1, 01) and CANCEL(W, <,...__,op2,x2,i> , A2, 02) 
then CANCEL(W, < ,...__,op0,x,i> , A1 U A2, uc (01,02)) 
2c) Downward Conjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If CA CEL( W, < ,.....,op0,x,i>, A, 0) 
then CANCEL( W, <,...__,opj ,xj,i> , A, 0) 
2d) Implication Axiom 
For {j ,k} = {1,2 }, If CANCEL( W, <op0,x,i> , A, 0) 
and CANCEL( W, <,...__,opj ,xj '. i> , Aj , 0j ) 
th en CANCEL( W, < opk,xk,1>, A U Aj , uc(0,0j )) 
2e) Equivalence Axiom 
If x is of the fo rm (x1 = x2) and { u, v, w} = {x, x1, x2} and 
CA CEL( W, < s1,u,i> , A1, 01) and CANCEL( W, < s2 ,v,i> , A2, 02) 
then CANCEL( W, < s,w,i> , A1 U A2, uc( 01 ,02)) 
where IF (s1=s2) THEN s= "p" ELSE s="n" 
3. CANCEL on negations 
If x is of the fo rm (not z) th en 
3a) Upward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, <s,z ,i> , A, 0) then CANCEL( W, < ,.....,s,x ,i> , A, 0) 
3b) Downward Negation Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, < s,x ,i> , A, 0) then CANCEL(W, < ,.....,s,z ,i> , A, 0) 
4. Manipulation of Assumption list 
4a) The Unassuming Axiom 
If CANCEL(W, < ,.....,s ,x,i > , A U { <s,x,i> }, 0) then CANCEL(W, < ,.....,s,x,i> , A, 0) 
4b) The Assuming Axiom 
CANCEL(W, <s,x ,j > , A U { <s,x, i> }, t/; ) where 'f/;={v !j /v !i : v is vari ab le in x} 
5. CANCEL for Facts 
If f is a fac t then 
Sa) Fact Axiom 
CA1 ·cEL(W, < p,f,i> , A,{}) 
Sb) Cont radiction Axiom 
If CA CEL(< s, x,i> , <n ,f,j > , A, 0) th en ANCE L(W, < -----·s, x,i> , A, 0) 
6. Contrapositive Axiom 
CA ·cEL(<s l ,x, i> , < s2,y,j > , A, 0) = 'A E L(< ·____, ~. y,j >, <,.....,s l ,x,i>, , 0) 
f 
E.4 A.xion1atisation of Predicate Calculus PROVEN 
1. PROVEN on atoms 
If x and y are unifiable input atomic fo rm ulae with </>=mgu(x!O,y!l) then 
lb) Equality Substitution Axiom 
If PROVEN( < s,x,m> , A, 1/;) th en PROVEN( <s,y,j> , A, 0) 
where j~m, j does not appear in A, W or 1/;; 0=uc(1/;,</> !(0--+m,l--+j)) 
2. PROVEN for Binary Logical Connectives 
If x is of the form (x 1 op x2) then 
2a) Upward Disjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If PROVE ( <opi ,xj ,i> , A, 0) then PROVEN( <op0,x,i>, A, 0) 
2b) Upward Conjunction Axiom 
If PROVEi\:(<'"'-'op1,x1,i> , A1, 01) and PROVE (<'"'-'OP2 ,x2. i> , A2, 02) 
th en PROVEN( <,...___,op 0,x,i> , A1 U A2 , uc(01,02)) 
2c) Downward Conjunction Axiom 
For j E {1,2}, If PROVE ( < ,...___,o po ,x, i> , A, 0) 
th en PROVE ( < '"'-'OPj ,xj,i> , A, 0) 
2d) Implication Axiom 
For {j ,k} = {1 ,2}, if PROVE ( <op0,x, i> , A, 0) and 
PROVE! (< '"'-'OPj ,xj ,i> , Aj, Oj) then PROVE (<opk ,xk ,i> , AU Aj, uc(0,0j)) 
3. PROVEN on negations 
If x is of the form (not z) then 
3a) Upward Negation Axiom 
If PROVE:'-J ( <s,z,i> , A, 0) then PROVE ( <'"'-'s ,x, i> , A, 0) 
1b) Downward Negation Axiom 
If PROVE ( <s ,x, i > , A, 0) then PROVEN(< ,...___,s, z,i > , A, 0) 
4. Manipulation of Assumption list 
4a) The Unassuming Axiom 
If PROVE 1( <'"'-'s,x,i> , AU { <s,x,i> }, 0) then PROVEN( < '"'-'s,x,i> , A, 0) 
4b) The Assuming Axiom 
PROVEN( <s,x, j > , AU { <s,x, i> }, 1/;) where 1/;={ v!j/v!i : v is variab le in x} 
5. PROVEN for Facts. 
If f is a fact then 
Sa) Fact Axiom 
PROVE (<p,f,i> , A,{}) 
This insert is a copy of parts of Appendix E of "The Theory of CES: 
A Comple te Expert System", and is provided as an aid to the reader. 
